

1387 62 *Amos*
THE
ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.

Written in *FRENCH* by

M. D U B O S C Q,

A

FRANCISCAN, COUNSELLOR
and PREACHER in ordinary to
THE KING
In the Year MDCXXX.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOLUME *the* FIRST.

TRANSLATED BY A
GENTLEMAN of CAMBRIDGE.

*— nil scribens ipse docebo,
Quid deceat, quid non; quò virtus, quò serat error. Hor.*



L O N D O N :

Printed by and for J. WATTS; and Sold by him at the
Printing-Office in *Wild-Court* near *Lincoln's-Inn Fields*,
And by B. DOD at the *Bible and Key* in *Ave-Mary-*
Lane near *Stationers-Hall*.

MDCCLIII.

THE
ACCOUNT OF
THE
JOURNALS

OF
THE
KING
IN THE YEAR MDCCXX

IN TWO VOLUMES
THE FIRST

44.
6. 6.
81.





THE
P R E F A C E.



ACCIDENTALLY meeting with an old english translation of part of the following treatise I was induc'd to search for the original, and having perused it, thought a translation of the whole as worthy publication as many of those productions, with which the present age abounds and superabounds, under the Titles of Romances, Tales, and Histories; all calculated, it seems, for the entertainment and instruction of the fair sex in virtue and

P R E F A C E.

good morals; which is professedly the design of this. *Moreri* and *Bayle* speak very respectfully of our author, and allow him to have deserv'd the reputation he gained by this treatise: And as another testimony of its merit, I might mention the several attacks of the critics in those days, who were answer'd by the author's friend the learned *P. D' Ablancourt*. But there needs no other apology for our author than what he himself hath given us in the second edition; where, at the end of the first chapter, on Reading, he says as follows, which I thought proper to transfer hither by way of PREFACE.

SO much for the reading the works of others; I shall now make some remarks on my own; having first shewn, *why I make use of so many fables; why I exhibit most of my subjects under two different views; why I give general lessons adapted to the use of men,*

P R E F A C E.

as well as of women ; and have not descended to particular instructions, to please the vulgar. These are the four principal topics, relating to this book, which I ought, it seems, to give some account of, in order to render it more useful to those who will take the pains to read it. But I would not be thought to add this, by way of making a new apology ; it is to instruct the ignorant, and not to defend myself from the malicious critic. They who will not be satisfied with what I have written, are desired to read the large preface, which one of my friends hath been pleas'd to write in my defence.

As to Fable, if I have taken some examples therefrom, it was to express myself more clearly, and not to strengthen my argument, but to embellish it ; not to make truth more powerful, but more agreeable. Every one knows that examples from fable are generally more diverting than those from history, be-

P R E F A C E.

cause they are form'd to please. The historians recount incidents, the poets invent them : So that in using them rather to delight than convince, I have had recourse to those that were most diverting rather than to those that were most true. Besides, it ought not to be thought strange that I should endeavour to make the *Metamorphosis* useful, since we must adapt ourselves to the taste of those whom we would persuade ; and since many delight in fables, and therefore read them. If we cannot quite free the world from serpents, at least it is commendable to make remedies of their poison ; and if the reading of fiction be dangerous, we have endeavour'd to draw some profit therefrom, and to find good in the evil which we cannot prevent. It must be consider'd too that the ancients cover'd, as it were, all their morality and all their theology under fable ; and that being at liberty to use

P R E F A C E.

use either true or false examples they made choice of the latter, as serving to make their instructions the more striking.

As I make use of fable to render my thoughts more clear and agreeable, for the same reason I treat of several matters problematically, that from the variety I may please at the same time that I would instruct. I have labour'd to join amusement with instruction: I thought that the mind as well as the eyes delighted in a diversity of objects, and that it is of no little use to see the good and bad in every thing. Moreover, since the better sort of instructions ought to shew at the same time what we ought to avoid, as well as what we ought to do, I thought that to succeed herein, it would be right to shew what belongs to each subject worthy our love or hate: And is it not manifest that there is scarce any thing, except what

P R E F A C E.

is the object of faith, but what may be seen in different views? If the melancholy humour, for instance, hath some good qualities attending it, hath it not also some bad? If it be wise to deliberate, it often wants strength to undertake; it is a paralytic that hath good eyes but feeble hands, and cannot move itself. We may say the same of its opposite, the gay disposition; on the one hand it seems very agreeable for conversation, but experience shews us on the other hand, that it is too great a babler to be trusted with secrets, and hath too much levity for designs of importance. I might mention also divers other places in this book, to shew that I make use of problems, because moral actions may be so circumstanc'd as to appear good in one light, and evil in another. Tho' I always conclude with the amiableness of virtue, I have sometimes shewn that virtue hath two extremes, against which we ought to be upon our guard,

P R E F A C E.

guard, lest we should be in danger of becoming prodigal, instead of being liberal ; of being stubborn, instead of being constant ; and of being impudent, instead of being gay. What therefore deceives the vulgar is, that in shewing the defect and excess, I seem to blame and praise the same thing. They consider not that my intention is to shew wherein we are abused, and to discover in every subject what is worthy our choice or detestation. If I attack the crafty, and after that condemn the imprudent ; if I blame those who are too free, and then approve not of those who are too coy, the dull of apprehension are apt to imagine, that I confound blame with praise, instead of acknowledging that this is the true way of setting in an agreeable light the difference between good and evil ; that this is not to confound, but to decide ; and that these are not superfluous problems, but reasonable distinctions.

P R E F A C E.

We will now speak to those who say, that *this book answers not its title, forasmuch as it is adapted to the use of men**, as well as of women, and that *I have not descended enough into particulars for the subject treated on.* I grant that most of my instructions, which are calculated for the use of one sex, will as well serve the other. But what can we find that is applicable to women only, when we are teaching them to *eschew evil, and to follow that which is good?* Is there another morality for them, or another christianity? Must we invent a new religion to instruct them, or a peculiar philosophy? Speaks not the preacher at the same time of the vices and virtues of both the sexes? Think what they will, since we have alike the same laws, the in-

* And as such I beg leave to recommend it particularly to the use of those young gentlemen, who in public schools are exercis'd in composing declamations; for I no where know a more complete pattern than what is to be found in some of these essays.

structions

P R E F A C E.

structions given must be in common, provided the examples are particular. This is what I have endeavour'd throughout, as the matter would permit; and it seem'd decent for me not to enter so far into certain particulars, which would render me ridiculous, instead of being useful.

It is time now to satisfy those who say, that *I disguise my precepts too much under the pretence of praise, and that I ought to be more particular in several circumstances.* I am surprised that any one should think the ladies stand in need of such heavy lessons, or so dogmatical a guide. They are the blind only that we must lead by the hand; it is enough to carry a light before those who have the use of their eyes. This is to affront their good disposition, and natural parts. They must have had less understanding to know what is good, or less inclination to practise it, to make such plain directions

P R E F A C E.

tions necessary. I am persuaded that they who think otherwise, are some little country-schoolmasters, who would exercise tyranny where they ought to pay submission. They should consider that I am speaking not as a master, but as a counsellor; that I make no ordinances, but am satisfied with only giving my advice. It is enough for me to commend what is good, and decry what is bad; to say, they ought to fly the one and embrace the other. I should be ashamed to act the law-giver, as some do, in writing on these matters, in a peremptory stile, *I would have it so; It must be so; I approve of this, I condemn that*, and the like. There is not more force in this manner of writing, but much less respect: Their stile is not more nervous, but more uncivil. After all, I think there is no better secret in writing, than to study to be agreeable in order to be useful. There is a way of instructing without dis-

P R E F A C E.

disobliging ; and no one can blame a physician, who hath the art of prescribing what best suits the palate of his patient. We may say the same of teaching as of healing, provided we succeed on this occasion, it seems a better method to use persuasion than command. There is a great deal of difference between the laws of an emperor and those of a philosopher ; we obey not *Cæsar*, as we do *Seneca* ; the command of one depends upon power, and that of the other upon address. And supposing I have this power, what reason is there I should abuse it by becoming impertinent, and treating rudely that sex, whom it is impossible to address with too much respect and civility. If it be said, that I yet might give more particular instructions to form my *Accomplish'd Woman*, without violating the respect we owe them ; I answer, that this would not only have been superfluous, but absolutely impossible. Was I to descend

P R E F A C E.

scend to particular instructions, instead of a book I should be oblig'd to compose several volumes. What? when I say the *Accomplish'd Woman* ought to know every thing that is proper for her age and condition; must I teach her the minuet step, to make courtesies, and dress her head? Supposing these little galantries are not to be neglected, they are but the mere externals of an *Accomplish'd Woman*. In morality alone are to be found the requisite qualities to form her, whom I here commend. My principal endeavour is to regulate the mind, and strengthen the moral sense of good and evil. These, in my opinion, are the principal points that concern an *Accomplish'd Woman*; and herein have I taken the most pains, passing by many other qualifications, either because they were foreign to my design, or were in themselves so easy to be acquired, as there was no need to lose time in giving rules concerning them.

I

P R E F A C E.

I shall not stay to answer those who think there are too many comparisons, and too few connexions. I shall only refer them to *Seneca* and *Plutarch*, to learn in what manner those great writers treated moral philosophy. And especially if there are some thoughts that please them, tho' perhaps they have not that connexion they could wish, I beg they would not reject them on this account, but consider that pearls are not the less precious, because they are strung into a neck-lace.

THE author having succeeded in the publication of the first eighteen chapters of this book, he soon after added ten more, which he calls a second part, and this meeting with the like success, he subjoined the twelve last chapters, to which he prefix'd the following

ADVERTISEMENT.

Tho' there is not a single discourse in this book, wherein I have not given
some

P R E F A C E.

some advice relating to piety ; it seems however necessary that I should make the *Accomplish'd Woman* yet more christian than she hath appeared in the two former parts ; I have therefore added this third part wherein I have endeavour'd to shew them expressly, that the christian virtues contain nothing grievous or burdensom to their conduct in morals ; but on the contrary that they direct, comfort, and adorn them. I would likewise shew them the impertinence as well as malice of those who would fain persuade them that devotion is irksom to society, and disagreeable to conversation ; since the infidels themselves have wish'd to have their women pious and devout. For this reason I have compar'd the virtue of the Gentiles with our own ; in order to learn more clearly that christian piety is not so incumber'd as the heathen was ; and that as, to form an *Accomplish'd Woman* in any age whatever, the religion

P R E F A C E.

gion of the country must be taken in; so it is impossible among us to make an *Accomplish'd Woman* without the christian religion; it is impossible she should deserve this title without piety and devotion.

The author then enters again upon his defence of the foregoing objections, and answers them much in the same manner; which we need not repeat here, and therefore shall pass on to his epistle dedicatory

To the L A D I E S.

LADIES,

IF the *Accomplish'd Woman* again presents herself to you, it is rather to return you thanks, and make an apology, than to prescribe laws, or pretend to give rules for your behaviour. As she declares throughout, that she hath borrow'd from you all that is rare and excellent;
so

P R E F A C E.

so she now confesses that in offering you this work, she offers only your own proper goods, and presents you with nothing more than the copy, of which you are the complete original. It is true she hath appear'd handsom in the eyes of the world; and hath met with marvellous approbation, having been caress'd and admired in the court of the greatest princes in *Europe*. But she takes not this honour to herself; she attributes it all intirely to the many illustrious ladies, of whom she is the shadow and humble representative; so far from pretending to serve as a rule or model: It is the honour only of imitating them, that hath given her so much credit, and made her so completely happy. Shall I venture to say then, that it is this also which obliges me to think, that it will not be unprofitable to many of your sex to follow the advice she gives them: If she presumes that you have made
any

P R E F A C E.

any efforts to resemble her, it is only because she is the pourtrait of your virtues : She asks nothing that can be grievous to you, when she only asks, that you would be like yourselves. For as to the rest, she freely owns without being ashamed, that she every day finds herself in the hands of many ladies who far surpass her ; but who nevertheless make much of her, and are so good as to pardon her, wherein she fails of strength to reach so perfect an idea. And indeed I may say, that now this design is become impossible ; as I find among your sex so many excellent persons, that have render'd this affair, as it were, infinite, by adding continually virtue upon virtue : So that their life is like those pourtraits, to which the painters are continually giving some new touch, by reason that they who sat for them are daily adding to their beauty some new graces and new charms. But
tho'

P R E F A C E.

tho' the *Accomplish'd Woman* finds herself vanquish'd in this rencounter, she still owes to you, in some measure, the obligation of a victory: For it cannot be denied but that since she appeared in the world, many women who have taken the pains to regard this work, have evidenc'd a better opinion and a greater love of good things. It seems that she hath awaken'd them, and inspired them with courage to reassume their right, and embrace the advantages that nature hath given them. They have studied with more care; they are more given to reading, to learn morality and many other sciences; and are capable of judging the works of others, and of distinguishing the most solid and sublime. We must however give them the glory they deserve. If they have profited by the advice of the *Accomplish'd Woman*, surely they have made so great a progress as to excel their own model;

P R E F A C E.

model ; they have gone even beyond their guide ; the perfection, that I endeavour to set forth in this work, is but an imperfect sketch of the many excellencies that we daily see display'd in your sex ; and the *Accomplish'd Woman* at length ingenuously confesses, that she proposes nothing to the ladies, but what she hath learned from the ladies themselves.

So far the author ; and the translator thinks he may justly transfer this compliment to the Ladies of *Great Britain*, to whom,

With all due Respect,

This translation is inscribed

by their most obedient

and most humble Servant,

L. M.



THE
CONTENTS
OF THE
FIRST VOLUME.

OF READING.	page 1
Of CONVERSATION.	24
Of the gay and the melancholy DISPOSITIONS.	40
Of REPUTATION.	58
Of the Inclination to VIRTUE and DEVOTION.	70
Of CHASTITY and COURTESY.	78
Of COURAGE.	89
Of CONSTANCY and FIDELITY.	98
Of PRUDENCE and DISCRETION.	107
Of Learned WOMEN.	115
Of DRESS and ORNAMENT.	123
	Of

CONTENTS.

Of BEAUTY.	page 129
Of CURIOSITY and SLANDER.	136
Of the CRUEL and COMPASSIONATE.	141
Of GRACEFULNESS.	147
The DISSOLUTE.	152
Of JEALOUSY.	158
Of AMITY and LOVE from Inclination or by Election.	169
Of COMPLAISANCE.	187
Of BIRTH and EDUCATION.	220
Of ÆQUANIMITY in good and bad FOR- TUNE.	248



111

Lately Published, (Price One Shilling)

The FOURTH EDITION, Beautifully Printed,

Dedicated to Her Highness the LADY AUGUSTA.

** The LADY'S PRECEPTOR: Or, A Letter to a Young Lady of Distinction upon POLITENESS. Taken from the French of the Abbe D'Ancourt, and adapted to the Religion, Customs, and Manners of the English Nation. By a Gentleman of Cambridge.

The Contents.

Of Politeness in general.	Of Insincerity.
Of Politeness in Religion, and against Superstition.	Of Friendship.
Of Devotion.	Of Doing Good Offices.
Of Behaviour at Church.	Of Anger and Resentment.
Of the Duties and Decorums of Civil Life.	Of Gentleness and Modesty.
Of Behaviour to our Superiors.	Of Keeping and Imparting Secrets.
Of Conversation.	Of Receiving and Paying Visits.
Of Complaisance.	Of Egotism.
Of Flattery and Servility.	Of the Imitation of others.
Of Appearing Absent in Com- pany.	Of Compliments and Cere- mony.
Of Contradiction.	Of Asking Questions.
Of Calumny and Detraction.	Of Talking before Servants.
Of Vain-Glory. Of Prejudice.	Of Behaviour towards rude young Fellows.
Of being too Inquisitive.	Of Ridicule. Of Politics.
Of Whispering and Laughing in Company.	Of Trusting to Appearances and Reports.
Of Applauding and Censuring People rashly.	Of Hope and Belief.
Of Mimicking others.	Of Idleness. [Places.
Of being Blind to what gives us Offence.	Of Appearing often in Public
Of Gallantry from the Men.	Of Housewifery. [ness.
Of Friendship with Men.	Of Frugality and Covetous-
Of Love. Of Matrimony.	Of the Learning proper to a young Lady.
Of Duty to Parents.	Of Letter-Writing.
Of Pride and Condescension.	Of the Choice and Entertain- ment of Books. Of Dress.
Of True and False Nobility.	Of Behaviour at Table.
Of Self-Conceit and Love of Vanity.	Of Behaviour at Assemblies, Operas, and Plays.
Of Humility and Pride.	Of Gaming.
Of Affectation. [tious.	Of Self-Conversation.
Of Going to Court, and Cour-	Of Good-nature and Charity.

THE



THE
ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.

CHAP. I.
Of READING.



THREE very Excellent Things, and of great Utility, are *Reading*, *Conversation*, and *Reflection*. By *Reading*, we treat with the Dead ; by *Conversation*, with the Living ; and by *Reflection*, with Ourselves. *Reading* enriches the Memory, *Conversation* polishes the Mind, and *Reflection* forms the Judgment. But of these noble Employments of the Soul, were we to say which we think the most important, we must

VOL. I.

B

confess

confess that *Reading* seems the Ground-work of the other two; since, without *Reading*, *Contemplation* is fruitless, and *Conversation* dull and insipid.

It is even necessary for all Women, let their natural endowments be what they will: Where these are excellent, it adds a beautiful lustre; where they are not so, it very much lesseneth the Imperfection; it makes the one tolerable, the other admirable. And indeed *Reading* brings many things to our view, which mere Reason alone could never have discovered to us; it teacheth us to have more Solidity in our Thoughts, and more Sweetness in our Discourse; it gives the finishing Stroke to that which Nature but begins.

Nor shall we wonder at the attainment of so great an Advantage hereby, if we consider, that the Invention of whatever is excellent depends upon Judgment and Reading; the one is as the Father, the other as the Mother of the brightest Thoughts: And these two not being able, separately and apart, to produce any thing perfect, it is easy to conceive why such who love not Books, can seldom exhibit any thing but what is impertinent; and why their Conversation serves only to persecute their Hearers.

To say that Persons of good Parts may happily enough display themselves without Study,

Study, as good Faces without any Ornament, is what I can by no means allow. On the contrary, as the Constitution that has the most heat in it, has need of the more nutriment to maintain it in good State and Life; so Women, of good natural Parts, have the more need of Reading to render their Minds commendably fertile and polite; and especially to moderate that Vivacity, which, being left to itself, would sometimes run the hazard of appearing ridiculous and absurd. It is therefore in this incomparable School they learn what is truly excellent for the Entertainment of good Company, or their Release from bad, when, being tired perhaps with many impertinent Visitors, they here find relief from such idle Persecution; it is Reading which makes Conversation more delightful, and Solitude less irksome.

Yet there are some perhaps who think, that from Conversation only with Men of Learning and Genius, enough may be attained of what is good and useful, without the trouble of poring over Books. — I grant that Society with learned and good Men is very necessary; it is a living School which powerfully affects the Mind, when we behold the Example concurring with the Rule; but I cannot help thinking that they, who content themselves in communicating with the Learned, might become yet more accomplished,

were they to read also their Works. If Conversation gives a Fluency, Reading supplies Matter; that only distributes, what this has acquired, and is not liberal but of such Treasures which this hath heaped together. Besides, as Men generally take more pains in Writing than in Speaking, and employ not so much care in what lasteth but a Moment, as in that which aims at Eternity, we cannot but find more excellent things in the Writings of great Men than in their Discourses, because in the former they labour at Perfection; whereas it is impossible but some things must slip from them unguarded and imperfect, in common Conversation.

Moreover, little else is wanting than a pleasing Voice, a magnificent Tone, a sweet Accent, or a certain good Grace, to lull and charm the Hearer; but in Reading, there can be no delusion of this kind; it is much easier to surprise the Ear than the Eye. Discourse passes lightly away, without giving time for Observation of what is faulty therein; but Writing stands exposed to the Censure of Judges, who are not apt to overlook, and know not how to pardon: And this I think a pregnant Reason to oblige us to the Reading of good Books, since therein the best learned have communicated what they thought of greatest moment; and in the Art of writing well, rather than of speaking,

ing, have employ'd all their Time and Study. *

And if still to prove this we must add Experience to Reason, can any thing be required more, to enrich and adorn the Mind, than what is to be found in Books? where Instructions of every kind abound; where Virtue is seen in every engaging Shape; where Truth is discoverable in whatever Fashion you can desire, with all its Force in Philosophy, with all its Purity in Historians, with all its Beauty and artificial Ornament in Orators and Poets. It is in this pleasing Variety, that all sorts of Humours and Conditions find the *utile dulci*, wherewith to be content, and wherewith to be instructed; where Truth also is not guided by Passion, but speaks without Fear, as without Interest, and trembles not at entering into Palaces, or in the presence of Kings.

Reading therefore is undoubtedly very requisite for Women; because, as they stand not in less need of mute Preceptors, than Princes; and Beauty, as well as Royalty, finds not so

* This is prettily express'd in that ingenious Treatise, call'd, *The Lady's Preceptor*, from the French of the Abbè D'Ancourt; *Authors, like the Ladies, generally dress, when they pay a Visit. Respect to themselves makes them polish their Thoughts, and exert the Force of their Understandings more than they would, or can do in common Conversation; so that the Reader has, as it were, the Spirit and Essence in a narrow Compass.* p. 65.

easily Monitors as Flatterers, it is necessary, for the readier acknowledgment of their Faults, they should sometimes learn of the Dead, what the Living dare not tell them. It is in Books only where they may note the Imperfections of the Mind, as in their Glasses those of the Face: In Books they find impartial Judges, whom neither Love nor Hatred can corrupt; where the Fair and the Homely are treated alike, being concern'd with Arbiters who have no Eyes but to put a difference between Vice and Virtue.

But since all Books are not alike excellent in kind, there being some which deserve to be committed to no other Light than that of the Fire; Books, the Impression whereof ought rather to be prevented than the Reading: I must confess there is no less difficulty in the choice of good Books for their Employment when alone, than of Persons duly qualified for their Entertainment in Company. So that, if there be any who dare not trust to themselves in the Direction of a proper Choice, they will do well to follow the Counsel of the more prudent and virtuous, lest otherwise they infect the Mind, or deprave the Sense of Good and Evil.

And here I cannot but blame the Tyranny of those, who enter into I know not what Cabals, in order to make their Opinion the Standard of just Approbation; as the value of
Coins

Coins depends upon the Ordinance of Princes, the worth of Books, and the purity of Language, depend upon the Will of these imaginary Kings. We cannot avoid their Censure, if we submit not to their Judgment. Use and Fashion are, as they pretend, in their hands; to have any thing take, it must first have their Permission; nor can there be any Glory, but what they are pleased to distribute. Tho' Men of Sense indeed, and of the best Note, mock at this ridiculous Presumption, yet some are so weak as to be impos'd upon by them. From whence it is, that many good Books are not relish'd at first; because, forsooth, these minute Impostors cry them down, and labour to obscure their worth. They are conceited enough to fancy, that by cavilling at the Works of others, they shall inance their own, and make them current; and that some Women will be fond enough to rely on their Judgment, as an infallible Rule. But as Innocence at length appears in spite of its Accusers, and Merit often shines through a cloud of Envy and Detraction, Reputation, tho' hindered for a time by such malicious Efforts, expands itself more gloriously afterwards; and Experience shews us, how vain it is to follow their Advice, who speak not of Books according to Truth, or even their own Sentiment, but according to the Interest they

propose to themselves thereby. * Women may from hence learn, that they are not so far to assent and subscribe to the Judgment of others, as quite to renounce their own; nor suffer themselves to be led by those, in whose Guidance there is the least reason to suspect an evil Tendency.

I do not mean, however, that they should take the pains to read all such Books as fall in their way, or affect variety: On the contrary, I hold this to be no less unprofitable than tiresome, to turn over Book after Book, like a Man that travels from place to place, without staying any where; at least such as read many Books must do as he, who, having taken a View of divers Countries, makes choice of one at last for his Place of Residence. But why should they seek in many, what they may find in one? as if that glorious Planet, the Sun, should call upon the Stars for their Assistance, not having Light enough in himself to illumine the World.

The Wise measure not by Quantity; and one single Book, when truly good, may serve as a sufficient Library. To this purpose, St.

* Tho' the Author in this Paragraph seems particularly to allude to some Party that opposed his Writings; and against whom his learned Friend P. D' *Ablancourt* wrote a large Defence; yet I think the Case is general enough to be admitted into the Translation.

Hierom,

Hierom, writing to *Furia* *, admirably well persuades her to forsake all other Books, and apply herself only to the *holy Scriptures*: *As you would sell, says he, many Pearls to purchase one that bath the Beauty and Value of all others, so should you renounce all sorts of Books to fix on one, where you may find whatever is necessary, either for Instruction, or solid Contentment.*

And indeed to peruse few Books, so they be pleasing and profitable, is not to diminish the Fruit of Reading but to refine it; it is not to be less wealthy, but only less incumber'd; otherwise, as they, who are continually eating, clog the Stomach with a Mass of Crudities; so they who read incessantly, are commonly perplexed with a strange Confusion of Thoughts and Words: And as excess of Aliment enfeebles the natural Heat, excess of Reading at length impairs the Light and Vigour of the Mind.

It is not necessary therefore to read many Books, but to read the best; and especially, not to be over-curious after such Books, wherein possibly something may be learned, but not without danger of becoming vicious.— Here I must encounter two great Errors, vain Fear, and presumptuous Boldness; since there are some who scruple to read Heathen

* A Roman Lady, Daughter of *Titian*, and Daughter-in law to *Probus* the Consul.

Authors, but are delighted with a modern Romance, they therefore most religiously abstain from the Writings of the ancient Poets and Philosophers, tho' fraught with the best of Precepts, and would be afraid of Virtue itself, were they to learn it in the Schools of *Socrates* and *Plato*.

But in truth such their Scruple proceeds from Ignorance; and *they are afraid* (as the Scripture saith) *where no Fear is* *. For as the *Hebrews*, by divine Command, plunder'd the *Ægyptians* of the Vessels which they afterwards consecrated to the Service of the Tabernacle †, why may we not take sound Precepts even from Heathen Authors, with a design to employ them to the Glory of God, and the Improvement of our Minds? As the *Israelites*, when they carried away the Treasures of the *Ægyptians*, left them still their Idols; so, tho' we borrow Science from the *Pagans*, we concern not ourselves with their Errors, or their Idolatry. What Danger can there be in stealing these divine Treasures from their prophane Owners, in order to put them to a better Use? As we baptize Infidels, why may we not as well make their Fables, or their Histories, *Christian* too? especially, when we find therein many fair Examples for Manners, and good Rules for the Conduct of Life? If we meet with any thing

* Psal. liii. 5. † Exod. xi. 2.

amiss therein, we must act as the *Jews* did when they married with Strangers, who were Slaves; *whose Nails they pared, and shaved their Heads:* * I mean, that in reading these ancient Authors, we must prune the superfluous, and cut off whatever may offend our Belief. But, in reality, we cannot be said to rob the Heathens at all, tho' we cull from them the very Flower of their Works; for these are the Riches they stole from our Fathers; it is that supreme Philosophy of *Ægypt*, which was convey'd from thence to *Athens*: Whatever their Poets and Philosophers have good and excellent, they extracted from our Prophets; and it is the Wisdom of the *Chaldeans*, on which they have only set a new Face, and which they have veil'd under strange *Ænigmas* the better to conceal the Theft.

This therefore is not to rob the Pagans, but to retake what is truly our own; and is so far from being sinful, that, on the contrary, there is no less Piety in borrowing from their Books any goodly Doctrine, than in delivering innocent Captives from the hands of Infidels, or removing some precious Relics from a profane into a more venerable Place.—Such then is my Opinion concerning the Writings of the Ancients: But as for our modern Romances, loose Memoirs and the like, we must

* Deut. xxi. 11, 12.

treat them in another manner; for in these there is scarce any thing that is not very bad and very dangerous, tho' mingled perhaps with something pleasant and agreeable; as in the other there is excellent Morality, tho' interspers'd with something that is superfluous, and of no concernment to us; there is an appearance of Evil in the Books of the Ancients, and nothing but mere appearance of Good in these Romances; taking off the Mask therefore, and searching somewhat deeper, we shall find little else than Vice in the one, and scarce any thing but Virtue in the other, so that the Ancients are not to be slighted for so small an Evil, nor Romances care's'd for so small a Good; it is necessary, I say, to prune the one, but absolutely to renounce the other.

My Judgment herein may, perhaps, offend many to whom Falshood seems more specious than Truth; who can take no Pleasure, but in that which is unprofitable, and who believe they cannot pass their time without losing it. “ Why are we forbid, say they, to
 “ read these Romances, and yet allowed to
 “ read the Poets? Can Fiction be thought
 “ more dangerous in Prose than in Poetry?
 “ Why upon so light a Consideration should
 “ we be debarr'd a most agreeable Amusement?
 “ What greater Satisfaction can be
 “ desir'd, than to read in these quaint Histories
 “ so many different successes, wherein
 “ we

“ we feel our Passions moved according to
“ the Adventures treated of; for tho’ we
“ are well assured, that the Objects which so
“ affect us have never been, or are no more,
“ yet we may sometimes have true compas-
“ sion for feigned Miseries, and shed Tears
“ at the distresses of imaginary Shepherds.

We ought not, say they, “ to renounce
“ Books because we may possibly sometimes
“ meet with what is bad, any more than it
“ would be reasonable never to venture up-
“ on the Seas, because there are Rocks and
“ Shelves; or as if the Art of Navigation
“ was less certain, or less profitable, because
“ now and then there are some, who,
“ through Disaster or Ignorance, suffer Ship-
“ wreck; there is no reason absolutely to
“ quit the Good, because often mixed with
“ Evil. Prudence teaches us to sever Vice
“ from Virtue, and not to fly them both at
“ once; otherwise we must pluck out our
“ Eyes for fear of abusing them with a
“ Glance, and not move a Foot for fear of
“ falling.

“ Moreover, why should Romances be dis-
“ allowed exhibiting the Lives of those who
“ never were in Being, when Painters have
“ free leave to draw the Pictures of imaginary
“ Persons, and please their own Fancies with
“ Grotesque? is it not as lawful to recreate
“ the Mind, as to please the Eye? Why
“ should

“ should the Pen be more guilty herein
 “ than the Pencil, and the one not suffer'd
 “ to relate what the other is allow'd to
 “ paint?

Now, to answer this long Apology for Romances, I must own, that were any of them altogether decent and polite, it might seem Injustice to forbid the Reading of them; and supposing that some Delight were to be found therein, without danger of corrupting the Mind, they could no more be complain'd of, than the Sports that are innocently used to pass away the Time, and which refresh the Mind after Study, or Affairs of Importance.* But when I think of the loose Principles, wherewith many of these Romances abound; and when I consider how many Dispositions are quite debauch'd with this poisonous sort of reading, I should hold myself guilty, if I pointed not out these Snares to such as dread the Danger; or if I waged not open War with these Corrupters of Innocence.

* And here I cannot but congratulate with the Women of this Age; that was the Author now alive, there is *One Book* at least of that kind of writing here censured; which he would not only not have condemn'd, but certainly have recommended, with all the Judiciousness of an *Addison*, and the Piety of a *Gibson*, so elegant the Stile and so instructive the Moral. It is too notorious to need a Name; and I know, in giving this small hint, I presume too far upon the Modesty of the Writer.

To

To examine therefore this matter farther; what Satisfaction can we look for in Romances, which is not to be found in true History? See we not here Adventures, Successes, and Events fair and tragical enough, as well in Love as in Fortune, to move, to instruct, and to recreate the Mind? Can there be a more agreeable Amusement than to be present, as it were, at the Birth and Fall of Empires and Monarchies, and to see in a moment what has been passing in many Ages? Is not this an honest means to shorten time when it seems long, and as it were to recover it again when it has slipped away; where we find Relief from Care, and store the Memory against Oblivion, where the Mind may be amused without danger of being corrupted, and the Spirits refresh'd without putting the Conscience in jeopardy?

But granting that good Instructions may sometimes be found in these Romances; what need is there to frame our Lives upon an imaginary Plan; and how shall we imitate Examples which we know to be false, as if all that is required were not to be found in true History; or as if we were to take our Light from Stars depainted in a Picture, and reject those which are so beautifully display'd in the Heavens? This is certainly a great Error; and, as Bees cannot suck their Honey from painted Flowers, much less can we gather

ther Fruit from Memoirs which we know to be spurious, and invented at the Writer's Pleasure.

I will grant, likewise, there may be something pleasing in Romances as well as instructive; but are there not poison'd Meats which yet may have a pleasant Taste? It is our duty to abandon what delights, and at the same time may hurt us, and to renounce a little Pleasure in order to eschew great Danger. Otherwise, to pretend to sever the apparent Good in Romances from that which is really Evil; or to be delighted with idle Stories without a Stain from the Obscenity, under the most artful Disguise, and which conceals a thousand hooks under the sweetest baits, is to run through the Fire in order to save a thing of little value; it is pretending to separate the Wine from the Poison, when they are both well mingled together; and, indeed, when History can give us Pleasure as well as Instruction, why should we not take them together without the Trouble of separating the profitable from the pleasing? In entertaining the Mind, as well as in preserving the Body, what need is there to part the Pleasure of the Taste from the Profit of the Food; since Reading, as well as Nutriment, ought to fortify and strengthen at the same time that it gives Pleasure and Delight?

The

The reading therefore such pernicious Books is not only wrong, and unnecessary, but very dangerous: Since whatever pains some Women may take to be upon their guard, they may chance at last to catch the Infection. Vice steals insensibly upon the Soul from soft Expressions, and under the Charms of such Adventures as please us. Be our Disposition or Innocence what it will, as Bodies, even without our Assent, take the Qualities of what we feed on; so our Minds, in despite of ourselves, are apt to imbibe I know not what from the Books we read: Our Humours alter ere we are aware; we laugh with the Gay and Pleasant, we grow dissolute with the Libertine, and we mope with the Melancholy; insomuch, that nothing is more common than to see Persons wholly changed after reading certain Books; they assume new Passions, they lead quite another Life.

The Reason is manifest enough; for as Mothers, upon viewing some extraordinary Object, often leave the Marks thereof upon their Infants, why should we not believe that the lascivious Stories in Romances may have the same effect upon our Imagination, and that they always leave behind them some Spots upon the Soul? I grant that we know well enough they are but Fictions, nevertheless they truly affect us being read attentively: The Propension we have to Ill is so powerful

powerful as to gather strength from false Examples, where true are wanting ; as the Ivy climbs up the hollow Oak as well as the solid, and leans no less on the wither'd Tree than on the Green, our corrupt Nature and irregular Appetites incline us so strongly to what is forbidden, that even a false Story is enough to warp us from our Duty, and embolden us to any vicious Enterprize ; and as the Birds came to peck the Grapes which *Zeuxis* had painted *, our Passions fly at, and catch fire from, the fancied Loves which these romantic Tales decipher.

The reading so many wanton Stories heats by little and little : It takes away imperceptibly the Repugnancy and Horror that a good Disposition has to Evil : The Mind becomes so well acquainted with the Image of Vice, that it startles not at meeting with Vice itself ; and, when shame is once lost, all that was preserved thereby is in danger. As the Waters will necessarily fall away, when the Trenches are cut that held them in, so the Affections will as certainly lanch out into all manner of Extravagancies, when they have not this sober Fear to restrain them. This Licentiousness indeed is not bred in a moment, nor from such Reading do we grow vicious all at once : The Contagion which lurks in these Romances insensibly gains the

* Plin. xxxv. 9, 10.

Heart ;

Heart; it works in the Mind, like Grain in the Earth; it daily gathers strength, and at last shoots up, and spreads around the pernicious Effects of its Corruption.

Nor is this all the Evil to be dreaded from Romances: having made Women bold, they generally make them expert and cunning: For here they find certain Subtleties which carry the face of Safety, and learn not only what they ought not to know, but even the most delicate ways to perpetrate the same: And indeed, 'tis almost impossible to read many Passages in these Books without hazarding even Innocence itself; where they meet with frequent Examples of unthinking Children, that leave their Country and their Parents to run after Strangers, who had inveigled them into Love in a moment: Not to mention the many Intrigues, and variety of Love-Letters that are scatter'd therein, all which are so many artful Lessons to teach the way of Sinning dextrously; and therefore I cannot comprehend with what Reason, or even shew of Reason, any one can pretend to justify so perilous an Entertainment.

On the contrary, as the *Lacedæmonians* prohibited the acting of Comedies, because Thefts, Adulteries, and Murders were sometimes exhibited therein*, and because in a well-govern'd State nothing should be suffer'd

* See the Spectator, N^o 446.

contrary

contrary to the Laws, not even in Fiction or in Plays; some Restraint surely ought to be put upon such Books as exhibit little else than dishonest Actions, loose Examples, and irregular Passions. Shall we dare to read, what the Heathens would not allow to be represented on the Stage? Or shall Christians shew less veneration for Virtue than Infidels? And if these were afraid, lest the People's Minds should be debauch'd by any unseemly Sights, how much more reason have we to fear, lest the Minds of the Simple and Unwary should be led away with and corrupted by such luscious Stories.

And yet there are some, no doubt, who will accuse me of too much Austerity, will take it ill to be robb'd of their darling Idol, and will weep no less for their dear Romances, than did those Women of whom the Scripture saith, *They sat weeping for their Adonis*.* Falshood is generally more prevalent than Truth, and we more willingly read the Books which are apt to corrupt good Manners, than such as tend to promote them: Nay, some perhaps had rather learn by heart the Tales of the *Amadis*†, than the most authentic Histories; who take less pleasure at a Sermon, than at a Comedy, and had rather hear a Buffoon than a Preacher.

* Ezek. viii. 14.

† *Amadis of Gaul*, a famous Romance.

*Strato** very justly complains that he had fewer Disciples than *Menedemus*†, because there are more who frequent the School of Voluptuousness, than that of Virtue, and we have greater Love for those who flatter and divert us, than for those who make us sad, and threaten us into humility.

To be plain, it is a great Misfortune in this Age, to see that there is nothing more apt to raise the Curiosity of reading a Book, than to know that it is or ought to be forbidden. It seems as if the same Spirit that deceiv'd the *first Woman*, still inspired some of her Daughters with the like Sentiments, by promising them that their Eyes shall be open'd to behold very admirable things, and that they are not debarr'd the reading these Books but from pure Envy. This Error corrupts many, whom Flatterers persuade that, as weak minds are in danger every where, even in the midst of good Things, the stronger are in no peril at all, even in the midst of bad, and therefore the one should be allow'd to read all sorts of Books; the

* *Strato*, the natural Philosopher. See *Plutarch* on the Tranquillity of the Mind.

† *Menedemus*, a Philosopher of *Eretria*, who allowed no Distinction in Virtues, but that they are all one under different Titles. See *Plutarch* on moral Virtue.

other few or none. But I beg leave to differ in opinion, and do maintain that whatever Disposition Women are of, they ought always to fly Danger; for very few, I believe, are of so warm and strong a Constitution as *Mithridates* * to feed on Poison, and live upon that which would prove another's Bane. In a word, I no more approve of some sort of Poetry, than I do of Romances, when they have the like evil Tendency. It is my design to oppose Vice in whatever shape I meet it; and let others think as they please, I shall always look upon it as my duty to condemn those lewd Books, which serve only as a School to teach to sin with a better Grace, and which may justly be term'd *the Politics of the Vicious and the Libertine*. †

I declare myself a Friend to none but who are Friends to Virtue; and shall lay down, in few words, what I think necessary concerning the reading either of good or bad Books. It is necessary then, that all such as are not capa-

* King of Pontus, who had so fortified himself by Antidotes against Poison, that when he was desirous to poison himself, none, that he could take, had any effect upon him.

Profecit poto Mithridates sæpe Veneno,
Toxica ne possint sæva nocere sibi.

Mart. v. 77. See Plin. xxv. 2. Gell. xvii. 16.

† What follows was added by the Author after the first Edition.

ble

ble of making a right Distinction for themselves, should follow the Advice of those who are more expert or learned; and who, they may be well assured, design only their good; and that all such, as are of stronger Capacities, suffer not themselves to be led away by Curiosity, (which to some is almost natural,) in search after any thing that is forbidden. There is no doubt but that Reading is both pleasant and profitable, provided a proper Choice be made of Books; it instructs the Ignorant, corrects the Vicious, and cheers the Melancholy; it supplies the most afflicted with a Remedy against Despair, and cautions the most happy against Insolence and Pride, by pointing out sufficient Examples to humble the one, and raise the other; it makes us talk better in Company, and think better when alone; nor without it is it possible to think to any Purpose, or to hold Conversation with a tolerable Grace. But this is too copious a Subject for the Conclusion of this Chapter; let it suffice to say, that there cannot be a more agreeable Employment, at proper Seasons, than Reading: But this we must always remember, that it is not enough for the Understanding alone to be improv'd thereby, but due regard ought to be had to the Mind, or moral sense of Good and Evil. As Virtue is of more value than Knowledge, Women should think it of more advantage

advantage to be good, than learned ; and I am not afraid to say, that a Woman of true Modesty would be as much ashamed to be caught with a bad Book in her hand, as to be surpris'd with a Man of a profligate Character in her Closet.



CHAP. II.

Of CONVERSATION.



HO' nothing is more important than for Women to know how to choose good Company for Conversation, and good Books for Reading; yet nothing is more difficult, because there are so many bad things that resemble the good, that without a sound Judgment, and an extraordinary Happiness, it is almost impossible to make a right choice, or to pass away the Time with Innocence and Pleasure, either in company or alone.

If indeed we yet lived in the time of primitive Simplicity, when nothing more was required than not to stand mute, and the only sin in Society was the telling a false Story, I must own a genuine plainness would be sufficient, and Prudence superfluous ; but as we

now

now live in an Age of Art and Cunning, where Words, it seems, that were invented to express Thoughts, serve for nothing more than handsomly to conceal them, we must acknowledge, that even Innocence itself hath as much need of a mask or veil as the Face; and that it is no less a folly to shew one's Heart openly, among those who are always upon their guard, than it would be to walk naked among armed Enemies whom we dare not offend, and against whom we have no defence.

Indeed, if it were enough to take or give pleasure in Conversation, and it served to no better End than to pass away the Time, there would be less difficulty in gaining Esteem thereby, since not to be dull and melancholy, would serve for this purpose: But whereas the principal scope of Conversation is to give Men an opinion of our Understanding and Judgment, something more is required than merely a pleasant Vein; and we ought at least to have as much Discretion as Virtue. But this in an eminent degree is not easily attainable; for the wiser confess they have not yet found a School where they may be taught to speak with propriety, or be silent, according as the occasion required.

Many Perfections are necessary to make Conversation agreeable, and many Qualities required to please in general; since even the

best Men have divers Inclinations, and Opinions are as different in themselves, as Good and Evil are contrary. If plain Simplicity begets Contempt in some, Subtlety breeds Suspicion in others. If they deride those Women that are free in Conversation, they distrust those who are more reserv'd. One wants a graceful Air, another Reading; one of the Senses is offended while the other is satisfied; and a very difficult Task it is, to please both Eyes and Ears at once.

When *Zeuxis* designed to paint a perfect Face, he set before him five of the choicest Beauties in *Italy*, to take from each the Charms and Graces he judged most powerful; so, to frame the Model of a Woman who should be able to please in all Companies, we must call to our assistance many good Qualities and rare Endowments: Nor all that Nature affords, or Morality teacheth, can be too much for this purpose. The fairest Ornaments of civil Life are all necessary, even all the excellent Qualities, that I shall recommend in the following Pages, since they all terminate in Conversation as in their Center; nor can we easily touch upon this Point, without concerning ourselves with the Lines that meet therein.

But to mention what I think principally necessary, I could wish to find in Women the three Perfections which *Socrates* desired in
his

his Disciples, Discretion, Silence, and Modesty. These are so fair and necessary Qualifications in Society, that to know the importance of them we need only point out the opposite Vices, Prattling, Imprudence, and Boldness: The first of these commonly contains the other two; for 'tis observable, that Women who take upon them to prattle incessantly, have seldom either Prudence or Modesty. I would not have them think however, that I purpose to take away the use of Speech, instead of giving directions for the regulation of it; it would seem very absurd to frame a Conversation of dumb persons. But in order to oppose a Vice the most troublesome and dangerous to Society, I only intreat those Women who affect much talking, to consider, that if there be a Time to speak something, and also to say nothing, there is never any to take all the talk to themselves: That in talking much there is not only danger of speaking what is false, but of speaking what is true; for so they may offend either against Prudence or Truth, and oftentimes both together; That they who speak so much with others, scarce ever speak with themselves; that they see not their own Thought, before it has escaped from them: That they learn too late by Repentance, what they might have learned sooner through foresight, and that shame and sorrow generally attend those Dis-

courses which are not usher'd in by Prudence : That finally, the greatest part of their Sex are in less pain about speaking well, than saying little ; and therefore that Discretion is more difficult, as well as more necessary for them, than Eloquence.

Numa * shewed no less Judgment than Religion when he caused Altars to be erected to a tenth Muse, whom he called *Tacita* or Silence ; to shew, that tho' all Sciences were in one Person, they would all be unprofitable without a discretionary Silence ; and that 'twere in vain to learn the Art of Speaking, without knowing the Art to hold one's peace. And indeed, as it is more difficult to arrive at true Wisdom than to be an Orator, Good-manners point not out so readily proper Rules for Silence, as Rhetoric does those for Discourse ; without which Rules, Knowledge, how great soever, would want both profit and ornament. We may justly therefore put Silence in the rank of the most necessary Arts, and say with the wise King of the *Romans*, The nine Muses, without this additional one, cannot make their lustre complete.

Silence gives a certain Grace to Speech itself, as Shade to Colours in a Picture. A Pause well used in Discourse, like a Rest in Music, often heightens the Sweetness of it.

* *Numa* the second King of *Rome*, A. M. 3236. He reigned 43 Years. See his Life in *Plutarch*.

Even

Even amidst the most excellent Speech, Silence is not altogether superfluous: It refreshes the Speaker or the Hearer; it helps Invention in the one, and takes off Weariness in the other.

There are some Women, notwithstanding, such eternal Talkers, that they think it doing them an injury to offer to put in a Word; but surely such general Talkers in Conversation deserve not to be hearken'd to, because they ask a Favour which they will not grant themselves. As they are not capable perhaps, or industrious to speak a good thing, neither are they to hear it; but we cannot help thinking, they would not speak so many bad things, if they would sometimes give themselves leisure to hear what is good.

There are but too many, I say, who seem to glory in this irksom Prattle, who think they shew their Wit in much talking, and hold it a dishonour to listen to the Discourse of others: But I must tell them a Truth, which at least may be profitable, tho' it be not pleasing to them: Women of this Disposition are seldom fit to be trusted, who can keep nothing secret with regard to their Designs or Affairs. What the wise will scarce give room to in thought, is ever in the mouth of these Imprudents. As it is said of the *Red-sea*, that whatever is thrown into it instead of sinking under water floats above it, so it is with these

these Tatlers; instead of discretely keeping to themselves whatever they are intrusted with of importance, they are sure to discover it, either in Discourse or by their Countenance.

Such is the Unhappiness of those Women who talk much in Company; whatever care they take to weigh their Words, it is almost impossible they should not let fall something that is amiss: As by often moving the Hand we may chance to hurt a sore Finger, so by much talking it is very likely we shall touch upon some design we intended to keep secret. And if insensibly, or without intention, we are apt to lay our Hand where the Pain is, so likewise do we bring our Tongue unawares to discover the hidden Passion of the Mind.

I know there are some who promise to themselves never to discover their Secrets, tho' they cannot help talking much in Conversation, imagining it enough for that purpose to discourse of general matters, and to treat of indifferent things. But there is no great trust to be laid upon this Conduct; for however common and indifferent the Things are they speak of, yet in the run of Discourse some subtle Wits will note certain shadows of the Thought, and see the Intention through the Veil. As the Needle, tho' far from its Pole, still directs itself towards it, and points at it aloof, tho' it does not touch it; so Words, I know not how, will point at a particular
Thought

Thought in matters seemingly very remote and general.

Let them force themselves as much as they please, to feign and dissemble, after they have hover'd awhile about their Secret like Butterflies about a Candle ; as these at last rush into the flame, so will they at last perish in their dalliance. This Comparison will hold still further ; as such eternal Talkers otherwise resemble these Insects, which are made up of Wings, have little or no solid Body, are very gaudy in fine Colours to please Children, and in their lightness discover their weakness.

Now if this Reasoning seems not sufficient, I will recommend to them an Example which shall be more effectual than any moral Precept whatever ; I mean that of the blessed Virgin, who ought to be the Rule of their Sex, as she is the Ornament. Whereas they are so far from imitating her, who, as represented in Scripture, never spoke but out of Charity, and with Modesty ; that they are continually talking, tho' it be nothing else but Evil of others, and Good of themselves, nothing but Blame or unjust Praise, nothing but Vanity or Slander.

No doubt then there are many to whom it is a pain to restrain the Liberty of the Tongue ; who therefore seldom come well off in Conversation, when by their Indiscretion they often expose themselves to Rallery or

public Scorn. For it is a great Misfortune, that such as have not Prudence enough to examine well their Words, have still less to consider before whom they speak: The Liberty they take is blind, exerting itself on all Occasions and in all Companies: I do not mean hereby, that there are not certain Seasons when they may use greater freedom of Speech than at some other; but we ought always to regard to whom we discover our Sentiments, when there is the least danger of their being published abroad; lest, with extreme regret, we find That in the mouths of every body which ought never to have escap'd our own. To remedy this Evil, therefore, I think it requisite that Women, for fear of being continually uneasy and under a disagreeable Restraint, should be careful in their choice of Persons with whom they intend to converse more familiarly, and not to covet too general an Acquaintance. And concerning the choice of fit persons for Conversation, I must observe there are two sorts whom they must absolutely shun, the Vicious and the Ignorant; because the Conscience is not safe with the former, nor can the Mind receive any Satisfaction from the latter. Familiarity with those who want Religion or good Sense is greatly to be suspected; nor can their Intention be honest who dare excuse two such gross Defects as Ignorance and Impiety.

An

An ill choice herein offends against moral or christian Virtue; for it is not true, that by conversing as freely with the bad as the good they disoblige neither; forasmuch as the one will be offended therewith, and the other but mock and jeer them. It is imprudent to afford matter of Hatred or Rallery; it is to have the Approbation of none, when they think to deserve it of all; and indeed I never see any of those, who make it a rule to gratify all Men indifferently with the same Countenance, but it puts me in mind of that foolish Image among the *Romans*, which they called *Citeria* *, and which they usually carried with them to a Banquet to divert themselves withal: For while they endeavour to oblige all Companies, they use Looks, Smiles, Congees, and Gesticulations every way as ridiculous as in this pleasant Puppet.

But this is not the greatest of their unhappiness; an ill choice brings them insensibly into extreme danger; they make good what the Philosophers assert, that *Prudence is the most necessary Guide in human Actions*; for wanting good Conduct they seldom can maintain their Virtue; they become guilty without design, and are led astray unawares, when their Complaisance is so unhappy as to engage them in the Conversation of the looser Sort. Vice, as we before observ'd on Read-

* A Sort of Panteon or Punchinello.

Cato. Festus.
ing,

ing, steals by degrees insensibly into the Soul, and they perceive not the Contagion till it becomes mortal and without remedy.

Here then lies the most important Point of this Discourse; for since a diversity of humours cannot long subsist in Conversation, they must at last either imitate the Vicious, or hate them; they must either be like them, or profess themselves their Enemy; they must either, by complying with them, put on their Iniquity, or strongly contest against them. But tho' they were sure of Victory, what need is there to engage, when there is always less danger and inconvenience in flying from, than in boldly entering the Lists with such an Enemy?

Say what they will it is a difficult matter, amidst the Infection of Vice, to remain untainted; Example is generally too prevalent even over good Dispositions. *Alcibiades* * professed Virtue when in company with *Socrates*, but gave himself up to all manner of Licentiousness among his looser Companions. The Soul is insensibly stained in Conversation with the Vicious, as the Face is imperceptibly tanned by walking in the Sun. It is a melancholy consideration that we are more susceptible of Evil than of Good; that Malady communicates itself more easily than

* A young Nobleman of Athens. See his Life in *Plutarch* and *Cornelius Nepos*.

Health,

Health, and the Conversation of the wicked has more power to corrupt the good, than that of the virtuous to correct the wanton.

I might seem perhaps to carry this matter too far, was I to propose to them, for the Rule of Behaviour, the Example of St. *Mary the Egyptian**, who would not confer with a virtuous Hermit, but with a River between them. There can be no danger surely in drawing somewhat nearer to a good Man; but as for the Vicious and Libertine, they cannot be kept at too great a distance; their Hatred can do less hurt than their Conversation; they are a sort of Enemy that work more mischief during Peace than War.

And indeed the sad Disaster of the first Woman should strike terror into all her Daughters, while in her Fall they cannot but see the common Cause of their own. What privilege have they to talk privately with Serpents, and to suffer the Conversation of certain loose Spirits, that are full of poison and dark designs against unguarded Innocence? Let them endeavour therefore to avoid them on all Occasions.

And the second sort of people, whose Company they are to shun, are the Ignorant and Stupid, because their Conversation is gene-

* A famous Courtisan at *Alexandria*, but she became a Penitent, being converted by *Zosimus*. — *Baillet, Lives of the Saints. Bayle. Moreri.*

rally shameful, displeasing, and unprofitable; whereas that of the more learned and wise is honourable, fruitful, and pleasant. Experience daily shews us, that such as have not Good-sense, either natural, or acquired by Reading, have I know not what rudeness in their behaviour: Whatever they exhibit is like the Fruit of wild Trees, that were never manured or grafted, very insipid, or very sour. And here I must observe, that it is a great abuse, and generally to be lamented, to see how Sciences, and especially the discursive, are confined almost to Colleges; and Men dare not withdraw Philosophy from her Home, to make use of her in civil Conversation; as if it were impossible or unjust to despoil her of her Intricacies, and make her speak with a better grace; as if they made a scruple of Conscience to give her a modern Garb, or that Men could not dispute rationally but in Latin, nor express the choicest Secrets of Nature in their mother Tongue.*

Besides wou'd it not give more satisfaction to the Mind to be entertain'd with serious and solid Subjects, than with the Gewgaws in fashion, Capuchins, Shades, Drums, Routs, &c.?

* The Author seems here to lament the want of such Books, for which we have since been greatly oblig'd to his Countryman *Le Pluche*, in his excellent Treatises call'd *Nature Display'd*.

I can by no means excuse such Gossips, as wou'd injoin silence to a dozen sober Matrons to hearken to a Kit ; who will sooner lend their ear to a ribald Tale, or a fresh piece of Slander, than to any thing of Importance ; who scruple to make the least noise, when attentive to a Song, and yet will interrupt every moment the most instructive Discourse, and are rapt with the Conversation of certain Fops, that can entertain them with News from Court.

But surely they would rather laugh at them than applaud them, if they did but consider that this Error creates but a small Opinion of their Wit and Judgment, who can approve of such as want both. For as we judge them to have but weak Stomachs, who can eat only light Meats ; so we may justly doubt the Strength of their Judgment, who cannot relish what is solid ; their Disposition is easily known by their Applause, and their Inclination by what they seem to love. This is certainly a great Fault ; but as there are others no less remarkable in Conversation, having spoken of those who contemn Knowledge and good Things, I shall now speak of those who profane and abuse them.

For as Women, void of Study or Reading, have little wherewith to make Conversation agreeable, so there are some who have both read and studied, but to so little purpose,

purpose, as only to perplex themselves and others; there is nothing but Confusion in their Ideas, and every thing they say seems forced. This happens, when their Spirits have not heat enough to digest what they read; and we may learn, by the disorder and inequality of their Discourses, that it is not enough for a Man to have Porphyry and Marble to build a Palace withal, if he be not an Architect; they are subject to many Repetitions, because having attached their Ideas to certain words and terms of Art, they have no power to invent others, whenever it is necessary; they are such slaves to Memory, that they seem to have lost the use of Judgment.

Hence it is they speak nothing but common-place stuff, and can mightily enlarge upon Subjects wherein they have any talent; they are very punctual in their recital even of marginal Notes, Pages, Quotations, and other superfluous Circumstances; I had as lief hear a company of Lawyers talking of Amerciaments, Recoveries, Indentures tripartite, and such like gibberish: But to discountenance them, we need only refer them to *The Theatre of Human Life*, or to some other huge Volume, where all is written they would say.

Their Answers and Compliments are all mere Orations; after they have once begun a Discourse

Discourse they must go on, and will never give over while they have a Word to say; they resemble those who recite Verses on the Stage, who cannot add to or diminish any thing of what they are to repeat, without being puzzled and forgetting the rest; they may chance sometimes to raise Admiration, but it must be among those who know nothing of the matter.

If they are unluckily drawn from what they have some skill into a Subject utterly unknown to them, and where Reasoning is rather required than Memory, then will they expose both their Weakness and Vanity, when they can neither hold their peace nor speak to the purpose; the visible Restraint upon their Countenance shews that they have not Modesty enough for Silence, nor sufficiency for Discourse; they either are silent with regret, or speak with great disorder and confusion.

Such then are the principal Vices of Conversation, from whence may be easily learned the opposite good Qualities: And in short I maintain there is nothing of more Importance, and more likely to please in Conversation, than the knowing well our own humours, in order to conduct them justly; and those of others, in order to comply with or guard ourselves against them. Knowledge and an agreeable sweetness of Temper are
two

two the most necessary Ingredients in Conversation ; without the one Conversation becomes too light, and without the other too rude and tiresom.

Lastly, such as speak little, as well as they who talk much, should consider that Modesty is as necessary for Discourse as for Silence, because it delivers the one from Contempt, and the other from Affectation. And of what Temper soever Women are, in order to avoid the danger of being persecuted or corrupted, they should always covet the Conversation of two sorts of Persons ; of the Judicious, because these easily pardon Faults, and are more ready to acknowledge Merit ; and of the Virtuous, because if Libertines hurt not the moral Sense, they wound the Reputation ; if they make them not vicious, they may chance to make them infamous.



C H A P. III.

Of the Gay and the Melancholy DISPOSITIONS.

THERE is nothing more necessary for Women, with regard to Conversation, than to know well their own Disposition in order to reform it, if bad ; or to polish it, if good. This is an affair

affair of the greatest consequence ; and since there may be two sorts of Dispositions, each good in its kind, I shall here compare them together, in order to note the better what is good or bad in either of them. And first, to point out that which is generally most esteem'd in Society ; since the noblest scope we can propose therein, is to have such Gifts of the Mind, as render us ever acceptable, I must confess the gay and pleasant Disposition has a much greater advantage than the thoughtful or melancholy ; which indeed is not amiss for Science, but too heavy for Discourse, and seldom productive of witty Conceits and apt Replies. The gay have abundantly more grace in them, there appears a more generous freedom in all they do ; and therefore they are much better received in Company, as being more ingenuous in their Affection, less forced in their Carriage, and more innocent in their Designs.

Let what will be said in behalf of the Melancholy ; tho' a thoughtful Disposition may be commendable in some Respects, it hath as many bad Effects as good ; and they who call it *the Mother of Wisdom*, must acknowledge it sometimes to be *the Mother of Extravagance*. They would fain persuade us, that in their Reveries they make great Discoveries, and travel far in their Imaginations ; but their Voyage is so far sometimes as they return no more ;

more; or if they do it is as Pilgrims, who leave their own Country to run unprofitably I know not where, without other Fruit than to bring home Weariness and Poverty; this musing is a Labyrinth where a Man may lose himself, or from whence he cannot extricate himself without great difficulty.

The Melancholy themselves, notwithstanding, call it *the Element of the wise*, thinking to excuse their weakness by giving it a fair name. But as Cripples cannot boast of their spending much time and labour in making a little way, so these Dreamers deserve no praise, who are long in searching what others of stronger parts sooner find out, and with less pains. The more Volatile have the same advantage over them, as Birds have over Serpents, or the Angels over Bodies of gross matter.

Nor can I conceive why they should pique themselves upon speaking little, when their Silence proceeds rather from Barrenness than Discretion: And if they hold their peace on certain occasions, it is not in order to choose proper words, but to get something to say. They would be at no great trouble in qualifying themselves for the Discipleship of *Pythagoras*, were it not, that being silent through necessity, they could not also learn to speak discretely; they had need of a School quite contrary to that of this Philosopher,

pher, to study promptness of Speech; they require Physicians rather than Teachers; and to cure them, it is not only necessary to give them Lectures, but to work Miracles.

As the Element of Fire can more easily descend, than that of Earth mount up; so such as are of a prompt and ready genius can moderate the same by Reading and Experience; but such as are of a gross and dull disposition, whatever pains and study they employ, find it very difficult to become more lively and spirituous. Tho' Birds have wings to fly withal, yet they close them for ease and refreshment; Men of a transcendent genius can do the like, when inclined to action or repose; but when the melancholy inforce themselves to quicken their Languor, they run the same hazard with *Icarus**, whose weight bore him down, nor had he dexterity enough to manage his artificial Wings; their Discourse and Behaviour are by no means graceful, when they affect an ardency that is not natural to them; they are like old people, who run when they think to walk, who gain no ground but with danger of falling, and with the least endeavour are on a sudden out of breath; instead of framing their Gait more wisely, and adapting it to their own imbecillity.

* Ovid. Met. lib. viii. ver. 195.

Whatever

Whatever they may say in favour of their plodding dulness, and perhaps they may imagine it of excellent service in the management of Affairs, a Man must be as dull himself to be of the same Opinion; if it sometimes succeeds, it is more by Accident than Cunning. If the brisk and airy are blameable for catching at Occasion too soon, the melancholy are in danger of being too late in their Attempts; if those have not patience till a proper opportunity offers itself, these think not of it till it is pass'd; they are ever subject to Fear and Despair; as they are without Heat, they are without Action; their frozen Disposition represents every thing to them as impossible, whether it is their business to undertake it or not: It is a lethargic Sense, which cannot be moved but by the Goad, and then they seem rather raised to Life than awakened; and even such is their Malady, we must almost kill them to learn they are not dead. Should they have any Judgment to deliberate, they have no Heart to resolve, and yet less Courage to execute; it is a paralytic Virtue of such an unaccountable languor, that it will not help itself with a Remedy however near it be to them, unless it be forced upon them.

It would offend them, perhaps too much, not to think there are some wise and virtuous Men of this Temper; but we must
also

also confess that it wou'd be too great an injury to Wisdom and Virtue, to suppose their chief Residence in a dull and phlegmatic Soul, as if they who have nothing to fear or desire from without themselves, might not shew a chearful Countenance to testify the Satisfaction of their Mind. On the contrary, as Serpents are supposed to breed in standing Waters, evil Thoughts spring up in plodding Tempers ; and as the Mind of such is apt to invent Malice, their Countenance is no less to cover it.

When the Wheels of a Watch are grown rusty, there is no regularity in the Movement, nor can the Hand of the Dial-plate be at all depended upon ; and when too deep a Melancholy hath seized upon our Spirits, the Mind is full of Inquietude, and the Visage of strange Looks. What Light, or what exertions of Reason can be expected, where there is nought but black and dusky Fumes, that Melancholy makes ascend into the Brain. As Devils are said to ride in dark Storms, when they would murder Men or burn Temples, so they often make use of this gloomy Temper to fit a Soul for Superstition, Hypocrisy and Despair. *Cæsar* well express'd his Judgment of Melancholy, when he publicly confess'd that there was greater reason to fear such as were pensive like *Brutus*, than such as were chearful like *Dolabella*.

bella. * And from the effects of this melancholy Humour, we may partly learn the Nature of the Cause : Now there are some of this hypochondriacal Disposition, whom Mirth no less displeases than day-light does the Owl. And as there is somewhat very dismal and displeasing in their Countenance, we cannot but turn away from them, and despise such intolerable Company.

If this moroseness however were only the effect of Constitution, it deserv'd some excuse or pity ; but if it come of Industry or Art, it cannot be free of Suspicion or Blame ; so that to examine well the difference of these two Qualities, we shall find the genuine modesty of the simple is only in the Heart, that which is forced and affected is in the Brow ; the one may be really good, the other bad but in appearance. I grant the Casuists have reason to say of Plays, and such-like Pastimes, what the Physicians judge of Mushrooms,

* See *Plutarch* in the Life of *Brutus*. How inimitably in his usual manner, hath our *Shakespeare* express'd the like Comparison between *Cassius* and *Marc Antony*.

Cæs. He reads much, he is a great Observer, and he looks

Quite through the deeds of Men. He loves no Plays,
He hears no Music, as thou dost, *Antony*,
Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort
As if he mock'd himself, and scorn'd his Spirit,
That could be mov'd to smile at any thing.
Such Men as he be never at Heart's ease,
And therefore are they dangerous, &c.

The

The best of them are worth nothing; yet we must not absolutely deery such Pleasures, as are indifferent in themselves, and which the Intention alone can make good or ill. *St. Elizabeth of Hungary* * did not scruple to dance, and her gaiety of Temper prevented not her Canonization; they who are most reserved with regard to innocent Diversions, are generally most free in such as are forbidden, when there are no Witnesses of their Behaviour.

And indeed such is the Reservedness and studied Airs of some among us, that we dare not laugh, lest we should give occasion of suspicion to the Simple, or of slander to the Wicked; as if a chearful Disposition were a certain sign of Levity or want of Judgment.

But we ought rather to despise such false Surmises, than give ourselves any uneasiness about them; and such Women as would maintain their free Behaviour without Affectation, or laying themselves under any Restraint on account of this vulgar Error, would do well likewise to guard themselves from Desire and Sorrow, as two the greatest Tyrants to their Ease and Tranquillity; seeing the one transports us unprofitably to the future, and the other makes us as idly look back into the past, depriving us of the liberty of fixing

* The Daughter of *Andrew* the second King of *Hungary*. Anno 1207. See *Moreri*.

our Felicity on present Good, while we pant for that which is not yet, or grieve in vain at that which is no more. Masculine Spirits very easily resist this Tyranny ; as when the Ship rides in the midst of a Tempest, the Needle continues fix'd on her Star, tho' the Mast be split and the Sails rent in pieces ; so ought we to shew a constant Mind in the most tragic Miseries, and testify our *Æquanimity*, however unequal our Affairs ; and as the Winds may divert the Ship from her Haven, yet not the Needle from its Pole ; so tho' various obstacles may retard our Endeavours, they ought never to beat us off from Constancy or Reason.

Having seen what is good in the gay Disposition, let us now examine the contrary ; and from the Defects which many attribute to melancholy Sedateness, let us pass to its good Effects, and shew forth its due praises. It is that which makes Men subtle in the Sciences, indefatigable in Business, serious in Conversation, constant in their Designs, modest in Prosperity, patient in Adversity, judicious and rational in all things. This steady and even Temper is what Virtue makes use of in the display of her brightest lustre ; it is that of which Nature forms her Philosophers and Heroes, and even Grace herself hath always employ'd it in exhibiting extraordinary Men to the World. Men of this Disposition

seem

seem to be born wise, and to be oblig'd to Nature for more than what Labour and Study hath given to others ; and without the inconveniences of old Age, even to enjoy an early possession of its fruits. Indeed they are sometimes blamed, in that their Meditation has more strength and fire in it than their Discourses ; but know, that as their Judgment is solid, they scorn that superfluous flash, which Men of a more light and gay disposition affect, in order to gain credit with the vulgar. And in this Modesty they are like the Eagle in the *Apocalypse* *, *that was full of Eyes within* ; whereas Men so mightily free of speech have them only on their Feathers, as Peacocks on their Train ; scarce sensible but in colour and shew only.

I deny not, but that Men of a jovial disposition are somewhat pleasing and agreeable, yet are they oftentimes obnoxious ; forasmuch as Jestings, which is their talent, tho' it be grateful to some, generally offends more than it satisfies ; especially when Religion or Reputation furnish the matter, nothing is more common with them than to fall into Impiety or Slander. And since we may not gibe at the Great without imprudence, or at the Miserable without cruelty, and must offend herein either against the Laws of Policy or Nature ; how wisely do the Serious ab-

* Rev. iv. 8.

stain from such a practice, which makes the Professors of it pass for idle Buffoons or injurious Enemies, and who at length create Sorrow to themselves, by endeavouring to make Mirth for others.

As for me, I think they do the Melancholy no wrong, who ingenuously confess they have no inclination to so foolish a quality, which generally evidences a Levity of Mind, and sometimes the despicable Endowments of a Free-thinker. Of this giddy temper were the foolish Virgins*, and all such as have more wit than judgment; who tho' they may seem at first to have some light, yet it is either false or of short duration; they often fail unawares for want of foresight in affairs of the greatest importance; whereas the wiser slumber not, and are ever upon their guard against all events for fear of Shame and Repentance.

And indeed, as the Mind and the Senses have a quarrel with each other, which lasts as long as Life; and as the Soul is not strong but in the feebleness of the Body, as in the fall of an Enemy, it seems that when the Temper is free and gay, the sensitive Soul has then the ascendant; on the contrary when it is sad and pensive, that it is become the slave of Reason; as an Handmaid shews a discontented look when insulted by her Mistress.

* Matth. xxv. 2, 3.

The Joy that flows from the integrity of Conscience, has very particular marks; it is more pure, and resembles the Stars that always appear with equal lustre; but that which proceeds from the Body or Constitution, is like the Comets which are nourish'd by the exhalations of the earth, presage dire events, and which seem to mount in the air, and to run after the vapours that maintain them, till they are extinguish'd, when this earthly matter fails them*. The Passion of the Melancholy hath nothing like to these tragic Meteors, either for its formation or preservation; their Amity is founded only in the Virtues of the Mind; and as their Fire is most pure, it loses nothing of its heat, but is always equal like that which the Philosophers believe to be under the Heaven of the Moon†.

I confess, that with regard to Amity the Gay are generally more frank and free, but yet the Melancholy are more discreet and faithful; these constantly abide by their Designs, while the other change their Passions every moment, and fall in with every object that presents itself; a small thing will serve to allure or vanquish them: Inconstancy is almost inseparable from gaiety of Temper; and if

* According to Sir *Isaac Newton*, a Comet is a compact solid, fixed, and durable body; a kind of Planet, &c. See *Chambers's Dictionary*.

† See *Plutarch*, on the Face of the Moon.

they offend not by maliciousness, they often become guilty through weakness; so that if their Simplicity chance to merit any favour, there is little reason so much to esteem natural Goodness, which is rather the effect of Constitution than of Choice. There is no glory in being good, when we cannot be otherwise; and if the Simple do no great hurt, they are by no means less guilty when they do as much as lies in their power.

Nor is it any credit to them to say, that if they be not better, at least they are more happy in having their Mind as void of Inquietude as of bad Designs; since this would be to ground their whole felicity on their defects, and to confess they are not happy but in their stupidity and ignorance. If Marble feels not pain, we do not say that it is well or healthy, but that it is insensible; so to the Simple that are not wretched, for want of knowing their misery, it is of no greater advantage to be exempt from uneasiness or care, than for strong Walls to be free from maladies, or Beasts from remorse of conscience.

If the stupid think they enjoy the same tranquillity of mind with Philosophers, they are mistaken; forasmuch as these surmount what the other have no notion of; the Animals that creep under the Earth are, indeed, no less in safety from storms than such as soar above the Clouds; and low groveling Minds, like

like them, may be safe perhaps in their Weakness; but it is more glorious to be above the storm than under it, to have it grumbling under our Feet than roaring over our Heads.

Since true felicity cannot be attained without virtue and good morals, the happiness of the Simple is very different from that of the Wise; nor can they any more be thought happy in this World, than as unbaptised Infants are by some fondly imagined to be in the Limbo of the other*, where they are supposed to exist in a state between Good and Evil, without being concern'd with either. The truly Sedate live not in such a state of indifferency; they owe not their felicity to Ignorance, but to the Goodness of their Mind; they would be ashamed, and justly complain of such happiness as rendered them insensible to Good, in order to be so to Evil.

But to shew the excellency of this grave Disposition above all other, we must observe, that the light and airy are no less incapable of warding off Misery than of tasting true Pleasure; their warmth hurries them into extremities; they do nothing but by fits; and, as if they were composed of the same materials with Gunpowder, there needs only a spark to set their Thoughts and Actions on fire;

* The Limbo of Vanity, or Paradise of Fools, and all the unaccomplish'd Works of Nature. See *Milton*, lib. iii. ver. 493.

without any other remedy than merely waiting the end of their impetuosity, which is soon tired, and goes out generally of itself. Such Tempers as want conduct in their Enterprises, want also fortitude in their Afflictions; they are bad Soldiers, who make no better use of the Buckler than of the Sword; and the same Levity which makes them rash to assail, makes them impatient and even base when they are to suffer or stand upon their defence.

On the contrary, the Melancholy and Sedate have always an equal Temper; they are free from insolence in good fortune, and from despair in bad; they suffer what they cannot overcome; they surmount the maladies of the Soul by the strength of Reason, and those of the Body by Patience.

And as, heretofore, an Assassin wrought himself up to a bold attempt on the person of a Duke of *Milan* * in the midst of his Guard, and the face of his Court, and even in the Temple, only by practising on the Picture of that Prince; what Valour must the Wise imbibe from continual Reflexions? what Events can appear so new as to astonish them, when instead of being surpris'd, they discover them afar off through foresight? and, by inuring themselves thereto betimes, they make them

* *Galeas M. SForza*, assassinated, Anno 1476.

as easy through meditation as the vulgar by experience.

Nor need we wonder that the Melancholy are so constant and seemingly undisturb'd, even when they are forced to yield to necessity; since they always reserve to themselves as it were a private room, which the tempests of Fortune cannot reach; thither the Soul retires to maintain herself in an eternal serenity, where she gains an absolute command upon her judgment, and where she solitarily entertains herself, even in the midst of Company, without any interruption from the Tumults of the World to break her rest or silence. In this solitude of the nobler part the Spirit is fortified, true Morality is learned, and the Mind without years, and without experience, is possessed before its time with the Prudence of old age and the Wisdom of Philosophers. Here in short it is where, by still preserving the Image of delightful things, no vile or unworthy Thoughts shall be able to intrude; or where, if the present Objects be displeasing to us, by thus re-entring into ourselves, we may still give contentment to the Mind, tho' the Senses are on the rack, and entertain ourselves with the Idea of Beauty, tho' foul Deformity stood before our Eyes.

But who can sufficiently praise this noble sort of Contemplation, since thereby the Soul seems to abandon, when she pleases, the cla-

morous fellowship of the Senses? and we consider with an attention less distracted, what we are when our Imagination represents us to ourselves, more clearly and with less danger than *Narcissus* saw himself in a Fountain*. No wonder the Poets feign that he lost himself, since he thought himself but in his Image; we cannot find ourselves indeed, but in our real selves; seek we any where else, we meet with only our Phantom or Shadow: So that without the use of this noble Meditation, to which the Melancholy are disposed, it seems as if the Reason of Man was imperfect, and even unprofitable. For as Bees retire into their Hives to frame the honey, when from the flowers abroad they have gather'd the materials, so it is necessary that, having view'd many Objects, we should re-enter into ourselves, to gather the Fruit and frame the Consequences thereof; or otherwise, whatever our Study, or what Experience soever we have, it will be no more than a medley or mere confusion, we have been but bad Managers of them; our Actions will appear without conduct, our Thoughts without order, and our Discourses without judgment.


Some indeed are so dull of apprehension, as to imagine there is no other kind of musing than what belongs to Fools, or to such as are of

* Ovid. Met. iii. 407.

an unhealthy Constitution : And indeed Meditation would do them no less hurt, than what it puts them in fear of ; it would be as thwarting to them as ungrateful ; it dazzles weak Minds, and galls the malicious ; 'tis Blindness to the one and a Scourge to the other. It is not probable that they, whose Minds are dark and Consciences guilty, should take any pleasure in looking into themselves for Satisfaction and Repose ; but to condemn this contemplative Disposition, because to some it is disagreeable and even destructive, is as great an error as to blame the Sun, because the Bats cannot endure its light, not considering how stedfastly Eagles gaze thereon ; and that we should not tax this luminary, because feeble Eyes are dazzled with its Rays, or find Darkness in the very source of Light.

But enough of these two Dispositions, the Gay and the Melancholy ; from comparing them together we may easily judge of their use in Conversation ; if the Gay seem more pleasing, the Melancholy seem more solid ; the one is the fairer, the other the richer ; they have both some good and some ill in them ; and in fact, as the maintenance of life depends upon the mixture of hot and cold, so the whole of what is graceful and agreeable depends on the temperature of these two Dispositions, when they serve as a counterpoise

terpoise to each other; and as the *Romans* esteemed those the best Tribunes, who testified an affection towards the Senate; and among the Senators, those wisest who favoured most the People, so the best of these gay Dispositions seem to be those that come nearest to Melancholy, and of the Melancholy those that approach nearest to the Gay; being so contemper'd, the former will be more discreet, and the latter less austere and offensive.



C H A P. IV.

Of R E P U T A T I O N.

WH O' Reputation is a Treasure, and of no less service to Virtue than day-light to Pictures in the discovery of their beauty; yet to consider by what means, in this Age, it is either lost or got, we may place it among the goods of fortune, which Fools have sometimes a greater share of than Persons of Merit. Was it in the gift only of proper Judges, to be virtuous would be a sure way to obtain it; but it often depends upon such wretched Arbiters, that if we were not obliged always to avoid scandal, the good might rest content with the

the approbation of their own Consciences, without giving themselves any trouble concerning the opinion of the Unwise, be it good or bad, as chance will have it. It depends too little upon ourselves to be happy in this respect, and it would be but an uncertain state of Felicity, which either the ignorance or malice of an Enemy can destroy.

Renown is sometimes an effect which seems not to have any cause; it is like an alarm, which puts a whole Army in disorder without their knowing a reason for it. I cannot therefore but approve of the opinion of those who compare it to the Wind, because it riseth and passeth away as lightly; and especially, because we know not certainly the Origin thereof*; and since it is so uncertain, why should the Mind give itself so much trouble to know how we appear in the opinion of others? and afflict itself for any error of the vulgar; as if it were but to-day when the ignorant began to be deceiv'd, or to tell false Stories?

I should have reason to wonder with *Aristotle*, why the Ancients gave the Prizes rather to the strength of the body than to that

* But since the Author's time it hath been demonstrated by Sir *Isaac Newton* and others, that Wind is caused by an alteration in the *Æquipoise* or Balance of the Air; which being more or less taken off, by the falling of Rain, the pressure of Clouds, Heat and Cold, &c. a Stream of Air or Wind is thereby produced, either stronger or weaker, swifter or slower.

of the mind, distributing their Laurels to Wrestlers and Boxers, and not to the Wise and Prudent, were it not that ignorance and poverty prevented them from setting a just value upon Virtue: Ignorance, because Virtue being conceal'd in the heart, men were often deceiv'd in their Judgments of it: Poverty, because had they known its excellency they had nothing precious enough to give as a due Reward, or wherewithal to make it a glorious Crown. Human Judgment therefore being liable to such uncertainty, what advantage or what wrong can Virtue receive from the mistakes of other People? they cannot give it its due recompense, because they know it not, or knowing it are not rich enough. But what Blindness! what Levity! How many imagine they see Virtue, where there is nought but Vice; and who unadvisedly give the most villanous names to the best things, like the Astrólogers, who call some Stars by the names of Bulls and Scorpions, which yet have neither Rage nor Venom in them, but only Light and Purity.

I could wish that such as pretend to judge of things without knowing the nature of them, were chastised with the Punishment of *Midas**. This ignorant Umpire prefer'd the rustic sound of *Pan's* Pipe to the sweet tones of *Apollo's* Lute, giving his Vote for that In-

* Ovid. Met. lib. xi. ver. 147.

strument which made the most noise; his Judgment herein is follow'd by those who set a value upon things according to appearance and outward shew, and who have the same title to long ears as a mark of their stupidity; for to judge by Appearances and not by Truth, what is it but to prefer *Pan* to *Apollo*, a Pipe to a Lute, and Noise to Harmony? There is I know not what brutality in such savage opinions; yet many there are in the world who judge by no better rule, and who bestow the worst of characters on Women that deserve the best. But I would keep my resentment for such as know how to blame, or praise worthily, and not be angry at what ought rather to make me laugh; there are few who judge aright; the mind of Man seldom penetrates so far, but rests, as the eyes do, upon the surface and outward shew; their opinion therefore is of no great importance; and I think, that setting aside scandal, it were enough to escape their censure, without being solicitous for their approbation.

We live in an Age of pomp and ostentation, where morality is subverted, and the virtues of the time consist in extravagance and excess; to acquire the reputation of being devout we must run into superstition or hypocrisy; and there are some so over-wise as to make Christianity, as the Stoics dealt
by

by Philosophy, to abuse the vulgar, to consist in imaginary Virtues beyond the reach of human Nature in its imperfect state. It is a great misfortune that scarce any probity is to be found in the way of Commerce, or purity in Religion; but that for Reputation and Credit we must demand more, as at Court, than we either expect or deserve.

But to speak my mind as a Philosopher, as well as a Casuist, we must not think that reputation is to be neglected, because not always distributed justly; this Disorder does by no means dispense with our Duty, and it would as ill become us to grow infamous upon this account, as to commit Felony or Murder because some guilty of these Crimes have been acquitted, and the Innocent condemn'd. Since all Women are not alike prudent, and many of them act more from example than reason, the wiser sort ought at least to consider, that Reputation is a public good; and that where it is once lost as much pains ought to be taken in the recovery of it, as in quenching a Fire, or putting a stop to an epidemic Disease.

Nothing can be more absurd and ridiculous than the practice of some, who give themselves all manner of liberty, because with regard to a bad Name slander often ranks the most virtuous with the most dissolute; and with regard to a good one, false
praise

praise often joins the most vicious with the most decent. This is to prefer Imposture to Truth, and Opinion to Conscience ; as if Kings should make use of Flambeaux in the day-time, because the Peasants as well as they enjoy the light of the Sun ; or should desire to be sick and unhealthy, because their Subjects are sound and well. We must not with a sort of indifference grow vicious, because of the ill-natur'd opinion some may have of us ; but rather so amend our Lives as to shame them into a better ; tho' we have not the happiness of an universal good Name, yet it is our duty to labour virtuously to deserve it ; the testimony of a good Conscience is more valuable than all the noisy reports abroad ; were there no Friends or Enemies to praise or blame, the beautiful find always enough in their Glasses to delight them, and the ugly to afflict them. Conscience does the same as these Glasses, with regard to Vice and Virtue ; none however but the proud and wanton are quite regardless of Reputation, many of whom seem to imitate *Martial's Lesbia**, who in her disposition studied pomp and shew, and seemed to take more delight in Spectators than in her Ga-

* Incustoditis, et apertis, *Lesbia*, semper
Liminibus peccas, nec tua furta tegis.
Et plus Spectator quàm te delectat Adulter :
Nec sunt grata tibi gaudia, si qua latent. Mart. i. 35.
lants :

64 *The ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.*

lants; she dealt by Pleasure as some ancient Sophists did by Virtue, who seldom did any good, as she seldom any evil, but in public.

And yet as it is not enough to be virtuous, but we must convince the World that we are so, it behoveth us to *shun every appearance of Evil**, and not to give the least pretext to Slanderers, who are apt to invent matter of accusation where they cannot find it: I allow that the love which *Socrates* bore to young *Alcibiades* was by no means dishonourable, nor did his affection contradict his Philosophy †; yet he certainly was so remiss in preserving appearances, that tho' the Oracle hath proclaim'd his wisdom, he cannot but stand condemn'd of imprudence with regard to his conduct in this affair. Love and Prudence seldom meet even in the best Dispositions, for which reason perhaps the Poets feigned that *Cupid* was always a Child, because Love, however old he grows, never arrives at the years of Discretion; his Infancy lasts as long as himself, that he may not be ashamed of playing the fool; no wonder then that Love, in some cases, should make a Person lose his Reputation when it has deprived some of their Senses, and when even

* 1 Theff v. 22. Tit. ii. 7, 8.

† See *Plutarch* and *Cornelius Nepos*, in the Life of *Alcibiades*.

Socrates was not secure from injury and reproach in his simple amity.

Among the *Romans*, *Clauda*, a vestal Virgin, tho' innocent, yet failed in point of Reputation by reason of her too delicate behaviour; and it was thought matter enough to condemn her, that she took a little more pains, both in her speech and dress, than well became a religious Woman, there seems but a small foundation to ground a process upon, yet she had not been saved but by a Prodigy; when, as the History says, she with her Girdle drew a Ship, which several men had in vain attempted to move with Engines*.

We are certainly obliged to do all we can to avoid censure, and stop the mouth of calumny; but the wisest and most virtuous have sometimes taken pains herein to no purpose. For whatever we do, or do not, there are no infallible means or rules to preserve Reputation; and since it depends so much upon the opinion of others, it is generally more owing to fortune than prudence; we must not think that innocence, with the most upright conduct, is sufficient for this purpose; since the Deity himself, the source of all Wisdom and Goodness, was for a time charged with the most hainous Crimes †. This Exam-

* Valer. Max. Plutarch. Aurel. Vict. Lactant. ii. 7. Silius, lib. 16.

† Matth. xi. 19.

ple alone is enough to shew, that somewhat more than virtue and address is required to preserve a good Name.

Moreover, there is a certain unhappiness attending some Women which exposes them to the Detraction of others, without the least grounds for such treatment; and this often happens to be the case of the more virtuous, because their just refusals are apt to create them enemies, and subject 'em, like *Susanna*, to the accusation of a crime which they would by no means commit; there are likewise certain countenances that invite Detraction, which happens because some are silly enough to imagine, that it is impossible to laugh and be merry without being vicious; and that there can be no innocence but where there is sedateness and gravity. Only the ignorant think that Virtue must needs be of a sorrowful countenance, and know not that they ought to beware of a sullen gloomy Temper as of cloudy weather; and that of all Tempers none is more agreeable than the gay and pleasant; and they must be very dull indeed, who think not that Good-humour is consistent with a good Conscience.

And again, was there no Malice or Enemy in the world, there is scarce any thing so certain and true but what may be taken in different lights; to examine well our
actions,

actions, they almost all seem subject to interpretation and dispute. Who can certainly determine, setting aside Christianity, when a Man gives public alms, whether he does it for the setting a good example, or merely to gratify his own vanity? or when he takes an affront patiently, who can say that it is owing to his virtue rather than to his want of resentment? who knows whether a gay humour springs from an ingenuous freedom, rather than from licentiousness? and may not Women that are grave and serious be thought stupid or affected, as well as modest? Interpretation does all; and when things are really not indifferent we speak of them according to our opinions, and not according to their nature. In short, the Wise must seek consolation in their own breast; and having done all they can to deserve a good name, they may slight a bad one.

The slighting an injury chokes detraction, and resentment revives it; it is to acknowledge the superior force of its arms, to own that it has the power to wound us; and such Women as are extremely sensible of injuries, only satisfy the ends of those who design'd to offend them, because it gives contentment to an Enemy to find that he can destroy ours.

Tho' for a while a good name may be cut off or diminish'd, it will at length return, if
innocence

innocence still maintains itself in patience, as the hair that is cropt will grow again, if the roots be left behind. In all cases, wherein we are blamed unjustly, we ought to take more comfort in the Truth than displeasure at the Forgery; the innocent should no more afflict themselves at being called guilty, then at being called sick when they know themselves in good health. From hence we may learn why the virtuous are always less revengeful when they are found fault with than the vicious, because as the most homely sometimes desire to appear handsome by dress and paint, so the most dishonest endeavour by their subtleties to gain the opinion of the wise.

From hence it is they are so peevish, and we dare not touch them on the tender part, lest we should drive them into despair: All the world knows that *Lucretia* kill'd herself on account of her vile treatment by *Tarquin*; and as she was dying, she said, *that she had two irrefragable Witnesses of her Innocence, her Blood before Men, and her Spirit before the Gods.* But I am almost of the opinion of a great Writer*,
who

* *Henry Stephens*, in his *Apology for Herodotus*; and from him, *L. Guyon* and others: But the great *M. Bayle*, relying upon the Testimonies of *Livy*, *Dionysius*, *Halicarnassus*, and other ancient Historians, hath handsomely defended *Lucretia*, and proved these Insinuations to be false and unjust. However, we find an Epigram by one
of

who accuses her of not having been always so chaste as the World makes us believe; and that, had she not been guilty, she would have found a better remedy in the secret satisfaction of her Conscience than in Death: It is said, how justly I know not, that she resisted rather from design, and the dread of Consequences, than from Virtue; and that having pass'd her time with other Galants, of less quality than this Tyrant, she was afraid her other failings should be discovered in this, and therefore was resolv'd to put an end to her Life, rather than survive the loss of her Reputation.


I own that it is better to be good in reality than in appearance, and that a discreet Woman ought to esteem Virtue more than Reputation; yet if they did but consider the importance of a good Name, I am persuaded they would take all imaginable care to eschew the danger of losing it; since such, as have a true sense of Honour, ought to think themselves unhappy, when they are put to the trouble of justifying themselves, and proving

of her Accusers so much to our Author's purpose, that it is worth transcribing.

*Si tibi forte fuit, Lucretia, gratus adulter,
Immeritò ex meritâ præmia cæde petis:
Sin potius capto vis est allata pudori,
Quis furor est hostis crimine velle mori?
Frustra igitur Laudem captas, Lucretia; namque
Vel furiosa ruis, vel scelerata cadis.*

their

their Innocence ; they ought always to have in memory what *Julius Cæsar* said, when he divorc'd his Wife *Pompeia**, notwithstanding she had fully proved her Innocence, *It is not enough*, said that Emperor, *that the Wife of Cæsar should be innocent, she ought not even to be suspected.*



C H A P. V.

*Of the Inclination to VIRTUE and
DEVOTION.*

I Must beg leave to differ in opinion from those, who think the piety of women the effect of a tender constitution and weakness of mind : To despoil them of this divine quality is no less an affront than to offer to pull out their eyes ; we cannot but think that such as desire women should have no devotion, desire likewise they should have no modesty ; and that, having robbed them of the sense of piety, they have a design to rob them of all that ought to be

* She was his third wife. *P. Clodius* a young nobleman of *Rome* was in love with her, and to get access disguis'd himself in woman's apparel, and join'd the ladies at a feast that was solemniz'd by women only : but he was found out, tried and acquitted. See *Plutarch*, in the life of *Julius Cæsar*.

dear

Th

dear to
creation
in upon
with t
his first
of god,
easily p
other f

But
seek th
contem
reign a
engrav
the me
AUG
the rei
leave t
to stud
sterity
no ne
cloiste
be de
in no
an hap
fort c
man,
culou

* A
ed 21
† 7
East,

dear to them. This error is as old as the creation, and the practice of libertines herein upon the women of this age is the same with that of the devil's upon *Eve*; when at his first onset he took away from her the fear of god, that afterwards he might the more easily persuade her to indulge herself in every other freedom.

But it shews great want of judgment to seek the reputation of a gentleman in the contempt of religion, especially in such a reign and such a court, where it ought to be engraved in deeper characters than those on the medals of the emperor *Adrian* *, PIETAS AUGUSTA. Hermits in these days, as in the reign of *Theodosius* the younger †, might leave their solitary places, and repair to court to study perfection, and learn examples of austerity even in the palace of pleasure. We have no need to seek the precepts of virtue in cloisters; to be a good courtier it is enough to be devout, and the laws politic are observ'd in not breaking those of christianity; it is an happy necessity which renders the looser sort of courtiers quite inexcusable, that a man, unless he will make himself wholly ridiculous, must now work out his salvation

* *Adrian*, emperor of *Rome*. A. D. 117. He reigned 21 years.

† *Theodosius*, the younger, created emperor of the East, A. D. 408. He reigned 42 years.

by

by the same means that he makes his fortune.

It is necessary then that women, who desire to evidence their inclination to virtue, should rather affect those that profess it than others, for fear it should be thought that, by favouring the libertine or the stupid, it is resemblance alone that forms the union. Those women that shew an aversion or coldness to men of a fair character, declare by their repugnancy to what is good, that they were born for evil; weak minds have not confidence enough to publish their virtues, nor discretion enough to conceal their faults.

And yet we often see, that women who are vain and full of some design, generally seek fools to be their admirers and confidants, as if it were not a blind choice to pitch upon such ill judges of their merit, and such ill secretaries of their diversions. Ignorance and folly are but unfaithful confidants; interest and persuasion will make them say any thing; and imprudence, tho' she be not solicited, will often speak when she ought to hold her peace. *Midas's* barber was wrong in addressing himself to the reeds to keep the secret of his master's long ears*, he had done better to have intrusted it with some honest men, rather than with this hol-

* Ovid. Met. lib. xi. ver. 190. Pers. Sat. i. 121

low plant : And the stupid, like him, often prove to their cost, there can be no fidelity, where there is no sense or reason. There are instances enough of this in true history, without our having recourse to the fabulous ; nor need we go back to the time past for examples, when every day supplies us with such as will afford proper materials for tragedy.

And as to piety, if any one imagines it to be inconsistent with good-humour, and that it must needs make us too reserved for conversation, I must own I can never approve of those women, who put their devotion on the rack to work them up into wry faces, and all manner of uncouth attitudes, as if we could not be saved without being terrified. When the grace of God is in the soul, the countenance is full of sweetness, and not distorted with the wrinkles of a fury. The weather is dark, when it is disposed to rain ; and such untoward looks presage something fatal in the reflective mind.

They who have no design to do ill, nor the consciousness of any hainous guilt upon the soul, are not apt to be of this gloomy cast, which we think as contrary to devotion as to decency : I do not mean hereby to take away the signs of a penitent heart. The summer hath its rain, as well as winter ; and love sheds tears, as well as fear ; joy weeps as well as

forrow; and the remembrance of sin affects not the soul more with grief, than the return of grace with gladness; like rain when the sun shines, tears often trickle down the face of the smiling penitent.

Let libertines say what they will, devotion is not inconsistent with a civil and courteous behaviour; Bees suck their honey from flowers without doing them any injury: Every profession likewise, where it is found, it embellisheth and renders more agreeable. As jewels cast into honey receive a lustre from thence according to their natural colour; so there is no condition in life, that becomes not more beautiful and valuable when it is accompanied with piety. It makes the religious more chearful, and seculars less insolent; moderating pleasure, and sweetning austerity. It heightens the comforts of matrimony, makes commerce more faithful, war more just, and the court more honourable. It is mere ignorance and tyranny to think, that it cannot be found but in cloisters; or that the world cannot enjoy it without incroaching upon monks and friers.

There are others of a quite contrary opinion; we live in an age when things are estimated according to the excess of parade and outward shew; so that many content themselves with a devotion consisting of mere outward forms,
or

or rather a human * religion : I never see this monstrous devotion, but it puts me in mind of the *Trojan* horse, to which, under the colour of piety, the *Trojans* not only open'd their gates, but broke down their walls, for the more solemn reception of this present dedicated to the goddess *Minerva*. But we must content ourselves with the disapprobation only of this outward shew, for fear of faring worse if we pretend to meddle or grapple with it. *Laocoon*†, who took his javelin in his hand to sound this machine, was severely punish'd for his curiosity, tho' very just. Were we to make war with hypocrites, we should find too many enemies to deal with, and should be surer of their hatred than their amendment.

True it is that those women, who are so exceedingly ceremonious, and who practise so many subtleties to deceive the eyes of their conversants, under a pretext of conscience, are like the spiders that take a great deal of pains in spinning their webs, in which they intangle themselves for the sole profit of catching flies. Weak minds admire these little arts, but the stronger condemn and slight them ; and, for my part, I cannot conceive how an accomplish'd woman can take dreams

* Human, in opposition to Divine ; as in the end of the following paragraph.

† See Virg. *Æn.* lib. ii. ver. 201.

for revelations, or suffer herself to be imposed upon by so many fancies and illusions. Those women that shew excessive fondness in marriage, often subject themselves to a suspicion of flattery and deceit; insomuch that some have been thought necessary to the deaths of their husbands, only because they were outrageous in their grief at the funeral. In religion, as well as in society, counterfeiting is altogether blameable; and so great parade is at least to be suspected, if it be not faulty. Wherefore concerning our conversation with the world, the best art is to have none at all; it is easier to be good in reality, than in appearance only; and it often costs less pains to regulate the mind than the outward behaviour; and is it not extreme blindness to expect from the hands of men, the reward of a service we pay to God, or to seek other approvers of our actions than him who is truly the only judge? It is to have a wrong notion of piety to practise it because some commend it; or to renounce it because others condemn it; these are motives too human for a thing so divine.

The superstitious are more scrupulous in matters of form, than in committing sin; like the *Jews*, whose consciences were more afraid of entering the judgment-hall than of condemning Jesus Christ, and of not washing their hands than of persecuting the innocent. Women

men learn this from their first mother, who made more ado, and evidenced greater dread, to touch the forbidden fruit than to eat it. Intricate questions, stories, and scruples without reason, give no trouble to persons of an honest heart, who follow the example of *Alexander*, and cut the knot, rather than perplex themselves with untying it, as the vulgar do, who seldom know what is true devotion.

* Yet lest we should run out of one extreme into another, we must so comport ourselves in finding fault with superstition, as those who set fire to the houses in *Asia* at the time of *Xerxes* : They spared the buildings that were near the temples, not only to prevent these sacred places from being burnt, but that they might not receive the least damage ; so we must pardon many things in this respect, which we might blame without injustice, but not without danger of leading weak minds into impiety. When superstition proceeds from the simplicity of the heart, it seems worthy of pity and excuse ; but when it comes from artifice and cunning it deserves punishment. The blade which covers the grain, and the leaves among fruit, are not altogether superfluous ; nature design'd them either for their preservation or embellishment : Ceremonies serve to the same purpose in re-


* The following paragraph was added after the first edition ; and a very just and necessary one it is.

ligion; and as devotion is inseparable from love, it sometimes borrows its transports, without keeping measure among the servants of God any more than among the profane, who so love their mistresses as to honour them in the least punctilios. It is very reasonable that divine love should testify its fervour in its effects as well as worldly love; whereupon says a great author very happily, *If the Cupid of the Poets bath two wings, our Seraphim have six.*



C H A P. VI.

Of CHASTITY and COURTESY.

T is necessary to join these two qualities together in order to complete an happy temper: Since some Women are so very chaste as to become unso-
eiable, and others so extremely courteous as to refuse nothing; this is truly to be too good or too bad; it is to change one vice for another instead of flying from it. As virtue hath two extremes both equally offensive, we should not carefs the one to keep off the other; as if we must needs be covetous to avoid being prodigal, or fling ourselves into the fire to escape being drowned. Morality approves not of such conduct; it teacheth

us not to choofe our fins but to fly them all ; and to fix alone upon virtue, which indeed is hard to find, becaufe excefs or defect hides it from the eyes of the vulgar. Thofe Women who think they cannot be good, and at the fame time obliging, know little of the nature of virtues, fince thefe cannot be contrary to one another, but only different, and their correſpondency is too natural not to be able to ſubfiſt in the ſame ſubject : when they are placed in a juſt degree, they are more graceful being united than when alone ; for which reaſon *Theodoſius** was the moſt beloved among the Emperors, being poſſeſs'd of ſuch different qualities to gain eſteem : His ſweetneſs and affability took nothing away from his majeſty ; nor his juſtice and ſeverity from his complaiſance.

There are ſome whoſe countenances are rather ridiculous than ſmiling, from an affectation to make themſelves agreeable ; and others ſo ſtrain their faces to put on gravity, that they look like furies or pedants. Be this as it will, to conſider well theſe two diſpoſitions ; they are to be ſuſpected either of artifice or ſtupidity ; inſomuch that, where they have no deſign, they have no genius, and where they have a deſign, the ſerious in-

* Emperor of the eaſt, A. D. 379. He reigned 16 years. He made a law that none ſhould be executed till 30 days after ſentence.

80 *The ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.*

tend to deceive, and the easy submit to be deceived: The one thinks you will attribute their easiness to good-nature, and the other imagines you will take their cold behaviour for an effect of their virtue. ; but these counterfeits seldom succeed long, especially among men of sense, with whom the best means to appear chaste is to be so.

As the most hypocritical are the least devout, so the most reserved are not always the most chaste. *Hecuba* may wear a beautiful mask, and *Helen* an ugly one; but this ugliness and this beauty deceive only those who dwell on appearances; we at length shew what we really are. And as innocence, falsely accused, shines more glorious when it appears, in spite of its enemies; so vice, falsely commended, appears more shameful when we come to be disabused.

But to say something in praise of chastity; it must needs be a divine quality, since its very enemies esteem it; and the most dissolute have less respect for those who yield to, than for those who resist them: We learn from the poets that *Daphne* * resisting the pursuits of *Apollo*, was changed into a laurel, of whose leaves he ever after made his crown: On the contrary *Io*, consenting to the designs of *Jupiter*, was turned into an heifer †.

* Ovid. Met. lib. i. ver. 472.

† Ovid. Met. lib. i. ver. 637.

How different were these two metamorphoses! and what more glorious marks did refusal meet with than consent! Respect accompanies desire; contempt always succeeds possession, as if women were no longer amiable when they become amorous.

Pan, being charm'd with the beauty of a nymph *, had recourse to violence when intreaties fail'd; and the nymph being persued to the brink of a river threw herself in to preserve her honour at the expence of her life: But *Pan* took pity on her, and chang'd her into a reed, of which he made himself a flute to the perpetual honour of her resistance. Those who have been won are not treated in such sort, having lost that honour which makes them sued to with so much care and pains.

They who promise themselves not to go so far, and to make no grant but of indifferent favours which common civility allows, after having listen'd too long, have been prevail'd upon to do what they never thought they should; and I could wish that the imprudence of many women had not turn'd the fable of *Europa* † into a truth. This young princess walking innocently by the sea-side, and observing the herds that were grazing around, spied a bull of extraordinary deport-

* *Syrinx*. See *Ovid. Met. lib. i. ver. 690.*

† The daughter of *Agenor*, King of *Phœnicia*. *Ovid. Met. lib. ii. ver. 850.*

82 *The ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.*

ment; she drew near to him, ventur'd to stroke him, and being pleas'd with his tameness soon mounted on his back; but she found her ruin where she sought diversion: By degrees he stalk'd into the water, and advanc'd so far that in vain the frighted nymph look'd back upon the shore, whither she was not able to return; she now found herself between two dangers, one of which was inevitable; she could not pretend to go back again without losing her life, nor suffer herself to be carried away without losing her honour: At length she was transported to an isle, where she found, to her cost, that this bull was no less than *Jupiter* in disguise to surprise her.

Such is the consequence of playing with beasts, and of being more free and familiar with fools than with men of sense and virtue. *Jupiter* prevail'd more easily under his disguise than he would have done in his proper person; the most dextrous, after his example, counterfeit simplicity and ignorance; they pass from little favours to greater, and are always carrying on their designs, till they come to change their intreaties into threats, and their gentleness into violence; and then it is that women, by too late experience, know that true simplicity is always ill-treated when it ventures to play with a counterfeit.

The fear of losing reputation, after having given some advantages, has been the ruin of many;

many ; but they deserve to pay for their too easy surrender, that they may learn there is not the least trust to be put in those who act in disguise ; and that the freer persons are from dissimulation, they are the more virtuous and the more capable of friendship. The satirical on women say, that “ they affect bold and silly
“ coxcombs sooner than men of more modesty
“ and better sense, because the rough violence of the former is more prevalent than
“ the soft persuasion of the latter, and because
“ they are less ashamed of having been oblig’d to
“ receive favours than of giving them, and
“ can plead a sort of necessity in excuse for
“ their consent.” But this I take to be an unjust opinion, which deserves rather to be despis’d than credited, and which offends no less against the verity than against the virtue of women in general, to whom seldom any evil of this kind happens, but for want of subtlety enough to be upon their guard against that of their enemies.

But to blame affectation, having commended pure simplicity ; it is not easy to be conceived that most women should employ so many inventions as they do, in order to appear amiable, without having any further design : They who incite love in jest are sometimes caught in earnest ; it would be miraculous for them to carry so much fire in their eyes without having any in their soul ;
and

and however they seem resolv'd, their looks and glances have not the privilege of the sun, which burns all here below, yet hath no heat in his own sphere *. These of love are but an untoward sort of arms, which persons seldom make use of, to wound others withal, but they begin or end with themselves.

I have often reflected upon the statue of *Venus*, made by *Phidias*, with a Tortoise under her feet †, and think I have discovered the emblematical design of it, in that the Tortoise seldom ventures abroad, and when he does he always goes cover'd and arm'd, and carries his house along with him. *Venus* contemns the solitary and reserved; such as are passionately fond of company are those whom she seeks for the enlargement of her empire; and she hath ever loved nakedness, having thereby obtained the golden apple.

They, who take a delight to be in the midst of their enemies, shew a sort of willingness to be overcome; and indeed, however good the company may be, distrust is always safer than confidence; and since she, who ought to be the example of her sex, was at first abashed at the sight of the angel *Gabriel* in the form of a man, women ought to testify a bashfulness in the presence of men, tho' they appear'd in the

* See *Plutarch* on the opinions of ancient philosophers.

† See *Plutarch's* morals, on conjugal precepts. Sect. 29.

form of angels, unless not having her resolution they have no need also of her fear.

It is ill reasoning to say that timidity lays a greater restraint upon women than virtue ; if their inclination were bad, would they want to be solicited ? Experience sufficiently shews, that where they have any apprehension, it is rather the fear of being vicious than blameable. Tho' the men who write books and proverbs generally speak in favour of their own sex, yet they have always owned that chastity is peculiarly a female virtue, since they who have it not are look'd upon as monsters ; we should not wonder at this so much, if this quality was not natural to them. There have been found perhaps some instances among men, who seem'd endow'd with this virtue ; but it was occasional, when either consideration or constraint took away all its merit. *Alexander* shew'd great decency and continence to the wife and daughter of *Darius*, when they were his captives * ; but to prove that this was rather out of policy than virtue, what did he not with the *Amazons* † ?

Scipio when young sent a beautiful woman, that had been presented to him, back to her husband ; but glory had more weight with him herein than love ; for had he accepted

* Quint. Curt. lib. vi. cap. 2. *Plutarch* in *Vita Alexandri*.

† Ibid. Quint. Curt. lib. vi. cap. 10.

the offer he would have intirely lost his credit with the *Spaniards* *. And where was the merit of *Xenocrates* †, when old and drunk, he refused the enjoyment of a common prostitute, which any young rake of the times ought to have been as much ashamed of as a philosopher? But there is no need of many words to disprove the title of men to this excellent virtue chastity; they freely give it up themselves, and think it would look too effeminate to practise the precepts given them by the weaker sex.

But I must own it a custom worthy of blame to see men take all manner of liberties without allowing the least themselves, and sometimes carrying their tyranny so far, as to make the institution of marriage look more like an imposition of jailors upon the fair sex: there is a great deal of ingratitude, as well as injustice in such behaviour, to claim a fidelity which they will not observe themselves, especially when they are under an equal obligation. Women have wit enough and conscience to believe, that it would cost them too dear to revenge themselves on the vices of their husbands by losing their own virtue.

* Valer. Max. lib. iv. cap. iii. Sect. 1.

† A disciple of *Plato*: 'Tis said that *Phryne* the famous courtesan of *Athens*, being set on to attack him, but without success, she said, she was come from a statue, and not from a man. Diog. Laert. in Vit. Philosoph.

Octavia loved not her *Marc Antony* less faithfully when he made love to *Cleopatra*, and left the beauty of *Rome* for one in *Egypt* not half so fair *. Women of such constancy are worthy the highest respect and admiration; but such as have it not, will find excuses in their weakness; "How is it possible, say they, for crystal to resist the blows that would break the hardest marble or adamant?"

But permit me to give some advice, after these not undue praises: As our Lord shewed a more extraordinary affection for one of his disciples † than the others, we may entertain a particular inclination without offending against chastity; we are not to discard our passions, but to moderate and rule them; yet we must beware, lest amity, which is a virtue in its own nature, become a vice in practice; and that we may not deceive ourselves, we must consider the end and design of it as soon as it commeneeth; we may be assured that it is dangerous, if we pretend to any thing more than pure affection.

And especially, for the better observance of the virtue we are speaking of, it is requisite to be always employ'd in some laudable exercise. Evil thoughts have the same power

* See *Plutarch* in the life of *Marc Antony*.

† *John* xiii. 23.

88 *The ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN.*

over a mind given to idleness, as enemies have over a man that is asleep. Wherefore some one hath rightly call'd this languishing repose, *The sepulcher of a living person**: For as worms breed in a body without a soul, affections and desires spring up in a soul that is without employ; and as dishonest love is the trade of those, who cannot find any thing commendable wherewith to engage their time, we must think that chastity is preserved by decent employment, and is always liable to be corrupted by ease and sloth: Whence she whom the ancients took for the *goddess of love*, was also look'd upon as the *mother of idleness*†.

*Diana, and Pallas, both their time employ;
This makes the arts, and that the field her joy:
But gentle Venus gives the live-long day
To nought but idleness, and sportive play.*

* Εμψυχος νεκρός. *Soph. Antig.* — So *Lucian* calls an old man Εμψυχος Τάφος. See *Erasm. Adag. ii.*

4. 3.

† The French is, *Diana hunts,
Minerva studies, but Venus does nothing.*

Perhaps some old verse, which I cannot recollect at present. But the reader may see many sentences to the same purpose in *Stobæus*, *Serm. 62.* *Theophrastus* being ask'd, what was love? answer'd, μάθησις ψυχῆς ὀλασσις, *The passion of an idle soul.*

CHAP.



CHAP. VII.

Of COURAGE.

MEN seem to think that courage is a quality peculiar to their own sex, without producing a better title to it than their own presumption. But he who thought there was scarce a brave woman to be found in the world *, made them ample amends for this affront; since, wise as he was, and the most powerful of all men, he lost this high prerogative among women, and became so weak, as for their satisfaction to sacrifice unto idols. Histories are full of the glorious and most generous actions of women; for the preservation of their countries, for love to their husbands, and for the religion of their ancestors.

But to learn whether our praises herein are just, it will be requisite to examine the opinions both of the wise and vulgar concerning the nature of true courage. Now, as the strength of the brain appears in walking upon heights and precipices without dizziness or fear of falling, so strength of mind displays itself in looking upon dangers without dismay; and yet the simple have no preeminence herein,

* Eccl. vii. 28.

when

when they wait occasions; nor the rash, when they seek them. The wise alone ward off dangers without being precipitous or insensible; for true courage should always arise from free deliberation, and is not a virtue by constraint, or merely natural. I can by no means think those persons generously brave, who are so hasty as to fall in a passion without knowing why; or those who by nature are so dull and heavy, as not to be sensible of any ill treatment or affront that is offer'd to them. Opinion errs either in excess or defect, that takes rashness or stupidity for courage; as sound judgment ought to appear in all the discourses of an orator, prudence ought to accompany all the actions of a wise man; without which, the giant *Polypheme* * cannot defend himself against the much weaker *Ulysses*; and having lost his sight must lose his life too.

This being the nature then of true courage, they who know the constitution of women cannot but own they have a great disposition towards it, being not so cold as to be insensible, nor so warm as to be rash. We do not find that such as are the most courageous, even among men, run headlong upon all occasions, as if they had as many lives as there are dangers and mischiefs in the world; the ablest among them, whatever face they may put upon the matter, do not easily resolve up-

* Hom. Odyss. ix. ver. 396.

on a thing which depends upon opinion; and with reluctancy commit a fault which may endanger a life; that when lost is not to be recover'd; which shews, that this virtue must have eyes as well as arms, and prudence as well as strength: so they who understand ethics, will not give the name of courage to fury and despair; and I can see no reason, why women should be called fearful, because they are not rash or imprudent.

And if any think I am making an apology for cowardise, they must excuse me if I tax them with favouring brutality. What glory is there in cutting throats? and of what advantage is it, setting aside custom, to boast of a trade which the *Goths* and *Vandals* have been complete masters of, and from whom we learned both rules and examples? What is more easy than to throw ourselves into furious transports, and be carried away with the violence of passion? They whom the vulgar call courageous are like certain glasses, which we cannot touch without breaking them; they know not that the mind, as well as the body, is always most sensible in the weakest part; for if to be peevish, and always complaining, is to be valiant, then the sick are more valiant than the healthful, the old than the young, and the common people than the wiser sort. When fear and courage are founded upon reason, they are not contrary to each other; the one opens the eyes to discover calamities afar off, and

and the other animates us to repel them when they approach.

But to leave reasoning, and come to examples among the fair sex; and indeed some are very wonderful. Hath not *T. Livy** left us the history of one, very much to their advantage, which he owns he wrote with astonishment and love? After *Philip* King of *Macedon* had put to death some of the principal lords of *Thessaly*, others to escape his cruelty fled for safety into foreign countries. *Poris* and his wife *Theoxana* design'd to go to *Athens*, but sail'd so unfortunately as to be driven by contrary winds back into the port from whence they set out; the guards having discover'd them at sun-rising, inform'd the prince of it, and labour'd to deprive them of that liberty which they valued more than life; in this extremity *Poris* employ'd his prayers to appease the soldiers, and to call upon the gods for aid; but *Theoxena* seeing death inevitable, and not being willing to fall into the hands of the tyrant, saved her children from captivity by a most extraordinary resolution: She presented to the elder a sword, and to the younger a glass of poison. *There is no remedy left*, said she, *to save our liberty or lives; and since we must resolve on death, be brave, my children, and choose it for yourselves rather than have it forc'd upon you by the hands of those insolent wretches. Let the elder use the sword,*

* Liv. iv. 10. 2. *Rollin's ancient history*, vol. 10.

and the younger drink this potion : The children having obey'd her, she toss'd them overboard half-dead ; and embracing her dear *Poris*, she threw herself with him into the deep in sight of the soldiers, who could not refrain from bewailing the loss, and admiring the resolution of this lady. Must we not own that constancy and courage here shone with transcendent lustre ? Can we find any thing greater among men, or even comparable to it ?

Indeed I think we cannot find an action more brave and courageous ; the despair of her husband, the tears of her children, and the threats of her enemies, could not shake her constancy : In the midst of so many misfortunes she shew'd a countenance as exempt from fear as pity ; she entertain'd the most noble resolutions, where some men would have acted with cowardise and baseness.

But if the constancy of *Theoxena* appear'd in the defence of her liberty, that of *Megisto* was not less remarkable, to save the liberty of her country. *Aristotimus* having usurp'd the sovereignty of *Elis* *, he banished the better part of the citizens, who pray'd him that he at least wou'd suffer their wives to follow them in their misfortunes : The tyrant seem'd to consent to their request ; but when he found that the women were inclin'd to go,

* A country in Greece, where the Olympic games were kept. Just. lib. xxvi. cap. i. See *Plutarch*, on the virtues of women.

and

and that they preferr'd the company of their husbands to their dwelling in the city, he flew many of them on the spot, and commanded the rest to be cast into prison; yet as tyranny hurts not less the persons who exercise it than those that suffer it, and as there can be no safety, where there are as many enemies as subjects, so *Aristotimus* from that time began to fear his ruin; and he was soon inform'd, that the banish'd citizens had rais'd an army, and were coming to besiege *Elis*; the barbarous tyrant now grew desperate, and in this extremity, finding no other remedy, he went to the prison, and commanded the women to write to their husbands in order to appease them. *Megisto* despised his commands, and without dreading the effects of his unjust power she thus answer'd him in the name of the rest: *Thou shewest that thou hast no more judgment than courage, in suing to those whom thou hast so cruelly treated, and in expecting a favour from them who never receiv'd any from thee. This horrid dungeon, the place of stench and darkness, and these menaces, which thou hast thunder'd out against us, shall never make us so base as to betray our country, for which we are determin'd to lose our lives with our liberty. Aristotimus* hereupon grew more enraged, commanded the officers to put the son of *Megisto* to death before her face; but he not being known among the rest, his mother herself call'd him forth by his

his name, and declared, *She had rather see him dead than a captive in the hands of Aristotimus.* During these troubles the tragedy was soon brought to an end; the tyrant was besieg'd by those without, and conspired against by those that were within the city, where they assassinated him in the public market-place. *Magisto* flies from the prison, and to shew she was truly noble, being as merciful as brave, she prevented any violence from being offer'd to the daughters of *Aristotimus*; remonstrating to the mutinous people, that they ought not to make themselves guilty of a crime which they had been punishing, nor commit a cruelty upon children in doing themselves justice for that of their father.

Euripides likewise speaks with admiration of the gesture, words, and resolution of *Iphigenia*, at the time she was going to be sacrific'd to *Minerva*, for the hind that *Agamemnon* had slain: when thus she said:

*Why weeps my father, I'm content to die;
To die for Greece: The oracle commands,
And I obey; nor destiny accuse,
If on my life depends your whole success.
Had I a thousand lives, I'd give them all
To deck my father with a thousand laurels.
At least, may conquest crown with equal joy
Your brow, as crowns this fatal garland mine.*

With

With such calmness and constancy did this young princess resign herself, offering no more resistance to her sacrificers than a rose to one that gathers it *.

Histories and fables are full of such examples; but it is of more importance to know how to apply this virtue: the vulgar have great need of a guide herein, since if we separate prudence from human actions, ignorance, despair and rashness have as it were the same effects with courage.

It is an infallible rule, that they who shew a resolution in an ill design, are almost always base and cowardly with regard to any virtuous enterprise. Hence it is that women ought to beware, not to be more daring for their passions than for virtue; and we cannot but condemn all such as are like *Theria* of *Corinth*, who was so afraid of flies, that she would not suffer a candle in her room for fear of seeing them, and yet had resolution enough to murder her husband. Is not this to abuse both fear and courage? to fear a fly, and yet commit murder with so much confidence?

And not to pass by the vices that are opposite to this virtue; such women, as lay violent hands on themselves, are by no means


* But *Minerva*, 'tis said, took pity on her; and, as the priest turn'd his eyes away to give the blow, she convey'd an hart in her stead, and carried her away to *Tauris*. Eurip. *Iphig. in Aul.* ver. 1550.

coura-

courageous but desperate. It is to give ground instead of standing upon their defence; it is to yield to the enemy without giving him the trouble to conquer them; it shews no great resolution to take death for a remedy against itself; it shews no great strength of mind to take upon themselves the office of an executioner; it would be infinitely better to seek a proper remedy in physic than in poison; otherwise it were no resistance but a flight, it were not to seek a remedy, but a more infallible way to be destroy'd for ever. As we think a body weak when it sinks under its burden, so should we think the soul base and cowardly that yields to affliction.

Some unhappy women indeed have been justly accused of this error; but have not men been guilty of it likewise, and that more frequently? If *Lucretia* slew herself for the loss of her honour, did not *Cato* do the same for the loss of liberty? The censorious therefore should not be too severe upon a young lady for an action which is so much admired, however unjustly, in that famous philosopher. Whatever slanderers may say to the disadvantage of women, we must confess they are generally more firm in their resolutions than men; at least, we may learn from the holy scripture, that, at a time when there was required more than ordinary affection and courage in the service of God,

three *Maries* were seen under the cross for one disciple *.



C H A P. VIII

Of CONSTANCY and FIDELITY.

THEY who think levity natural to women, in reading this discourse wherein I prove the contrary, will perhaps imagine that we undertake to find stability in the winds, safety on the waves, and strength in reeds. But passing by this opinion, as it is not our present business to confute every error, we will endeavour to shew, that as to inconstancy the women are more likely to be prejudiced by it than to be guilty of it themselves; and that very just is their diffidence, in an age when the friendships that are promised them with so much ceremony either are without truth or without duration. Constancy is only attendant upon good purposes, pertinacity upon bad; otherwise sin would be eternal, and repentance for fear of a change, prohibited. When the change is just, it is election or choice; when it is not, it is mere levity. As it is not reasonable that such as are sick should always continue in the same state, for fear of

* John xix. 25.

being

being inconstant ; so I think it as little worthy of blame to quit an error, as to get rid of a fever ; and that repentance is as necessary for the mind, as medicine for the body. What danger is there in preferring a greater good before a less, and to own that the sun shines more gloriously than the stars ? Otherwise, the first thing that we saw in the world would put our liberty in chains, even to the taking away our right to choose, and making us love what rather deserves our hatred.

Were they who esteemed *Nero*, while he behaved wisely the first five years of his empire, oblig'd therefore to love him when he became a tyrant ? Was their affection due to him any longer, when he had forsaken the rules of virtue ? I may love this man for his merit, the face for its beauty, and the flower for its fine hue : but when the man is become vicious, the face disfigur'd, and the flower faded, why should I affect an object, wherein are left no amiable qualities ? And how can the building stand, when the foundation is taken away ? Were we bound to observe such idle laws of constancy, they who love paintings would be oblig'd to love the canvas after the figures are defaced. There is no religion that requires us to honour such relics, unless affection should change into pity, or we do it to avoid ingratitude, rather than inconstancy. Hence it is, that they who admire only the

beauty of the body, find great difficulty in preserving long their affections; it is the beauty of the mind and virtue alone that can bind us eternally. Countenances, as well as years, have their seasons; however agreeable the spring may be, it must resolve to see its flowery beauties fade away, and yield to the rough unpleasant days of winter.

Nevertheless there is no reason to blame so noble a virtue, and a quality so necessary in the world, as constancy is; without which love is but treachery and mere imposture. Be it then taken according to custom or reason, the following examples sufficiently shew that men do wrong in giving the name of vices to the virtues of women, calling them obstinate or light, when they have reason to change or not to change. *Synorix* being smitten with the love of *Camma**, the wife of *Synaltus*, made use of every art to gain her to his purpose; but all his pursuits and the lustre of his quality not availing to shake the resolution of this lady, he imagin'd, that if her husband was taken out of the way she would no longer refuse him; he therefore murder'd him, and after this cruelty so importun'd the parents of the widow, that to all appearance she consented to marry him. When they came to perform the ceremonies in the temple of *Diana*,

* A noble lady of *Galatia*. See the story in *Plutarch* on the virtues of women.

as the custom was, this chaste lady drank part of a potion, which she brought with her, and gave the rest to *Synorix*, who drank it off with joy, not imagining it to be poison, as it really was. *Camma* seeing her designs accomplished, flung herself upon her knees before the image of *Diana*, to whom she render'd her thanks and excuses in this manner. *If grief could kill as often as it is extreme, I had not now been in the world; where, nevertheless, I refused not to stay a while, to take vengeance on this perfidious wretch whom you here see, who was so vain as to think, that I could love him after he had robbed me of my dear Synaltus. Think with thyself, thou barbarous man, and confess my right to sacrifice thy life to that, which thou hast taken away from my husband. I regard not my own, which I have only detain'd till now, to give posterity a remarkable testimony of my love and thy cruelty.* *Camma* was so happy as to see *Synorix* die before her, tho' he drank last; the gods gave her this satisfaction in reward of her fidelity; and she ended her life, calling upon *Synaltus* to accompany her in her passage out of this world. Can we find even among men a more glorious instance of constancy? and was he not a sort of *Cynic* philosopher who publicly maintain'd, that of a thousand men he could scarce find one constant; but of all women, not one *?

* Eccles. vii. 28.

After this it is easy to judge, if the prince of philosophers * had reason to compare women to the *materia prima* or first matter, because it ever affects to change its forms; and tho' it enjoys one ever so perfect, it still maintains a general inclination for all other. He design'd to shew by this parallel, that women are as dissatisfied in, and inconstant to man, as matter is to forms. But this comparison is very injurious, and would better suit this philosopher himself than the lightest of women; since he left one of his mistresses for another to whom he erected altars, to testify with more solemnity, that he was guilty of the crime which he laid to the charge of women. The truth is, they have more reason to complain of men than to fear their reproaches. How ill are credulous minds paid for their simplicity! But whatever assurances men may give, they are rather to be called deceitful than inconstant; for at the same time they make promises, they intend to break them; there is no change in their resolution, but only in their words.

This vice affects not those who are above the vulgar; such may well be trusted, who remain firm to their designs of the least con-

* *Aristotle* who, when he quitted *Athens*, retired to *Atarne* in *Mysia*, where at that time reigned his old friend *Hermias*, who gave him his daughter, others say his sister *Pythias*, in marriage, of whom *Aristotle* was so fond that he offer'd sacrifices to her. See *Moreri*.

sequence,

sequence, and are not to be shaken from their purpose by the greatest storms of fortune. Levity comes from weakness, constancy from strength of mind. When affection hath once joined together two generous souls, separation must be impossible; for as love in its nature is immortal, that which can ever cease can never be true love. St. *Augustin* said, *That his friend and himself had but one soul, as well to live with, as to love: that death had not separated two but divided one; and that after the loss of his friend he was afraid to die, and even life was a pain, because without his friend he was but half alive, and yet was oblig'd to preserve this half, lest his friend should die wholly.* There are few of so great constancy; friendships in this age are by no means so firm; for as, upon examination, we find that affection ceases upon the slightest occasions, we cannot but think the union was weak indeed, where separation is made without regret.

After speaking of inconstancy we must likewise oppose perfidiousness, which is generally inseparable from it; tho' indeed it seems very extraordinary, that any one should be perfidious, since all the world holds perfidiousness in abhorrence, and it infallibly creates enemies: Such as are conscious of it, ought to be afraid of, and such as are offended by it will most surely take vengeance. But

what is more astonishing, even their outward demeanor shews, that as they are at variance with all men, they are not easy with themselves, confessing, without speaking a word, the horror they conceive of their crime. There is no need of being skilful in physiognomy to read in their faces the malignity and torture of their mind; they must certainly be the vilest of criminals, who draw up their own indictments in their consciences, and are often their own executioners; practising a new form of justice, where themselves are the judges, the council, and the criminals. Tho' self-love be natural, these are such as cannot even pity themselves; and shew by their dismal countenances, that no one can absolve those whom their own consciences condemn and torture. It is the most horrible and most inexcusable of all crimes; since they who are addicted thereto, are in so much pain to commit it, and so much hurt themselves in designing to hurt others. On the contrary fidelity is always pleasant and easy; but the perfidious are always gloomy even amidst their diversions. A faithful mind knows no pain, a treacherous one knows no pleasure; their sensibility acts in a different manner, so that vice makes the one weep, even in their pleasures, and virtue the other smile amidst their sufferings. When a soul is tainted with this vice, it is capable of all manner of evil; but
avarice

avarice most surely follows it close ; and when a woman is covetous, it is very difficult for her to be faithful : the extravagant love of money is almost an infallible sign of a base mind, and a corrupt soul. Women should never shew an inclination thereto, for fear of the fate of *Procris* * ; who having withstood threats, and the fairest promises, surrender'd upon sight of the ready cash.

But to behold this vice in all its shapes ; the credulous and ignorant are in no less danger of it than others, seeing that they are persuaded to many things which their easiness leads them to commit against their honour ; tho' it seems indeed, as if such were neither capable of being perfidious, or faithful ; since they have not design enough for the one, nor strength enough for the other. This is the simplicity, which, the poet says, is excusable, provided *they take not a delight in being deceiv'd*. The artful are apt to do that through a wicked heart, which the simple do by misfortune ; but subtlety often lays snares wherein she is caught herself. There are some evils where flight is better than resistance ; and the best swimmers are sometimes drowned, because their skill tempts them to go beyond their strength.

There is no need of proofs to shew that women are generally less perfidious than men.

* Ovid. Met. lib. vii. ver. 740.

We have examples enough to this purpose; and experience alone shews, that they have more reason to defend themselves against it than to be afraid of being accused of it. Do we not read among the heathen dames, how that generous lady *Pompeia Paulina* caused her veins to be cut, when she saw her husband *Seneca*, by the sentence of *Nero*, condemn'd to the same condition*; she refused to live after the death of him who had taught her to love as a philosopher, that is, with constancy; and when against her will they stopped the bleeding, she ever after shew'd by the paleness of her countenance how ungrateful this favour was to her; and that she staid not in the world but with regret, seeing him no more, from whom she had learned to condemn both life and death, to evidence her constancy in love. The wife of *Mithridates*† seeing the affairs of her husband in a desperate condition, took off the crown from her head, and pressed it on her neck to kill herself; but having broke it on the first essay, she took the pieces in her hand, and complain'd bitterly that the crown, which serv'd as an ornament in good fortune, could not serve for a remedy in affliction.

* Tacit. Annal. 15.

† Her name was *Monima*. See *Plutarch* in the lives of *Lucullus* and *Pompey*.

And

And behold, among christian women, an admirable effect of their constancy, on the most glorious occasion that ever was offer'd; the penitent *Magdalene* was absolutely resolv'd to follow her master throughout, when his disciples had left him, notwithstanding their many protestations never to forsake him *.



C H A P. IX.

Of PRUDENCE and DISCRETION.

WOMEN are no more than women by beauty; but prudence makes them, as it were, divine. If beauty begets love, prudence gains them admiration and respect. It is a virtue the more necessary for them, and gives them greater authority, because without it all other fine qualities want ornament, or at least order, as the scatter'd flowers which the winds carry confusedly away; with it the most vicious sometimes preserve their reputation, and without it the most virtuous often lose it. It is therefore very requisite for all women, whatsoever they do, or do not; and as architects have always their compasses at hand to measure all their works, the wise ought always to have the

* Matt. xxvii. 56, 61.

rules of prudence before their eyes, to make all their actions reasonable. But were we to speak of all the good effects of prudence, we must recount all that is good in morality, or the conduct of life. As the poets feign that the fire, which *Prometheus* stole from heaven, was divided into parcels to animate the several creatures, we may say the same of this virtue, which ought to be the rule of every action; and which is necessary to every the least undertaking, since what we call the arts and sciences are but so many fragments of prudence.

Slanderers indeed accuse women of having no address or industry, but where they have a passion; that they have no subtlety but in trivial or wicked enterprises; that, like the spiders, their whole art is of a poisonous quality; and that they spin nor their webs but to catch flies; but this falsity deserves rather punishment than a serious answer. It is also tyranny, and a custom no less unjust than ancient, to exclude women from public government, as if their minds were not as capable of affairs of importance as those of men*; at least the following examples testify, that the praises we give them are not without foundation; and that they have sometimes provided a

* I suppose the author intended here a fling at the *Salique* law, which debars the Females of *France* from the crown.

remedy in the most desperate crisis of states and provinces.

When the *Latins* demanded the *Roman* damsels in marriage, with sword in hand, in order to revenge themselves in case of refusal, the senate was embarrass'd in forming an answer, where the consequence of a refusal was certain war, and consent would endanger their state, because this alliance was only a pretext in the *Latins* to make themselves masters of *Rome*. *Tutola* * being yet very young, offer'd to give her advice; and after having observ'd great irresolution in the speeches of so many old senators, she no sooner had proposed her opinion but it was generally approv'd: She remonstrated to them the necessity of gratifying these strangers in their request, and to dress up their handmaids as brides; so that the *Sabins* amusing themselves with these might be drawn off from their design of war.

This succeeded as she would have it; the slaves seeing their pretended husbands laid in a sound sleep, most subtly robb'd them of their arms, and advertising the *Romans* thereof by the light of a torch, they came and surpris'd their enemies who were in no dispo-

* Or *Philotis*. In honour of this fact, there was annually kept at *Rome* a feast call'd *Nonæ Capritinæ*, or the maid's feast. See *Plutarch's* lives in *Camillus*. *T. Livy*, lib. 1.

sition to defend themselves. We cannot, I think, sufficiently praise the conduct, the courage, and affection of *Tutola* herein; who found the means to save her country, when so many great personages were perplexed with the uncertainty of their affairs.

Whatever may be said of the imprudence of women; how many men, if they had taken the advice of those whom God had given them for help-mates, had succeeded better in the management of their affairs? they must acknowledge it was doing them wrong to slight and neglect them, at a time when prudence and direction were the only means of saving them from destruction.

When *Theseus* was expos'd to the *Minotaur* in the labyrinth; who gave him the means of escaping, but *Ariadne*? without the clue that he receiv'd from this princess, he had never disengaged himself from those intricate windings *. This labyrinth resembles affairs or times when hard and perplexing; *Theseus* represents men that are involv'd therein; the clue of thread is prudence; and *Ariadne* pointeth out judicious women, who commonly save men from the utmost extremities. When *Jason* was deliver'd up as a prey to the wild bulls that kept the golden fleece †, was it not *Medea* who tamed them, and gave

* See *Plutarch's* life of *Theseus*.

† *Ovid. Met. lib. vii. ver. 1.*

free passage to this prince to carry off the prize? By the wild bulls we may understand the perils that often hinder the attainment of the choicest things; and by *Medea*, women of spirit and judgment, who can, as it were, inchant danger, without other charms or art magic than prudence and good conduct; for the delivery of those who, like *Jason*, have more courage to undertake some arduous affair, than talents to succeed therein.

Women are not only capable of knowledge in the common affairs of life, but also in matters of the highest importance and most consummate wisdom. If the oracle of *Apollo* declared *Socrates* the wisest of men; *Socrates* freely confess'd that his *Diotima* * had taught him this prudence which the gods themselves had judg'd incomparable. It was no small honour to this lady to have instructed a philosopher, whose life was so full of virtue, and whose morality more resembled the christian than that of all others. Nor do we find in history or fables, any thing more to this purpose than what daily experience evinceth to those who judge of women without partiality and prejudice.

But it is not enough to prove, that women are capable of this virtue; it is of more impor-

* She was so skill'd in philosophy, as at *Athens* to read public lectures, which *Socrates* himself was wont to attend. Cæl. Rhod. Antiq. Lect. lib. xiv.

tance to them to know the means of preserving it : having proved it to be natural to them, we must now shew it to be necessary ; having demonstrated its excellency, we must now examine the use and effects of it. There is nothing more certain than that prudence and fear are, as it were, always inseparable ; and that as temerity puts the strongest in danger, diffidence procures safety to the weakest.

The poet's *Minerva*, a proper example for the wise, was always armed, to shew the fair sex how necessary it is for them to be always upon their guard, and that having so many enemies, they have always need of some defence. Women should tremble, like the covetous, at the shaking of a reed, because their treasure is more easily lost, and much more worthy to be preserved ; and indeed whatever merit they may have, she that is without fear is like a town without walls, which cannot stand a siege. I am not speaking of the fear of frantics, which is itself a greater evil than what it threatens, but of that sober fear of the wise, which sets misfortunes before them, without altering the temper of the body, or the tranquillity of the mind.

Yet I would not, that prudence should always put them in fear ; there is a certain mean between fear and temerity, which this virtue points out to us, for the prevention of or escape from evils ; and indeed there are some, who are
either

either too credulous or too diffident ; meer phantoms affect them ; their fear is as idle as their hope ; they discover no less weakness in their credulity towards what is good than towards the contrary ; and this proceeds from the same error, because they know not how to examine rightly the one or the other. As prudence teaches the point of mediocrity in other virtues, in this likewise it ought to shew wherein consists excess or defect ; but in truth, I think diffidence is more generally attended with wisdom than credulity ; and if it be not more reasonable, it is at least more secure.

This virtue displays itself no less in choosing the good, than in eschewing evil ; and yet we see nothing more common in this age than a bad choice, be it either in friendship or fortune : Prudence repairs this defect, as it is chiefly employ'd in deliberating and choosing. Surely many have great need of this virtue, who ought not to be surpris'd that repentance follows their affections, when they are not usher'd by knowledge and a proper choice ; when they fail herein, their affections are irrational, conversation becomes dangerous, and confidence uncertain.


In this, as on all other occasions where good conduct is to be wished, there is a certain deliberation which examines all the circumstances of a design ; and if prudence is
the

the eye of reason, this discretion is, as it were, the apple of it ; it is the flower of this plant, it is the point of this arrow.

But concerning one of the principal effects of this virtue, commonly those women, who study to seem prudent, are not so ; the wiser sort conceal the secret springs of their conduct, that others may deal with them with more confidence, and not stand upon their defence instead of trusting them. It is a treasure that still subsists, tho' conceal'd ; like that lamp of the *Romans*, which had burned so long under ground, but was extinguish'd upon the letting in of air. This grand parade is generally attended with levity of mind ; such as pretend a great sufficiency are often found wanting ; they are like apes, which are never more beasts, than when disguised in the apparel of men. Wherefore the holy Scripture hath very justly join'd together the prudence of serpents and the simplicity of doves *, lest the one should be attended with the poison of malice, or the other with levity ; lest the one should deceive, or the other be deceiv'd. These indeed ought to be inseparable companions, forasmuch as they give a lustre to each other ; prudence takes upon her the charms of simplicity to become more lovely, and simplicity the direction of prudence to be more secure ; and in truth, if address without

* Matt. x. 16.

probity is but guile, simplicity without prudence is mere folly.



CHAP. X.

Of LEARNED WOMEN.

I Cannot but laugh when I reflect upon the error of *Francis* duke of *Britany* *, who was extremely enamour'd with *Isabella* daughter of the king of *Scotland*, because she was not book-learned, imagining a Woman to be wise enough, *who knew the difference between the shirt and doublet of her husband*. The esteem he paid to ignorance and simplicity, obliges me to think that he had made a vow to love his like.

The emperor *Theodosius* † set not so great a value upon ignorance, when he married *Athenais* only because she was learned, and of a generous spirit, tho' her father was but of mean extraction, who had left her no other legacy than beauty in her birth, and philosophy in her education. They who distrust a

* *Francis* I. who married *Isabel* the daughter of King *James* I. Anno 1441. See *Moreri*.

† The younger, who by the advice of *Pulcheria*, his most prudent sister, married *Athenais* the daughter of *Leontius* the philosopher. See *Moreri*.

woman of letters, are of weak minds, who deserve what they fear, and who ground their suspicions on those very reasons, which ought to make them the more secure.

Besides, women of sense and knowledge in books, not only give pleasure to others in conversation, but in their solitary hours receive no less themselves; they enjoy a satisfaction in their ideas, whereas the ignorant are continually subject to evil thoughts, having nothing commendable to employ the mind withal: As their conversation is disagreeable, their fancies cannot but be extravagant. They who think it an advantage for women to be ignorant, yield too much honour to the gross simplicity of a country-village, which is always in danger when it meets with opportunity or a rude companion; or, if this opinion be just, have not the blind likewise an advantage in the loss of sight, when nothing more is required to avoid a precipice than to shut the eyes? At court as well as in the ocean, they must know the rocks, who would not suffer shipwreck; and if women, who know them, still suffer, the cause of their disaster must be laid upon design and not upon knowledge.

And yet, should I maintain, as reason obliges me, that women ought to be qualified with reading to appear in company, perhaps I may at first offend the stupid and ignorant, who,

who, imagining all like themselves, think a woman cannot study or read much without becoming vicious, or at least without being suspected: But they who judge so rashly, condemn what they ought most earnestly to covet, as if they were oblig'd to hate the perfection they want, or ought only to have weak minds in esteem; instead of considering, that they who have not judgment enough to know vice, have as little to make choice of virtue; or to prefer, upon occasion, truth before appearance. But they who know any thing of morality, are of another opinion; because we may learn from every day's experience, that the light of reason is as a natural virtue, which disposeth us to do good almost without study, and that we rarely see good natural parts without a good conscience. The help of letters strengthens the best inclinations; and they who persuade themselves that reading is a school, wherein they learn to do ill with more dexterity, would do better to believe that women find the means herein, rather of reforming than corrupting their morals.

Reading and conversation are absolutely necessary to make the temper and disposition agreeable; and as the one supplies matter for discourse, the other points out the method of graceful expression, and joins together ease and fluency. Without this, conversation is
but

but an insupportable tyranny ; and it is impossible without being in pain, to endure it long with those who can talk of nothing but of their ducks and geese, if of the country ; or, the newest fashions in vogue, if of the town. It must not be imagin'd therefore that by an ACCOMPLISH'D WOMAN, whose picture we are here drawing, we mean *the mother of a family*, who knows how to command her servants, and dress her children : Tho' we blame not this, yet music, history, philosophy, and other the like exercises are more apposite to our purpose, than those of good huswifery ; and there is no one so void of common sense but must own, that without some of these choice qualifications, tho' women may be of an excellent disposition, yet they often find it embarrass'd with troublesome and irregular thoughts. Their good natural parts or good disposition remain without effect, for want of reading or conversation ; when the tyranny of their mothers or their husbands, or some other misfortune hinders them from acquiring those excellent qualities, of which they are capable by nature. For to say that the sciences are too obscure for women, and that they cannot comprehend the arts even in their first principles, by reason of the terms which are hard to be understood ; this is a strange mistake ; it is an extravagant opinion, to think that reason does not speak
all

all languages, and that the sciences cannot be as well express'd in english as in greek and latin. Those pragmatistical writers, who, either through ignorance or malice, hide the arts under uncouth terms, as in an old tatter'd suit; and who leave things in confusion, on purpose that we may have recourse to them as to the interpreters of an oracle, are not less injurious to the arts and sciences, in setting them forth under such an hideous disguise; than libertines are to virtue, when they paint it sullen, austere, and inaccessible, to prevent as much as lies in their power the profession of it; but men of sense know how to draw off the mask; it is a deceit that gives no pain but to vulgar minds. I confess indeed, that as to philosophy and theology, there may be some words that seem not purely english; and that as the other arts have their particular terms, which cannot well be lower'd down to the apprehension of those who are not of the profession, it is not reasonable, that the two noblest sciences in the world should be render'd more familiar than the other. I own likewise that in a strong dispute some mysterious words may sometimes be used, which better express the truth than such as are more elegant; but after all, setting aside this necessity, what need is there to affect obscurity in our discourses or writings? As if perspicuity render'd the sciences less venerable; as
if

if darkness serv'd for ornament and lustre ; as if the force and dignity of reasoning was attach'd to barbarous terms. On the contrary they would no more diminish the value of them, by rending the veil that hides them, than they wrong the value of gold in drawing it from the bowels of the earth, to refine it and fit it for commerce. I think that they, who in a clear manner explain the sciences, discover to us a treasure indeed ; and that, in some measure, they merit the glory of *Socrates*, who brought down wisdom from heaven to the earth ; that is, who made it easy to the comprehension of those minds which seem'd most incapable of it. It is certain then, that from a just conception of the sciences, they may be express'd in any language whatever, and that women are by no means incapable of understanding them.

On the other hand, they who say that the chief impediment lies in the weakness of their capacities for such studies, judge but ill of the constitution of women, which, according to physicians, being more delicate than ours, is also better disposed for the study of arts and sciences. Say what they will, women are certainly as capable thereof as men ; and if sometimes they relinquish their part herein, which otherwise they might pretend to, it is rather through modesty and design than incapacity. See we not in history, that the ancient

cient *Gauls* * divided with them the glory both of peace and war, reserving to themselves the use of arms, and leaving the establishment of laws and the preservation of states to women? and as these things belong not to the ignorant, we may from hence learn in what esteem our ancestors held them, when they allotted to men only the proper exercises of the body, and to women those of the mind and discretion.

What difficult science is there, wherein they have not excell'd, at least as much as men? Was not *Aspasia* † judg'd worthy to teach *Pericles*, who himself was able to give instructions to all the world? *Cornelia* ‡, the mother of the *Gracchi*, compos'd such excellent epistles, that her children afterwards derived from thence all their eloquence, and *Cicero* himself admires them. *Pamphylia* § wrote thirty three books of history, which in that age were in high esteem: And as to the sacred sciences, did

* *Cæsar de bello Gallico. lib. 6.*

† Daughter of *Antiochus*, so eloquent that *Socrates* likewise attended her lectures. See *Plutarch* in the life of *Pericles*. *Athenæus, lib. 5. 13. Bayle.*

‡ She was the daughter of *Scipio*, and the wife of *Sempronius Gracchus*. See *Plutarch* in the lives of *Tiberius* and *Caius*, and in his morals on conjugal precepts. *Cic. in Brut. cap. 38 Quintil. lib. i. cap. 1. Valer. Max. iv. 4. 1. Juven. sat. vi. 167.*

§ An *Ægyptian*, who wrote, in the time of *Nero* the emperor, eight books of history. *Phot. Tom. 8. But*

Vol. I.

G

Suidas,

did not St. *Gregory* * confess that his sister was his school-mistress, and had given him his knowledge of polite literature? St. *Bridget* † wrote so well of mystic theology, that the most learned men admire her doctrine? But there is no need to have recourse to past ages for examples, when the present supplies us with women whose extraordinary virtues we may well oppose to any in all antiquity, and who have wrote on subjects, serious, abstruse, and entertaining ‡? However parsimonious and sparing men are of their praises on women, they cannot but acknowledge this truth, and own their obligations to them herein, and if we may be allow'd to call in fable to our aid, we learn that as the men had an *Apollo* for the author of the sciences, the women

Suidas says, she was of *Epidaurus*, the daughter of *Soterides*, and the wife of *Socrasides*, and that she wrote thirty three books of history, and three an epitome of *Ctesias*. She is mention'd by A. Gellus, 15. 17. and frequently by Diog. Laert.

* Bishop of *Nice*, anno 331. He was brother of St. *Basil*, and his sister's name was *Macrina*. See *Moreri*.

† The wife of *Ulphonsus*, a Prince of *Swedenland*. Her writings were examin'd and approv'd by the council of *Basil*. She died at *Rome*, anno 1373. See *Moreri*.

‡ The author here takes notice of the writings and particularly the *Homilies* of the lady viscountess *D'Auchi*. In whose stead the english reader no doubt will place with the utmost respect and gratitude, our dutchess of S—— Mrs. C——, Mrs. N——, Lady W. M——, Lady I——, Miss L——, and others, that excel in ethics, philosophy, divinity, and poetry.

have

have their *Minerva* for the patroness of polite literature, and who gives them a just pretension thereto. If I was not afraid to ground a truth so well known upon these fictions, I would remind those, who doubt it, of the nine muses, to whom all the ancients attribute the invention of arts *.



CHAP. XI.

Of DRESS and ORNAMENT.

IT is certain that, let women dress how they will, they cannot please every one; either the old or the young will find somewhat to carp at; and it is impossible to escape the laughter of the one or the censure of the other. There are some of such an antiquated taste as not to endure to see any one in the fashion, and think it intolerable to depart from a dress that was wore at least some hundred years ago; but this is to shew too great a contempt for the present age, in honour to the past, without

* *Melpomene* is said to have invented poetry, and particularly tragedy. *Thalia* comedy. *Clio*, history. *Euterpe* mathematics, and playing on the pipe, and other wind instruments. *Terpsichore*, playing on the harp and lute. *Erato*, nuptial ceremonies and dancing. *Calliope*, heroic poetry. *Polymnia*, rhetoric and also agriculture. *Urania*, astronomy.

considering that we must submit to what we cannot hinder ; and that oftentimes there is less vanity in following the fashions received than in being tenacious of the ancient. Fools perhaps may invent them, but the wise will accommodate themselves to them instead of inveighing against them to no purpose. Dress as well as words ought to be conformable to the present times ; and as they would be taken for madmen, who should speak at court in the *Cornish* dialect, we ought to think no better of those who should come there in the apparel of rustic villagers. They who blame the *English* for their inconstancy herein, would do better to quit that slavish opinion which restrains them from following the fashion, for fear of not dressing like their great grandmothers. Or where will they fix the date of dress ? If that of ancient times is to be the only rule, they may as well go back to the days of *Adam*, and be clothed in skins and leaves, to make it the more venerable for its antiquity.

'Tis happily enough said, that *reason and custom are like the sun and moon*, because we make use of the light of either upon occasion, tho' the one is much brighter than the other. Excess is every where blameable, but especially in novelties ; it is folly to condemn them, and vanity to embrace them. As I approve not of those who with too much curiosity look out for new fashions, I cannot esteem

esteem those who part with regret from their high-heads and vardingales. This obstinacy arises from self-love; and they are not less punishable than those who, in trade, would put off old medals for money, against the laws of princes and the usage of the country; they render their age ridiculous, and are so full of ceremonies that they only make the decay of time and the defects of nature the more observable in them. Indeed care and time employ'd only in dress is worthy of blame, when it is extreme, or when the intentions are not honest; but setting aside this abuse, I see no more danger in decking the countenance than in engraving jewels or polishing marble. Men decorate their cielings with fretwork, gild their swords, and enrich their habits with most costly lace; in short they dress up every thing, even the very churches; why then should any one find fault with womens dressing themselves to the best advantage, when ornament is approv'd of in all other respects? St. Hierom writing to *Gaudentius* concerning the dress of young *Paula*, seems to excuse the innocent curiosity of several women, who dress with decency according to their condition. *Their sex is curious in ornament, and naturally given to sumptuous apparel, insomuch that we see many very chaste ladies, who nevertheless dress themselves with great industry, without any other desire than to gratify their own taste in a*

certain complacency and very innocent satisfaction. This inclination indeed is so natural to them, that there have been those who have desir'd to be coffin'd in their best dresses, that they might carry into the other world what they so dearly loved in this. They who approve not these indifferent things, which the intention alone makes good or ill, think they have a mighty advantage on women, when they call them *the devil's instruments*; not considering that women, while their intentions are honest, whatever harm they do, are no more blameable herein, than is the Almighty's thunder, when the devils are permitted to pour it down on men or churches.

Nevertheless this discourse extends not so far as to justify excess herein, or patronize vice. I by no means excuse painting. Modesty is the most powerful charm, without which beauty hath no soul; and if other virtues gain admiration, this alone merits love. Dishonest decoration adds nothing to beauty, nor does it in the least diminish ugliness and deformity; since in the opinion of *Pythagoras*, *an ugly face painted makes the heavens laugh and the earth weep*: And after all they have nothing but what you may find in a milliner's shop; they glory in a foreign good: Whoever observes them well will perceive they are mere pictures, dress'd up to deceive the eyes,

eyes, like old gilded images, which in the inside are worm-eaten and rotten.

But how shameful is it to see men more addicted to superfluities than women? *Hortensius** the *Roman* orator, spent half the day in beholding and dressing himself instead of studying his orations; but we need not go so far back for examples, since we live in an age when young gentlemen affect this vicious curiosity more than ever, nay, so extravagantly spruce are they grown, that we can scarce help giving them the title which *Aristagoras* so dearly earned, who was so complete a fop, as generally to be called MADAM†. Indeed such coxcombs fail as much in their designs as in the decorum of their sex, for among women of sense they are never less amiable than when they take such idle pains to appear so; they even make themselves odious to all that see them, and would find that a certain negligent air, with a genteel decency, would do more execution than all such fopperies and quaint dresses, which indeed are unworthy a man.

Moreover it is to be feared, that as women, too gorgeous in apparel, cause some doubt of their modesty, so men that are effeminate in their dress, create a just suspicion of

* Valer. Max. lib. viii. cap. 10.

† The reader will be pleas'd to remember here that the author was a *Frenchman*.


their courage. Those young *Roman* knights, in whom *Pompey* had placed all his hopes, turned their backs at *Pharsalia*, for fear of being wounded in their pretty faces; they were not so much afraid to be conquer'd as to have a scar; and, to preserve an imaginary beauty, abandon'd their liberty, their honour, and their country *.

But to return to our purpose *Cæsar Augustus*, beholding his daughter *Julia* too curiously dress'd, look'd sternly upon her for some time without speaking a word, shewing his discontent by his silence; the next day seeing her more modestly attired, he said with a smiling countenance, *This dress, my child, better becomes the daughter of Augustus*. The reply of this princess was no less remarkable than this caution of the emperor: *The day before*, said she, *I was dressed for my husband, to day for my father* †.

* See *Plutarch* in the life of *Julius Cæsar*. *Cæsar's* Comment. on the civil war. lib. 3.


† She was the wife of *Tiberius*, but was banish'd from *Rome* by *Augustus*, and after his death *Tiberius* suffer'd her to die in want. *Æmil. Prob. Life of Augustus*.





C H A P XII.

Of B E A U T Y.


THEY who either adore or contemn beauty, ascribe too much or too little to the image of God ; it is one of the choicest presents that heaven has bestow'd on the earth ; but we are to attribute the whole merit of it to the power and goodness of him who gratifies us therewith. In the opinion of *Plato* is it a *human splendor, lovely in its nature, which hath the power to ravish the mind as well as the eyes.*

And certainly this must be a sign of the inclination we have to good, when in times past such as had any blemish were not permitted to administer in the temple, from a just opinion of that beauty which God himself thought necessary for those who were to serve at his altars *. The judgments we form of the beauty of the mind from that of the body are not always amiss ; souls, like great queens, cause their dwelling to be decorated, or take the pains to adorn it themselves, when they are receiv'd therein ; and indeed if virtue be necessary for the establishment of soveraign authority, beauty at least seems decent for it ;

* Lev. xxi. 17, 18.

if we sometimes find very excellent minds in bodies deform'd, they are like relics ill-accommodated, which many respect not with that veneration they would have paid, if they had been set in gold or pearl.

This lovely quality is worthy of empire, wherever there are eyes or reason ; it hath no enemies but the blind or insensible. The beautiful countenance of *Scipio Africanus* gained him the surrender of many nations, without drawing his sword* ; and *Heliogabalus* himself, from priest of the sun, became emperor of the world upon his mother's shewing him to the soldiers†. Such an universal homage is paid to those to whom nature hath given this preeminence above others ; and yet tho' we blame not beauty, at least we complain of it.

The vulgar think, that if there is no ill in beauty, there is at least an unhappiness ; there is danger, if there be no sin ; but indeed when it is the occasion of evil, it often happens that the innocent makes the criminal ; and they who complain thereof, may as well accuse the sun for dazzling their eyes, when they look too stedfastly on this luminary. *It is hard to keep,* says Theophrastus, *what so many*

* See his life in *Plutarch*. *Livy*. lib. 21. *Polyb*. lib 4.

† *A. D.* 218. He reigned three years. His mothers name was *Sœmia* or *Semiamira*. See his life in *Herodian*. *Eutrop*. lib. 8. *Aur. Vict*.

admire and love; and there is but little assurance in the possession of that to which all the world aspires: Men besiege a town so long, and assault it so many ways, that at last they become masters of it.

The authority of this great writer offends not beauty in the least, since he could not praise it more than by confessing, that all desire it as the object of their pleasure; so that if the fair sometimes suffer themselves to be overcome, the fault lies not in the face but in the mind: A place is not the less impregnable, because it is given up when it might have held out longer; the fault is in the governor rather than in the citadel. Be this as it will, the homely have no cause to triumph at this reproach; for as they are seldom solicited, we cannot judge their strength by their resistance; they are at more pains to defend themselves from affronts than pursuits, and patience is their principal virtue.

The fair are also accused of being scornful; but upon examination we shall find, that this disdain proceeds from the goodness of their mind rather than from their vanity, because they cannot bear the idolatrous courtship, and excessive praises, which artful men make use of to surprise them. As kings mock at the compliments of courtiers, which, they know, proceed rather from a view of interest than from affection; so should women laugh

at

at the devoirs of those galants, because with all their care and pains they seek but their own pleasure, and perhaps the ruin of those who imprudently listen to them; there is not so much presumption in the proudest fair, as there is meanness in their humble slaves, who freely throw themselves into chains; the services they pay them, and the exalted names they bestow upon them, discover no less their weakness and extravagance than their passion. Is there any reason to call the empire of women tyrannical, when their vassals are such voluntary enemies to their own liberty?

I intend not hereby an apology for the vain, but only for the sincerely modest; they who imagine that a great number of galants add something to their beauty, and who pride themselves in the submissions and devoirs that are paid them, give a great advantage to their enemies, and shew they may at length be won at an easy rate; since there needs no more than the most respectful behaviour and flattering address, of which indeed the Men are no less prodigal than the women are desirous; but I would have these know, that when pure simplicity has to deal with art and subtlety, it generally fares the worse. It often happens, that if women are fair, such as praise them extravagantly design to deceive them; if they are not fair, they only laugh at them; so that women have great need of some
spirit

spirit and virtue to preserve themselves either from danger or ridicule.

Others there are, who scruple to commend beauty because *it soon passeth away; it is as a flash of lightning, and often, like it, promisseth storm and tempest; it is a flower, say they, which fades as soon as blown, which the winds shake, the sun withers, the rain dasheth; and which is so delicate, that without being crop'd, or having an enemy, finds its ruin in its own weakness*: But may not the same be said concerning any of the perishable things of this world? They complain of beauty, because it hath not equal duration with the stars, when it is as bright and charming; and yet we must confess that the most beautiful fair may find an excellent remedy against vanity, if when between sixteen and twenty they would reflect upon the defects and inconveniences of old age; however gay the plumage which nature or art hath given them, they would be ashamed, like the peacocks, when they look down upon their ugly feet, at foreseeing so great a change and such unseemly ruin. I pretend not here to preach on the four last things of man; but methinks they need not give themselves so much trouble about a thing which years insensibly steal away from them, and which of itself decays every moment in despite of the utmost art.

It

It is true that *Cato* himself set so great a value upon beauty, that he said publicly, *It was no less a crime to injure it, than to rob a temple*; but he spoke of natural beauty, not of that which is full of art and affectation. *Sulpitia* *, among the *Roman* ladies, had such fine eyes that it was impossible for a man to look on her without adoration. The neck and bosom of *Theodota*, an *Athenian* lady, were so striking, that *Socrates* himself was enamour'd with them †. These darts and charms are not to be sought in art, nor possess'd in vanity; nature hath gratified some persons therewith in order to please the eye, and raise the mind to the love of him who is the source of all human perfections. Counterfeit beauties drop happily in the sight of men, like false stars, which having deceiv'd the eye, for a time shew us by their fall, that we took a vapor for a star.

What art and useless pains do many employ to conceal the defects of nature! as if it was not better to have recourse to virtue than to imposture; as if it would not be of more advantage to them to repair, by the good qualities of the mind, what is defective in the face.

* Daughter of *Paterculus Sulpitius*, and wife of *Fulvius Flaccus*, or it may be that *Sulpitia* whom *Martial* celebrates. lib. x. epigr. 35, 38.

† *Athenæus*, lib. 13.

Their

Their design succeeds but ill, when their vanity appears with this ugliness; and they make themselves not more excusable, but more ridiculous. How silly would they look, were they to be treated as *Phryne* serv'd some of her companions! Wherever this courtesan appeared, saith *Galen*, she quite eclips'd all the ladies in the assembly, leaving them no other colour than what sprung from shame and jealousy. 'Twas a customary sport with them to play at questions and commands; and when it was her turn to command, she order'd water to be brought, and that every one should wash their hands and faces, which was no sooner done than the counterfeits were discover'd, and scarce any one could be known by her face, so fallow and wrinkled were they grown on a sudden. On the account of this beauty it was, that the *Areopagites* forfeited their character of being above corruption; because not believing her innocent, yet as soon as they saw her they could not think her guilty. *Hippocrates* pleaded in vain against her, tho' he was most eloquent; her presence serv'd for a sufficient apology, and she stood in need of no other defence; so powerful is beauty even at this day, that, however poorly the fair may plead for themselves, let justice but pull her hood off to see them, and they will surely gain their cause.



C H A P. XIII.

Of CURIOSITY *and* SLANDER.

CURIOSITY agrees not well with silence; such women as are desirous of picking up news seldom resolve to keep it to themselves, and slander infallibly makes distribution of what imprudence gathers up. The minds of the curious are like the Vessels of the *Danaïds* *, which emptied themselves as fast as they were filled; that which entreth by the ears soon issues from the mouth, because indiscretion, which presides not less in hearing than in speaking lightly, opens the door to lyes for their going forth, as well as for their entrance.

I blame not that divine curiosity of philosophers and men of parts, which discovers to us the secrets of nature, and instructs us in the means of governing the passions of the soul; I am only condemning that curiosity which incites us to the knowledge of what is useless or sinful, and which separates us from the true knowledge of ourselves.

* *Lucr. lib. iii. ver 1021. Tibul. lib. i. El. 3. Virg. Æneid. x. 496. Hor. lib. ii. od. 14. lib. iii. 11.*

And

And indeed I am no less ashamed than sorry, to see many amuse themselves with the common tattle of gossips, and know nothing but what will appear impertinent and troublesom in good company ; they furnish their minds, as the *Cbinese* deck their cabinets, I mean with strange old pieces of broken ware. I would advise those who spend their time in such unprofitable things, likewise to learn the anatomy of flies, or count the atoms in the air ; and for the entertainment of their bodies, as well as their minds, would have them live by some crevice where they may find enough to employ them, but nothing to feed on. Such levity gives us but an ill opinion of their disposition, or sense of good and evil ; for we may well suppose that they spend their time in listning not only to superfluous but to wicked things ; and their readiness to believe a crime is a shrewd sign of their not being unwilling to commit it.

There are some who take a delight in hearing all manner of scandal, who cannot endure that any one should speak well of another, and who think that in blaming all the world they make an apology for their own vices, in shewing how many are guilty of the same, as if the number of criminals could authorise sin. When they hear any one praised for their virtue, they look as much chagrin'd, as the ill-favour'd when beauty is extoll'd in their

their presence ; and, upon examination, we find this opinion springs from a source more black and odious ; they are glad indeed of companions in infamy, but they desire none in their pleasures ; they have more jealousy than shame, imagining that they who indulge themselves in the like diversions rob them of some part thereof. They are of the same humour with the emperor *Tiberius*, who appointed officers in *Rome* to discover and condemn adulterers, that he might be the only one *.

The virtuous excuse faults instead of publishing them ; on the contrary the vicious are always unmerciful towards their like, in order to evidence, by their detestation, that such crimes are unknown to them ; but their actions bely their words, and this their art generally succeeds so ill, that it rather condemns than justifies them. Virtuous women drive, as it were, vice out of the world by their charity ; and the looser sort banish virtue by their slanders ; and grant that many are not given to calumniate, yet, if they believe scandal, their ears are no less guilty than the tongue of others ; and if calumny be a civil murder, they are at least accomplices.

It is no difficult matter to know a chaste woman from one that is not so ; the latter will examine into the least circumstances ; her

* *Suetonius*, in the life of *Tiberius*.

own consciousness serves her for a pattern to judge of evil, and her experience and design makes her put a bad interpretation on the best things. After *Procris* had betray'd her husband, she pried into all his actions, and could hardly believe him innocent of that which she had been guilty of herself. The vicious are always jealous of others, and pretend to be afraid they make not a right use of liberty; they cannot imagine that a walk or a conversation can be innocent; no, they must surely have been guilty of what themselves have committed, or would commit, if in their power; and yet they have no better means to cloke their sin, than to seem astonish'd and displeas'd when they hear others found fault with; because, in pretending to disbelieve a scandalous report, they would have it thought they are far from being guilty of a crime, the name of which is so odious to them; and that, should they shew but a slight resentment, or seem to allow by their countenance what their mouth condemns, this would be an encouragement to the vicious, who love not to have any thing to do with the stricter sort.

But to examine further into this vice it will be necessary to consider, wherein flattery and scandal are alike, and wherein they differ; the one attacks us with poison, the other with the sword; but we find that more resist scandal than flattery, because self-love, which fortifies

fortifies us against blame, weakens us in what concerns our praise. I join these two vices together, because they are as it were inseparable; and the dispositions that are given to scandalise, are likewise addicted to flatter; they both proceed from meanness of spirit, as it is merely want of courage not to dare to speak the truth freely, or not to be able to excuse faults. But indeed, if it be a weakness to exercise slander, it is no less so not to be able to defend ourselves against it, or wholly to slight it; for what need is there to be in pain, when we can feel no more than what we give ourselves? Patience is not wanted, contempt is enough; we should not be afraid of the wounds of slanderers, when it is in our power to keep out of their reach.

There are those who use an art in slander-
ing, and wound not but with golden arrows;
they disguise their accusation under some ap-
pearance of praise; if they speak ill of us,
they at the same time testify their sorrow; but
it is acting like archers, who draw back the shaft
to hit the mark the surer. What error and what
vanity is there in our judgment and dis-
courses! Since we continually differ more
from ourselves than from others, how can we
be assured but that she, who was yesterday
given to her pleasures, may be reform'd to-
day, and from being loose become austere.
I grant we may be deceiv'd in our judg-
ments,

ments, but we are not to sin against charity any more than against the truth.

Women that are but once guilty of a crime ought not, I think, to be called vicious; and they who have committed many, may perhaps resolve to do so no more; the former correct themselves, and the latter may be converted. And indeed it is very difficult to speak of the crimes of any one, without danger of a falsity, since one moment, or a single reflexion may make a penitent of a sinner; after all it is no small comfort to the innocent to think, that calumny had the assurance to attack the deity himself, and is at all times an enemy to virtue. This is a substantial reason not to be troubled greatly thereat; but that we may not be guilty of it, there is no better remedy than to avoid idleness, and to think no time proper to speak ill in but that which is not spent in doing good.



C H A P. XIV.

Of the CRUEL and COMPASSIONATE.

WHATEVER some men think of the passionate temper of women, pity is so natural to them, and their inclination is so powerfully inclin'd to compassion, that the furies themselves wept

wept at the misfortunes of *Orpheus*, when he went to the shades below to demand his *Eurydice**; and if those pitiless regions, where horror always reigns with cruelty, could not stifle the feelings of compassion for this unhappy man, from this fable alone we might judge, had we not many examples and true histories to shew, that sweetness is a quality inseparable from the fair sex, and that the most wicked of them have a certain tenderness, that gives them compassion for the miserable and clemency for the guilty.

Yet many accuse them of being extreme in their passions; it is thought that if sometimes they embrace not an opportunity of revenge, it is only to gather strength; and especially that they seldom or never pardon any one that offends with regard to love or fortune. Tho' this falsity likewise rather deserves contempt than an answer, yet I will say, that whoever takes the pains to examine thoroughly their disposition, he will find it as innocent as their enemies suppose it guilty, and that in all respects they are worthy at least of excuse, if not of praise. Those of a moderate spirit are moved and soon appeas'd, because their violence tires itself, and cannot continue long in motion, which is neither natural nor reasonable, without losing all its force. Time, which

* *Virg. Georg. iv. ver. 482.*

all the world takes for so great a physician, cures but the first disorders of the mind; but when passion is just, the longer it lasts the more it increaseth, because thought and meditation serve it for fuel, and give it strength by reflecting on the cause that gave it birth. The sense of both the weak and stronger spirits resembles fire, which goes out as soon as it is inkindled in tow, but remains a long while in iron and more solid matter. Women are not of that light temper to be passionate without reason; they are also as hard to be appeas'd as to be mov'd; they are with equal difficulty provok'd to make war or peace.

They would not a little deceive themselves who should think from hence, that my proofs were less reasonable than natural: I always submit my ethics to christianity; and I own, that I should rather teach vice than virtue, if I should justify revenge in favour of the fair sex to the prejudice of religion, and even their own disposition, which always tends to sweetness and countesy. I am only praising the constancy of their intentions when they are just; otherwise I should offend instead of obliging them, if I defended a sin so prejudicial to them, and which makes them pass for monsters. They have so little inclination thereto, that it is not only unseemly and indecent in them to be cruel, but even to be severe;

severe ; and of the two parts of justice, they seem born only to exercise the less rigorous ; and indeed it is not less shameful to see a woman without pity, than a man without courage.

And yet there is no necessity to be prodigal of compassion on all occasions. *Anaxaretè* in *Ovid* * was not cruel in suffering *Iphis* to die at her gate in despair ; her refusal was just, because the demand was not so ; and the criminal did but execute justice on himself for his temerity. Chaste women ought less to fear the ruin of an importunate suitor, than that of their own honour ; and it would shew but little judgment in them to be cruel to themselves, in order to render an ill-timed pity to the insolent or mad.

But except on such an occasion, when tenderness would be a crime ; except this defence, where severity is absolutely necessary, women should always think, that cruelty proceeds from a weakness of soul, and that such as want compassion want also knowledge and true fortitude. Certainly the most generous are always the most compassionate ; they know that it is more glorious to conquer their passions than their enemies ; and that to give life, when it is in their power to destroy, is, as it were, to raise the dead without a mi-

* *Metam.* lib. xiv. 705.

race. The proud and dishonest seem incapable of this virtue, because finding many enemies to their designs, there is no malice so black which passion suggests not to them, to ruin such as oppose them either in the enjoyment of pleasure or raising their fortune.


Aphrodisia the wife of the emperor *Dioclesian** tried all manner of ways to procure the love of her son-in-law *Erastus*; and after a thousand intreaties to no purpose, in a chamber where she thought opportunity would give her victory, the refusal wrought in her no less despite than shame; she went to her husband seemingly in great trouble and confusion, and accused this innocent of a crime he would not commit. It is the custom of lewd women to change their love into hatred, not being gratified in their pursuits when they have discovered them, and to desire to save their reputation in the ruin of the witnesses who refused to be accomplices. It is probable that the philosopher *Chilon* spake of these, when he publicly maintained, that the last and greatest evil he would wish an enemy was, that he might be subject to the rage of a woman; and indeed it seems an arduous undertaking, in which scarce any one ever succeeded, to appease a furious woman.

But more strongly to assail this cruelty, and make women conceive a greater horror of it,

* Emperor, Anno 284. See his life in *Tillemont*.

let it suffice to say, that it is not less contrary to beauty than to the goodness of mind; and that if tears sometimes sit well upon a face, rage has not the same privilege as sorrow. We often see a melancholy fair one, but who can say they ever saw a furious fair? I grant that to cure other passions they have need of philosophy, but for this the glass alone is enough; for this passion is too violent not to mar the features of the fairest face. The eyes turn their charms into terror, and the chagrin of the soul is visibly depainted in their whole demeanour, even to such a point of horror, that we dare not approach them without pretending to the power of exorcism, as if we were dealing with the possessed, whose frantic looks and behaviour they assume. *Medusa's* head, so terrible in ancient times, had only its locks turn'd into serpents; and these want nothing but their eye-brows so chang'd to make them wholly dreadful; and surely the devil, who inspires them with fury, must cast a mist before their eyes when they look into their glasses, even with such complacency, as to expect that men should not only endure them but love them; they demand to be caress'd when they scarce merit sufferance. Let the infernals keep their furies to themselves, these are enough here to commit and persuade blander crimes than those that have drawn down fire from heaven, and open'd the abyss of earth.

C H A P.



CHAP. XV.

Of GRACEFULNESS.

THE soul is not more necessary to life, than a good grace to make a woman agreeable; it gives a lustre to the fair, and diminisheth the blemishes of those who are not so. When they have this lovely quality, whatever they undertake is decent and pleasing; there are divers sorts of it, every humour hath its charms, as every star its influence. The heart as well as the body is wounded with different weapons; the looks, the gait, the discourse, the actions, the voice, and even silence itself have their different allurements, insomuch that some look never more beautiful than when they weep, like *Pantbea*, who had such a gracefulness in her melancholy, that it oblig'd *Araspas** to adore her tears.

Indeed this agreeable quality seems natural to the fair sex, who are often possess'd of it without any pains or study; but tho' birth in great measure contributes thereto, and the force of a good grace is better perceiv'd than can be express'd, yet it is possible to give some rules, by which it may be render'd more per-

*Abradates. Xenoph. Cyr. lib. vi. & vii.

fect. We must own likewise, that the beauty of the body in some things depends upon that of the mind, and the laws of gracefulness are attached to those of morality : An evil conscience carries a remorse with it, which dissimulation cannot long conceal ; rage, cruelty, love, and inquietude appear upon the brow. The countenance discovers the passions to be troubled or serene, as the dial-plate the regular or the irregular movement of a watch ; so that to preserve a good grace, we must regulate the motions of the soul as well as of the body.

And to begin with what seems most important, there is nothing that women should avoid more than affectation, and too artful a constraint ; they must not aspire to any impossible excellence ; art cannot make too extraordinary an effort any more than nature, without producing monsters. It often happens that by an extreme desire to please, women create a distaste instead of love, when they labour so much in their discourses, as, instead of expressing their thoughts with genuine simplicity, to perplex and confound themselves ; they are like the bottles, whose mouths are so small that scarce any thing can get out, tho' they are full, but with noise or violence. As a forced affectation displeaseth in the fairest actions, a genuine plainness is agreeable in matters of the least consequence ; it hath such sweet charms that none can resist them, because they proceed
from

from innocence, whereas affectation is never without some imperfections, and generally proceeds from too great a love of self.

How strange it is for some not to dare laugh for fear of disturbing a patch, or never to change their colour but in a morning when they dress themselves; yet such is the fashion of those who desire no glass but what flatters them, and give up day for a false light; and who, how devout soever they pretend to be, would not venture to church in the rain, for fear of washing off their borrow'd beauty; but the misfortune is, that in striving to conceal their defects, they shew them but the more. A good grace is such an enemy to this slavishness and these restraints, that tho' we might always do well, I know not whether we should always strive to please; some intervals are required for the relaxation of the mind. Art herein should conform itself to nature, which hath not spread the heavens throughout with stars, nor the earth with flowers; and tho' flowers are not so fair and splendid as the stars, yet we behold them with pleasure and attention, because their beauty, being of short duration, leaves us a desire of seeing them again. The animal spirits are subject to weariness as well as the senses, and have need of some rest and relaxation to digest pleasure.

I intend not hereby to persuade any, that they ought to disregard being guilty of faults; but provided they are trivial, they may some-

times so happily commit them as to turn them to their advantage ; because the shame which commonly attends them, and shews itself in the countenance, is an infallible sign of a soul dispos'd to innocence ; which is so far from conceiving any hainous crimes, that it is sensible of the least, and even of such as are only imaginary. If then a good grace is observ'd to do all things, as by nature and without study, a genuine freedom is much better than constraint ; every one knows that there is some difficulty in doing any thing extraordinary ; proper address therefore consists in not seeming to take any pains therein, or to be at any trouble like an awkward country-girl, but industriously to conceal it, without discovering any art.

This unaffected freedom is as requisite for discourse as for actions ; the words of common use are the best. The philosopher* that was always weeping, would scarce be able to refrain from laughing was he to hear some women, who affect to be more learned than they are, flinging out such uncouth words as serve rather to shew their extravagant folly than their meaning.

The excessive desire to please, which we have here condemned, is generally attended with a fear of not pleasing ; and from hence it is that these two contrary passions meeting together in the mind, they clash and cause


* Heraclitus.

great inequalities and changes therein; because as desire excites, fear cools us again, when the one inspires us with a *bon mot*, the other stops our mouth, and obliges us to silence. From whence we may judge, that fear as well as vanity often prevents gracefulness; it often happens, that they who are continually afraid of making a slip, seldom do any thing else; extreme apprehension disposeth the mind to error, as well as the body to diseases.

And indeed upon examination we shall find that this inborn passion is no less owing to education than to birth and constitution; such as are bred up in a servile manner can never do any thing with a becoming freedom, they dare not hold up their heads with that decent confidence which gives a grace to action; their thoughts are always mean, and however good their inclination, yet shame and ignorance prevent success in their undertakings.

Women who know nothing of the world, are apt to wonder at every trifle, because diffidence in themselves makes them admire and fear every thing; having made their courtesies, they have no other compliments to use in discourse than what they have seen at the conclusion of letters. It would be of service to them to think, they ought not to admire every little thing, and that, had they leisure to examine what at first so astonishes them, they would find after an hour's conversation the

subject of their admiration more worthy contempt ; but such resolution is not easily acquired ; it is even difficult for the better sort of dispositions to have address without experience, or readiness without practice. Actions beget an habit, but with some pains ; and the habit being form'd, adorns and gives a grace to actions ; yet in blaming a rustic bashfulness, I mean not hereby to commend boldness, since both have their proper bounds, which if they exceed, they become faulty ; as the one carries us beyond our power and a fit decency, and the other restrains us too much on this side : On the contrary, the modesty I desire lies between these two vicious extremes, to keep us from having too good or too bad an opinion of ourselves.



C H A P. XVI.

The DISSOLUTE WOMAN.

THERE are few places like the isle of *Cio*, where they say that the women in general inviolably kept the laws of honour and chastity for seven hundred years together * ; I know not whether this was an effect of mere design, or of their virtue ; but, be that as it will, it was a cha-

* See *Plutarch*, on virtuous women.

stity of long continuance, and as worthy of admiration as the corruption of this age is of censure and punishment. Perhaps this discourse may not please those for whose benefit it was design'd; but if the vicious are not disposed to take our prescriptions for their health's sake, at least they ought to suffer our reproaches for their shame.

I speak confidently to all; if they are guilty, I desire not to be thought their friend; if they are honest I have no fear to offend them; the one will applaud my censure, and the other will do me the honour not to approve of my discourse any more than I do of their manner of living; yet this I am sorry for, that whatever horror we conceive of it, we must rather speak obscurely than plainly in this matter; wherein modesty obligeth us to conceal what truth and detestation incite us to publish; herein this crime hath a great advantage, in that being most worthy of blame, its vileness serves it for a cloke, and we are constrain'd to spare it rather out of shame than pity.

It is certain then the passion of the dissolute deserves not the name of love; it is some other malady, which is incurable but by a miracle, and we may justly upbraid such as are infected with it, as the poet did *Myrrha*, when he says it was not *Cupid* that inkindled this vile flame in her, but one of the furies *.

* Ovid. Met. lib. x. ver. 311.

—And notwithstanding they have their consciences fraught with crimes, they would sometimes fain pass for saints; as the most homely have the most need of paint, so these harlots more studiously seek the appearance of virtue; hence it is they live under so much constraint, and there is nothing genuine in their deportment; to day appearing insolent according to their humour, and the next day modestly demure according to their feigned guise and hypocrisy. They who say the dissolute resemble the *Sirens*, perhaps know not the mystery of this comparison: One of these monsters was called *Parthenopè*, that is, *Virgin*, having a smiling countenance to allure the mariners, and make them run their ships on the points of rocks conceal'd beneath the waves. The most lascivious study commonly to appear the most chaste, but with all their dissimulation they are but infamous gulphs, where none but imprudent and desperate men suffer shipwreck.

They pretend to live genteelly and at ease, in order to deceive those who are so silly as to believe it the effect of a good disposition and innocence, which is nothing else but a snare to catch fools; this however shews the value of virtue, since they even borrow its appearance to make vice receiv'd the better; but herein they do not always succeed, for be their address what it will, their artifices subject them the more to suspicion; and as false
gold

gold betrays itself by having too high a colour, their counterfeited goodness discovers itself by the great parade they make of it. After all, true chastity affects not such formality as the false does; the coyness of an honest woman differs very much from that of the dishonest, the one appearing natural, the other forced.

But indeed, this is not what the dissolute are most blameable in, since they even do an honour to virtue in taking so much pains to counterfeit it; and their cunning seems the effect of their remorse, that, as the ugly by their use of art acknowledge the defects of their faces, so these by their dissimulation shew some horror of their crime, and are not willing it should appear publicly; but some are so impudent as to glory in their shame, and declare freely what they are by their indecent conversation.

Whatever may be said to excuse this liberty, methinks, it cannot be called gentility or frankness of humour that creates such promptness; civil courtesy extends not so far, nor is it possible to live in so free a manner without giving offence to modesty. Pudicity is always severe, when pure and entire; but, when it softens and relents, it is in some measure corrupted. Had the widow of *Sigismund* been the chastest woman in the world, she would have created some suspicion of her virtue, by her answer to those who counsell'd
her

her to marry again ; *That were she to take example from birds, she had rather imitate the sparrow than the turtle.* Tho' women were ever so innocent, such bold speeches hurt their credit ; if it be not sin, it is at least imprudence ; true modesty forbids not only the speaking any thing indecent, but even to hear or understand it : When *Helen* had once open'd the letter *Paris* had sent her, she imagin'd she was not to deny him any thing. Having granted a favour, some thereby engage themselves to do more than they ought, or ever thought to do ; they who have no desire to be vanquish'd, ought at first to deprive their rash assailants of all hope, lest they should take a slight repulse for a permission.

Dissolute women are not only impudent, but calumnious, imagining through a false policy to justify their sin, if they can but persuade 'tis common every where. What error and what blindness ! As they slander the most virtuous, they also hate even those of their own trade ; so that conformity, which in other professions is apt to create an amity, in this breeds nothing but hatred. Is not this the way to be at variance with all the world ? since the presence of the virtuous seems a kind of reproach to them, and the company of their like is a bar to their diversions.

Lastly, to impudence and slander they generally add cruelty ; and indeed we must run
through

through the whole catalogue of sins to describe those of a thorow-paced harlot; the salvation of these unhappy wretches is desperate; their repentance may be put in the rank of miracles, for whatever purposes they make of conversion they almost always relapse. We had need to be frequent in our public devotions, to preserve us from them, as from a worse plague than the three other; nor must we wonder, if sometimes their prosperity is as large as their crimes, and they are as happy as guilty; because God defers their punishment to make it more extreme, and would not have that anticipated in this world, which he designs them in the next.

But to be as short as imperfect on so unpleasing a theme, I shall leave this pourtrait of the dissolute woman, as *Apelles* did one of his pictures; when this admirable painter had survey'd with a great deal of pleasure the features and charms of *Campaspe* * *Alexander's* mistress, he was so passionately smitten therewith that he could not finish the copy of so lovely an original. The same do I through aversion, what he did through love; I find such horrid strokes in the pourtrait of these infamous wretches, that the pencil falls out of my hand; having so much detestation and so few invectives, I cannot finish this piece with colours black enough.

* Plin. lib. xxxv. cap. 10.



C H A P. XVII.

Of JEALOUSY.



E always lose with regret what we possess with love and preserve with inquietude ; hence it is that jealousy is not so unjust as some imagine it, since it makes us fear only, lest another should rob us of what we think intirely our own ; is it so great an offence to guard what we prize, especially at a time when fidelity is so rare, that none are more likely to be deceiv'd than those who are least afraid of it ? As the goods of fortune and of the body yield to those of the mind, the loss of the latter is felt more sensibly ; when we are robb'd of the affections we think due in return to ours, it is the greatest of thefts, as we are hereby robbed of the greatest good. And to philosophize aright, love seems to be the empire or kingdom of two persons only, which cannot extend itself farther without being destroy'd, and where obedience and sovereignty are reciprocal ; it is a miser, so extremely covetous, that he cannot bear to lose even a glance of the eye or a hair of the head.

Indeed it is no less folly to believe, there is no love in the mind when it is become jealous,

lous, than to think there is no life in the body when it is only sick. On the contrary, as sorrow and grief belong not to the dead, so jealousy is never to be met with, where there is hatred and indifferency; and this passion must needs have some shew of reason in it, since God himself formerly permitted husbands to try the fidelity of their wives by the water, as it is called, of probation or jealousy*. If suspicions had been in themselves so extravagant and unjust, God, no doubt, would have forbidden them, instead of curing them with such solemn remedies, and would have testified rather an abhorrence than a tender compassion for this malady.

They are also greatly mistaken, who think to make jealousy more criminal, by asserting that it betrays too bad an opinion of our own merit, or of the fidelity of the person whom we love. If they examine this passion well, they will find that it does not always proceed from distrust; nor do we therefore think ourselves less amiable, or others less affectionate; it is a fear which betrays not so much our weakness, as it acknowledges that merit may be examin'd. What do we more herein than for treasures of any kind, which we cannot love without fear of losing them? As the most stedfast in faith may yet have some doubt, the most assured of love may have some suspicion.

* Numb. v. 12.

The strongest trees are shaken by the winds, tho' their roots are firmly fixed, while the branches and leaves tremble.

We would not indeed be hard of belief, but reports with conjectures solicit and incite us rather to conclude on the behalf of fear than of assurance; - during this irresolution the mind suffers many things, and appearances give much trouble, while we cannot judge infallibly of what is true or false. There are good or bad examples enough, either to make us fear or be confident; and we are more apt to affect those who persecute, than those who comfort us. The example of *Penelope* gives us hope, when we reflect on her continuing faithful during the absence of *Ulysses* for twenty years; but that of *Messalina* * tyranniseth and revives suspicion, when we think on her vile lewdness and infamy. The mind weigheth both sides; but the misfortune is, that conjectures having once alarm'd us, we find or else invent matter to change our doubts into a firm belief.

You may say perhaps, that experience ought to give us rest, when a person in divers ways hath testified his affections; but I think that all these proofs cannot hinder us from still being under some pain, because fear, which often is not in our own power, interprets the least appearances in ill part, and for

* Tacit. Annal. xi.

want of true objects to employ itself upon, will take up with false. Whatever fidelity we have experienc'd, when love hath nothing more to desire, it is apt to fear every thing. It is the natural course of our passions to menace a change when they are extreme, and to fall of themselves upon no other account than merely because they are human. *Hippocrates* hath a maxim to advertise us, that *bodies are in danger of sickness, even in their best health, and when full of vigour* : But a certain poet more happily accounts for this change of mind, when the affection is too violent : *The will, says he, deserves as much a wheel of inconstancy for its passions, as fortune for her favours ; when they come once to the top, they cannot subsist long either through disaster or weakness.*

Such as are in an high degree of love, are like persons standing on a precipice ; their brain turns, and tho' no one pushes them, they even totter till they fall of themselves, only from the fear of falling. When the sun has reach'd his meridian, he begins to decline, because not being able to go beyond this point, he retires of himself into the west, or another hemisphere. Our minds seem to have the like motion ; disgust follows pleasure in an order as natural as the night succeeds the day. We find ourselves insensibly tired with the best things, and tho' the soul is in her nature

ture immortal, yet in her actions she evidenceth youth and old age, as well as the body.

Socrates saith, that the Gods endeavour'd to mix pain and pleasure one with another, but not being able to effect this, they tied both ends together, so that the one might succeed the other, to curb insolence and relieve despair. This often happens without our voluntarily contributing thereto; and as we pass from joy to sorrow, so we often find that our love changeth into coldness or indifference. The maladies of the mind, as well as those of the body, often come upon us without our consent; the tranquillity of the soul, like health, is often lost on a sudden without our foreseeing the alteration, or being able to find the cause of or a remedy for this passion, any more than of a quartan ague.

But I have said too much against my own opinion, if not against truth, in favour of a passion which destroys love, reputation, and the repose of the soul: Reason begets love, and love conceives jealousy; but the one and the other resemble those little worms that corrupt the matter where they are form'd; the one destroys his father, the other his mother. How moderate soever this passion may be, it is always dangerous; and tis but doing it justice, to take away the use on account of the abuse of it, because the one is so closely connected with the other. As there are no
serpents

serpents so small but they have their venom; there is no point of jealousy so well regulated but that it is attended with mischief; it is justly compared to ivy, which commonly grows on old ruins; so this passion seldom affects any persons but such as are absurd and conscious of some defect. We see the ivy full of verdure on the most withered trees; the older men grow the more youthful grows this passion; and it is always more strong in those, whom age and the want of spirit hath render'd more feeble and more stupid. Other plants have their root at bottom only, but the ivy throughout, and even more root than leaves; so jealousy roots itself from day to day, and becomes more inseparable from the soul, than ivy from trees or walls.

None but persons of a mean spirit are subject to this contagion; great minds are above the reach of it, the dull below it; these are ignorant of the occasions, and the other surmount them. In this respect therefore stupidity stands on the same footing with wisdom, and the swain is as happy as the philosopher; otherwise they who afflict themselves at a misfortune, where there is no remedy but patience, maintain a common error, and have the full moon in their head, when they think they have but half upon their brow. It shews no great sense in a person to trouble and perplex himself without pleasuring any one else,
and

and to seek torment here for fear of not suffering hereafter. If the distrust of the jealous be publicly known, they but increase the evil instead of remedying it; if it be not known, it is altogether superfluous; it is a latent misery, which silence and modesty make more insupportable.

It is not at all surprising, that the jealous should be lean and meagre, when their passion is fed only with shadows and fancies. Good minds know how to restrain their curiosity, while the meaner sort wholly apply themselves to learn what they ought not to know, not considering that in worldly affairs the most exact fall short of their account. If our judgments had been well form'd, we should have master'd many enemies; melancholy and meditation nourish jealousy; diversion and forgetfulness kill it quite. The spirit tires as well as the sight, when it is fix'd too long upon the same object; on these occasions we must gain the victory as the *Parthians* do by flying, and rather divert the thought than obstinately attach ourselves to it; it is an enemy whose weapons are poison'd, and who conquers at the first approach. When the mind has once receiv'd it, reason often comes too late to make resistance; we may prevent its entrance, but it never leaves us without ruining its host.

Cydippus,

Cydippus, among the *Romans*, having seen a bull-baiting, so dreamed thereof all night that he arose in the morning with fancied horns upon his head ; the sight had pleas'd him ; he had fed his fancy therewith, and his imagination at length did him this ill office. Thus it is that many are head-sick without considering that their inquietude or their curiosity is always prejudicial to them ; because, if they learn that their suspicions were false, they are oblig'd to repent ; if they discover them to be just, they are for ever miserable by being too inquisitive. They who say that the sin of the fallen angels was jealousy or envy, seem in some measure to justify this passion, seeing that the angels themselves were subject to it with all their understanding, which so far exceeds that of men ; but we likewise learn from hence that it is this which made an hell, and which daily makes men wretched in the midst of pleasures, so as to destroy the lover's paradise, if there be any such in imaginary satisfactions.

There is no crime so black which this passion is not capable of committing, giving dexterity to the most dull, and corrupting the most virtuous. *Circè*, being jealous of *Scylla*, thinking that *Glaucus* was enamour'd with her, poison'd the waters wherein she used to bathe herself, to make of this nymph a monster*.

* Ovid. Met. lib. xiv. ver. 1.

Murder,

Murder, poison, and magic were her usual diversions, nor had she any other restraint in her inventions and in her crimes than impossibility.

It is a strange thing that women who love diversion themselves should be jealous of their husbands, and break the law of reason as well as revelation, *in not judging others as we would be judg'd ourselves**; it is a sign they practise what they fear, because their fear comes from experience; the jealous never acknowledge their error till it becomes remediless. Every one knows the suspicions of *Herod* concerning *Marianne* †, for no other reason than because she was very beautiful; nor had he any other grounds to believe her guilty than because her merit gain'd her universal love and esteem. But what madness! what folly! after he had put this innocent lady to death, he used to call upon her as if she were yet alive, and expected to find her in his palace, as if she had not been laid in the tomb. This tyrant surely had committed many the like crimes before, since he had so soon forgot this, and had as bad a memory as judgment. Jealousy drives us out of our senses, so that when we return to them again, we have reason to deny the effects of it on account of their wickedness and extravagance. We often force, by his

* Matt. vii. 1 — 12.

† See Josephus, lib. xvii. cap. 1.

example,

example, the persons we love to die of grief for our unjust suspicions, and then lament in vain, restoring them their reputation by our repentance, tho' we cannot the life that melancholy hath destroy'd; we too late condemn our own blindness, to justify their innocence. Slandrous reports made *Procris* jealous of her husband *Cephalus*; she fancied he had some mistress in the woods, to whom he used to resort under a pretence of hunting; she therefore follow'd him, and, in hopes of discovering the object of his melancholy, hid herself in a thicket, near which he had retir'd for shade; but hearing a rustling and thinking it to be a deer, he threw a javelin and killed her crying out, *Alas! my much injur'd Cephalus**; upon this *Cephalus* found he had mistaken his wife for a beast, and perhaps he was not much deceiv'd. It argues a want of sense so lightly to credit appearances, and to put the worst constructions on the best designs. A just liberty is better than so much restraint, and often quenches the flame, which this serves but to inkindle. When opportunities for sin are common, they are slighted; when rare, they are embrac'd, for fear the same may not be given at another time.

In every case, how extreme soever the jealousy may be, the example of *Vulcan* may serve as a remedy against it, when he was

* Ovid. Met. lib. vii. ver. 844.

jealous

jealous of *Mars* and *Venus*, he threw a net over them and surpris'd them in the presence of all the gods; but what was the consequence of this his curiosity and art? he was only declar'd infamous with the more solemnity, and being cast out of heaven broke his leg in the fall *.

Yet not to be deceiv'd in this matter we must observe, that jealousy belongs to love, envy to fortune, and emulation to virtue; the goods of fortune are too gross, and those of love too light for the mind of man; they are those of virtue alone, which are deservedly proper for its entertainment; it is here alone where competitors mutually bear with each other, and have no more disputes or seditions among them than for the enjoyment of the light of the sun; so we see among the ancients, how the three graces went hand in hand, and were united in the bond of virtue, while the three goddesses were at variance for the reward of beauty; and the triumvirate † could not agree in the possession of the empire.

And to join christianity with morality in order to find a remedy in the greatest persecutions of jealousy, let us consider the example of *Joseph* and the blessed virgin, to learn how the most chaste of women hath raised a jealousy in the most simple of men; there is

* Hom. Odyss. lib. viii. Ovid. Met. lib. iv. ver. 176.

† Octavius, Lepidus, and Marc Antony.

some-

sometimes more misfortune in it than design; we must therefore like him slight appearances, and like her suffer suspicion. It is no small consolation to think, that after all the proofs and all the testimonies that can enforce us to judge ill, it is better in this extremity to believe a miracle than a sin, and to confess the power of God than the weakness of a creature.



C H A P. XVIII.

*Of AMITY and LOVE, from
Inclination, or by Election.*

SINCE there is no pleasure in life without amity, and where it is wanting the greatest prosperity is but irksome, and the least affliction insupportable, there is no reason I should forget this divine quality, whereby women have rendered themselves so commendable in all ages; it would be unjust, I say, to pass by this virtue unobserv'd, to which the most barbarous nations have erected altars, and which exerciseth an absolute command over all hearts, where there is any sense and knowledge. There needs not therefore many proofs to evince, how necessary amity is to all the world; it is of more importance to shew how dangerous it may be, and to exemplify the use rather than the

merit of it; for certainly if we have not the skill to know what is worthy to be belov'd, imprudent affections may cause the greatest evils that can happen to us; it is truly the source of misery as well as of happiness, and therefore it is necessary well to examine amity from its birth, since all the passions and affections of the soul depend thereon: For as formerly among the *Romans*, when they elected a dictator, they deposed all those who had any employ in the government, that a new lord might have new officers; so when we change our love, all the passions change their nature, to follow this their *primum mobile*; if we still hope or fear, it is no longer for the same end, as we are no longer affected by the same object: And indeed when I think that this passion not only gives motion to all the others, but even constrains us to put on the qualities of those we love, and especially, that it ends not but with life itself, I affirm that in this, more than on any other occasion, our election is important, and that we never can employ too much care and prudence to examine well, whether that which at first we esteem worthy of love and amity, be not in effect more worthy our hate and detestation. To make a right choice is not less difficult than necessary; but since they say commonly that love hath two eyes, that of inclination and that of election, I think, to treat

T
treat o
proper
fees n
And
which
what
great l
fable,
his w
where
power
place
inclin
this f
Achill
and v
what
ble, i
succe
A sin
than
it is v
a mo
while
stant
that
fight
who
*
iv. ve
ed. 6

treat of this matter methodically, it will be proper to know with which of these two he sees more clearly what is truly amiable.

And to begin with love from inclination, which some esteem the better of the two, what the poets say of *Achilles* will give us great light in this affair; for as we learn from fable, this great captain had but one place in his whole body vulnerable, and that every where else neither dart nor arrow had the power to hurt him*; so it seems the only place where our soul is most sensible, is the inclination; and they who have found out this fatal place, as *Paris* did the heel of *Achilles*, need only touch us there to wound and vanquish us; without this, let persons do what they will to make their services agreeable, it is all in vain; or if by chance they succeed, it is with great pains and hazard. A single look with inclination has more effect than the devoirs of many years without it; it is violent, and yet constant; tho' it acts in a moment, it ceases not to continue a long while; it sometimes finds, in the same instant, its birth and its perfection; it was this that made *Dido* in love with *Aeneas* at first sight, not regarding that he was a stranger whom a tempest, and not love, had thrown on

* Dictys Cret. lib. iv. Qu. Cael. lib. iii. Virg. *Æn.* iv. ver. 53. Ovid. *Met.* lib. xii. ver. 580. Hor. lib. vi. od. 6. Plutarch. *Symp.* lib. ix.

the coasts of *Carthage*. It is true, that consideration at first, like this queen, will sometimes stifle the sentiments that inclination gives birth to; yet these are but vain efforts; it is a pain to resist the love that is pleasing to us: Reason itself takes its part, and becomes as pliable as the sister of this fond princess, so as to help us with the means of succeeding in our undertaking. Inclination hath not less address than courage; it enchants an *Argus* *, it gives us wings to escape from labyrinths; there is nothing it will not suffer or undertake: And tho' tis said that some surmount this passion and subdue it, such examples are very rare; nor can we believe they are cured thereof, but rather that they were never sick. Feign what they will, all that truly proceeds from this passion is agreeable to us; we suffer ourselves to be carried away with its motions; we can deny it nothing; when this *Eve* hath presented us with the apple, to please her, we are ready to forego the interest of the whole world: Nor need we wonder at it, since she is taken out of our side, and makes a part of us; tho' she sometimes does us harm, reason checks her with regret; and in opposing her, we are like the fathers that are constrained to make war against their children, and who are as much in fear to gain the victory as to lose it; but in truth, what reason

* Ovid. Met. lib. i. ver. 716.

Is there we should be willing to hinder the effects of our inclination, when they are so pleasing and natural? Why should it continue barren, and so fair a cause produce nothing? is there any better sort of amity than what springs from hence? or is there any so faithful, or more constant? it is as agreeable as it is strong, and hath not less sweetness in it than duration. We find no more difficulty in loving an object to which inclination carries us, than a stone in falling to the center, or the fire in ascending to its own sphere. As the elements are neither light nor heavy, in their natural place, it requires violence to remove them thence, so we cannot be torn, without great pain, from what we love by inclination; it is here, where our affection finds its rest and most pure delights. We may justly say, that love from consideration is like the fire here below, which hath continual need of nourishment, and goes out if not supplied with constant fuel; whereas love from inclination is like the fire in the upper region of the air, which continues always equal and supports itself; it is the more natural, as it is the more generous; it is never mercenary or fed with infamous views, but proposes no other end than love itself. I am not surpris'd that love from consideration should last so short a time, and that it is stronger while it hopes than when it is in possession;

since it incites us but with a view of interest, and hath no other tye but pleasure or profit; it holds us as with a rotten thread, and nothing more is required to break it than some misfortune or malady. And if there be no better amity than that which is of the longest continuance, we ought to judge that of inclination to be the most excellent, because as it is the most pure, it is the most constant. There are some however who think sufficiently to decry it, by saying that it proceeds from self-love; but methinks, this should be an argument in its praise, because we may from hence conclude, that it is almost as difficult to draw us from what we love by inclination, as to separate us from ourselves, and that at least it will continue a long time when it springs from such a source; or should they say, that we from hence may judge this love to be blind, as is that which we bear for ourselves, I cannot see how they will prove it: We think that this love from inclination hath no eyes, because we ourselves cannot see them; and if sometimes we cannot discover the causes, we had rather say there are none, than acknowledge that we do not know them. It is true, we cannot so well judge of the resemblance of humours, as of that of faces; yet if any one would take the pains to search for the origin of our inclination, he may very often find it; provided he gives himself leisure to philosophise

phise a while on the perfection of the object that delights us, he will infallibly know where-in it is amiable.

It is through this inclination, that when many behold a beautiful face, but one perhaps shall be deeply smitten with its charms. The greatest merit often finds more admirers than humble servants; we love not all we praise; the will does not always take part with the reason, and we often give our approbation to a thing to which we deny our love. Many may have the same judgment with us, but they can scarce have the same inclination; and I grant many may love the same thing, but it seldom happens, for the same reason; as we have not the same appetite to all sorts of delicacies however good we may think them, so we have not the same inclination for all sorts of persons, how great soever we may esteem their merit. As there are divers tastes in the senses, so are there divers inclinations in souls.

But why should we not follow inclination in love, as we follow it judiciously in all other things? To choose an office, to learn a trade, to study a science, we have a regard to the humour and disposition; why should we not do the same for amity, since it is allow'd to be one of the most important things in the world? And if we examine our natural parts and constitution, before we give ourselves to learn-

ing or any other exercise, why should we not look for a certain disposition to love, as well as to study; since there is nothing so true as that, if we can make no progress in the arts without a genius, we can less succeed in our amities in despite of inclination? We may add, that as the same soil is not fit for all sorts of grain, so the same heart is not capable of all manner of affections; nor need we wonder at our having an inclination to one thing and not to another, any more than at the loadstone's attracting iron, and not lead or copper. And if we pretend to love contrary to our humour, we have an eternal sedition within ourselves; we cannot be happy but by halves; our inclination is on the rack, while our reason is satisfied; say what you will, love without inclination can never last long; without it amity hath no intire satisfaction or firmness; it is a building without a foundation, the least touch will overthrow it; but to conclude with the strongest reason, since love ceaseth to live when it ceases to reign, and that it cannot divide its power without destroying it, to prove that love from inclination is the most soveraign and most legitimate, let it suffice to shew that it is intirely one, and that it never suffers us to love more than one thing; as we have but one sympathy, we can love perfectly but one object. On the contrary, as we may seek our interest in divers persons
when

when we cannot find it in one alone, so love from consideration may divide itself, and seek the profitable in one object, and the agreeable in another; in a word, if consideration and inclination were to bring their cause before a wise arbitrator, in order for him to decide which is the more legitimate love of the two, as formerly the two mothers pleaded before *Solomon* for a child *, inclination would certainly get the better; because it will not bear a division like the other, and will either possess or lose the whole.

Having seen the reasons that are given to prove that inclination is the stronger in amity, it is time to examine those that are brought to prove, that election therein is the more certain. At first then it may seem enough to shew, how dangerous this love from inclination is, from its being blind; as *Aurora* goes before the sun, so knowledge should usher love; and yet sympathy acts without election, and without light; and what she does in a moment sometimes obligeth her to repent all the days of her life. As election is not so prompt, it is not so unhappy; and I think *Zeuxis* made a prudent answer to those who upbraided him for not finishing his pictures with such expedition: *I am a long time painting, because I paint for a long time.* We may say

* 1 Kings, iii. 20.

the same of a lasting affection, is necessary that long experience should precede true amity, for fear a long regret should follow too sudden a choice: Affection by sympathy is a contract or bargain soon made up; it often obliges without knowing the conditions, and signs without seeing the articles; the example of *Dido* sufficiently testifies the tragical effects of this levity. The poet hath reason to say, *Blind was her love; a fire, more heat than light* *. And indeed in this fable I find the unhappiness as well as the blindness of this love; if *Dido* hath inclination, *Æneas* has none; as she is imprudent, he is ungrateful. History and experience supply us with many such examples; and I make use of fable by way of ornament to our discourse, rather than to give it strength; but in truth, is it not a weak reason to oblige any persons to love us, because we own an inclination to love them? The same arguments we bring to require love, may serve others to refuse it; their aversion may be grounded on the same principles with our sympathy; if we would have them renounce their humour to satisfy us, have they not reason to ask the same? I greatly approve what the poets say concerning this matter; they feign that *Cupid* hath two sorts of arrows, the one of gold, the other of lead; this

* Virg. *Æn.* iv. 2. — et cæco carpitur igni.

inspires

inspires hate, and that love; with the one he inflam'd *Apollo*, and with the other struck a damp in *Daphne* *; and was not the flight of this shepherdess as just as the pursuit of the god? If he sought her, because he had an inclination for her; she fled, because she had none for him.

Besides, what assurance can we have that a person has an inclination for us, what signs can he give us sure enough to know it? It is true we well perceive our own, but wherein can we infallibly see that of others if not by the means of reason, which ought to examine well, whether what we at first take for truth be not a mere illusion and deceit? And when inclination sometimes surpriseth our reason to love an object too lightly, we find it to be a very slave that acts by interest and corruption, and scruples not to betray her mistress. The senses likewise often seduce the mind herein, and are either traiterous or ignorant servants that give in false reports; were it not better then to love for the amiable qualities that are visible, than for an inclination which is conceal'd from us? How strange is it to contract an amity, without knowing the cause of or the reason for it? Surely this would be to love by chance, wherein there can be neither certainty nor satisfaction, so long as we

* Ovid. Met. lib. i. ver. 470. Eurip. Iph. Aul. ver. 548.

are in pain to know whether the sympathy be equal on both sides. We feel a wound, not knowing the hand that strikes us; we are slaves without seeing our chains; and I am persuaded, were we to examine well what holds us, we should see our error and our imprudence; were we to light up the lamp as *Psyche* did, we should like her perhaps find that love is a child, who dreads being seen for fear his weakness should be known. It is a misfortune that it requires so much pains to be undeceived; tho' the sentiments which are most natural, may not always be the most reasonable, yet as the earth furnisheth more moisture and nourishment to the herbs which it produces of itself, than to those which the gardiner implanteth, so it seems we entertain more cordially the affections which spring from our corrupt nature, than those which come from reason; and nevertheless we ought to think, that as physicians correct the appetite in what relates to nourishment, so the wise ought to moderate the temper in what concerns the affections. We must behave like sick persons; there is nothing we should so much refrain from, as from what we like best; our inclination is no less distemper'd than their taste; it proceeds from an empoison'd spring; it comes not from a sound, but from a corrupt nature. I greatly approve the opinion of those who compare the amity of election to the sun,

and

and that of inclination to the moon; because the one is always constant, and the other commonly inconstant, full of spots and error. The moon hath no light of itself, the inclination alone hath no conduct; it must necessarily be beholden to reason; and especially, as the moon appearing sometimes with the sun, adds no light to the day, nor contributes any thing to that luminary, to enlighten the world; so when happily the love of inclination meets with that of election, it is not *that* which must govern us or bear the sway, but on the contrary, it should borrow all its light from *this*; and to enrich this comparison the more, I could wish in this point that women would imitate her, whom the holy scriptures represent *as having the moon under her feet, while she was clothed with the sun* * : I mean not hereby to take away inclination, but only to conquer or moderate the same; that a little humour is necessary, but a great deal of prudence; that amity hath no need of inclination but in its birth, whereas it hath need of consideration as long as it endures; if it requires the one for its mother, it requires the other for its nurse and mistress: And indeed inclination is an imprudent mother, who dotes too fondly upon her children; they must be taken from her breast as soon as they are born, for fear she should stifle them with her caresses.

* Rev. xii. 1.

After

After all, this inclination is very often nothing but fancy, the best learned find great difficulty in explaining the cause and nature of it; it is so dark, that many cannot comprehend the love that it gives birth to, saying, *It is I know what, it is form'd I know not how, and enchants us with I know not what charms.* There are some that teach us, upon the principles of *Plato*, that inclination comes from a certain reminiscence, from an acquaintance contracted by our souls in a former life; that it is not properly the birth of an affection, but the revival of it; so that in their opinion our souls remember their former alliances, even as two persons who heretofore loved each other, and seeing one another again after long separation, they are surprised at first, while the imagination and memory labour to discover what it is that so much affects them. There are some likewise who attribute it to the four qualities, and others to destiny; but not to set down the opinions of all that are deceiv'd herein, and who look for the origin of inclination where it is not to be found, I think, to philosophise aright, it undoubtedly proceeds from the love of self. We love every thing that resembles us, even our pourtraits; we affect our image wherever it is visible; we take great complacency in whatever we may call our own; hence fathers love their children, and artificers their

their works. And from hence we may learn the great danger wherein love from inclination is apt to involve us ; for as we often love ourselves, for that wherein we are most imperfect, and even, like *Narcissus*, embrace our own shadows, it follows that we are in danger of loving imperfections in others, if they happen to resemble our own. If self-love be blind, love from inclination is so too ; it is an effect very like its cause.

But was amity of inclination not so dangerous, or so full of darkness, what need is there of this sympathy, or this natural conformity ? cannot love be form'd where this is not ? love, as well as death, makes all things equal ; in loving, as in dying, the shepherd and the king are under the same predicament ; they are alike men, both as to affection or weakness ; love is like a fire, which every where communicates itself, and not only transmits its power into the subject it burns, but disposeth it likewise to receive it ; it drives away the contrary qualities to make room for other ; it chaseth away the enemy before it can be master of the place. And as there are certain forms hid in the bosom of matter, which natural agents can draw forth, so there are inclinations hid in our soul, which conversation and familiarity can easily produce ; time and a diligent search are only wanting to effect this.

this. How many persons do we see that almost affright us at first sight, who yet after some conversation give us great delight? and others, who greatly please us upon the first view, but soon turn our pleasure to disgust? Love may succeed aversion, as well as aversion love. Experience gives sufficient evidence of this; and as trees of a different sort, being well ingrafted, fail not to bring forth fruit, so the amity between two persons of a different humour, being well grounded, seldom miscarries. *Plato* had reason to say that love teacheth the art of music, since affection may spring from an inequality of tempers, as harmony is form'd from an inequality of voices. In fact, what sort of conformity can there be between the old and young, and yet we sometimes see, that they love, and are fond of each other; what similitude is there between the loadstone and iron? Was this attraction through any sympathy or resemblance, iron would sooner be drawn by iron than by the loadstone, to which it hath so small relation.

But to see how shameful and unjust this love is, we need only consider that they who love us only from inclination are injurious to us; they love us not for our merit, because they hereby often love before they know us, and are fond without knowing whether we are amiable. It is the effect of their constitution

rather

rather than of their election; and I think we owe them but little obligation for what they cannot help.

Having shewn the good and ill of these two sorts of amities, it will be easy to apply them to practice; there is no need to divide, but only to regulate them. They are as the two poles of our thoughts and actions; and as one of the poles is under our feet, while the other is above our heads, it seems that we ought to have less regard to inclination than to election, which should serve as the star, and rule in our amities. They say that *Alexander* had two favourites whom he oblig'd in a different manner, he loved *Hephestion* tenderly being the trusty master of his pleasures, and *Craterus* mightily for his good government of the state and finances; he esteem'd the one as emperor, and the other as *Alexander* *. We must join these two sorts of love together to make one perfect and complete, lest amity without inclination be too much forced, or without election too imprudent; where consideration is wanting, love is without conduct, and where there is no sympathy, there can be no sweetness. Indeed these two loves ought to be in one soul, like *Rebekah's* twins †; they are two brothers, of whom one

* See *Plutarch's* life of *Alexander*. *Valer. Max.* lib. iv. cap. 7.

† *Gen.* xxv. 24.


indeed

indeed is first by the order of nature, yet not so as to have the preeminence; the one is more violent and impetuous, the other more sweet and prudent. And 'tis a misfortune to the mind, that like the dying father it seems to incline to the love that is more natural, and which comes from sympathy; but as the mother of *Jacob* instructed him to supplant his brother, reason should teach us to regulate the amity of inclination, so as to subject it to that of election.

To conclude, if you demand of me the most necessary rules of amity, as well for the satisfaction of the conscience as of the mind, I think there can be none better than to believe that our affection is unjust whenever it is contrary to that we owe to God. As the ark was between the two cherubims *, so God must be between two hearts that love each other; this must be the knot in all amities to make them strong and reasonable; and to speak in the words of that great bishop who hath wrote so divinely on this subject, *Love is most commendable on earth, in proportion as it resembles that which is in heaven.*

* Exod. 25. 22.





C H A P. XIX.

Of COMPLAISANCE.

AS we are form'd for society both by constitution and inclination, the art of pleasing, and gaining the esteem and admiration of those with whom we converse, is of the greatest importance; and indeed, among all the qualifications conducive to this end, none seems more requisite than complaisance, since without complaisance other accomplishments, whatever they be, can never make conversation agreeable, wanting as it were life and gracefulness. But here lies the difficulty, to know truly what complaisance is, and how to apply it; it may err and give offence, either by defect or excess, where it is not accompanied with great judgment and discretion; women by being over-complaisant are look'd upon as mean-spirited or affected, and if deficient herein, they are thought scornful and unpollite: The like care is to be taken in the reception of it as in the address; they who are too free of their complaisance, are continually subject to importunity; and they who are too easy in receiving it, are liable to be seduced; flattery is generally thrown into complaisance, to produce error, as poison is mingled with wine,

wine, to cause death. It is to be feared therefore, lest women should sometimes mistake poison for aliment, and accept of flattery, when they only took it for mere complaisance; they are commonly so closely connected that it requires much prudence to make a just distinction; and in order to accomplish this, it will be necessary first to examine the good and bad qualities of complaisance, that we may the readier learn wherein the practice of it is commendable, and wherein to be condemn'd.

Among the latter, there is a sort of complaisance, which is nothing else but the art of deceiving agreeably; and one of its effects, a most pernicious one indeed, is the making appearances pass for truth, and false friendship for genuine. The greatest dissemblers endeavour to appear plain and simple, in order to acquire the credit of confidants and friends; but herein they betray themselves, and with due observation we may easily learn, that they have not that ingenuous freedom which they so much pretend to on all occasions. Tho' *Patroclus* * had the free use of *Achilles's* armour, yet he never dared to touch his javelin, this being a peculiar piece which no one could well manage but *Achilles* himself; so tho' a dissembler takes all imaginable pains to seem qualified with every virtue requisite in a friend, yet she dares not venture upon true

* Hom. Iliad. lib. xvi. ver. 140.

- freedom;

freedom ; it is a quality that will not fit well upon her ; she cannot even counterfeit a genuine frankness without discovering her want of it. As *Cameleons* take all sorts of colours except white, such persons as act in disguise take all sorts of forms, and appear under every different visage ; but after all their cunning, it is impossible they should affect to any purpose freedom and candour. As in a painted face, a narrow inspection will discover both the paint and the defects beneath it, so countenances over-complaisant generally betray both their art and guile : But women, by fatal experience, find the want of such discernment ; who, as their good-nature makes them credulous, are often hereby made very miserable.

What unnecessary pains do the complaisant take ! what trouble do they give both themselves and others ! there is no disposition so extravagant but they will affect to sympathize with it. They will weep with the wretched, scandalize with the spiteful, laugh with the merry, and lowr with the melancholy ; they consent with meanness, they praise with excess, and condemn with virulency ; they will blacken virtue, and palliate vice ; they have an ointment for every wound, and a paint for all complexions. To surprise weak minds they sometimes pretend to correct with severity ; but their counsels, as they want the force of truth,

truth, have seldom any effect; they are like the *Hercules's* of the stage, who seem to carry a massy club; but it being hollow, and form'd of pasteboard or painted cloth, they cannot make whom they strike feel the blow.

Certainly, if holy writ calls your complaisant preachers, adulterers*, such painted friends deserve no softer name, who speak not in order to be useful, but only to be agreeable; not for the pleasure they give, but the pleasure they receive themselves.

However enchanting complaisance may be to some, its promises are generally false, and its appearances deceitful: The complaisant, who pretend an affection for the whole world, have seldom any in fact for a single person; as upon the sepulchres of princes we see only the name of greatness, so on the countenances of the complaisant nothing is to be read but the bare name of friends; as nothing but dust and rottenness lie under these gilded monuments, nothing but treachery and inconstancy lurk under a mien so full of complaisance; we must look for truth elsewhere, and not take pleasure in embracing phantoms. The complaisant have seldom any thing in view but interest; they follow fortune, and move not but according to the motion of her wheel; wherefore *Heliogabalus* † for their punishment

* Jer. ix. 2. 3. xxiii. 10, 17, &c.

† Lamprid. in vita Heliogabali.

order'd them to be bound to a wheel, and flung into the water : It seems this emperor, wicked as he was, sometimes form'd a right judgment, as in condemning these complaisant gentlemen to a punishment so answerable to their crimes, by giving them to an element as pliant as themselves, and binding them to a wheel which they resembled in their inconstancy : It would not be wrong to compare those who listen to such sycophants to so many Ixions, because we find by experience, that after all their fine promises and compliments, when we come to the proof, they are of no effect, and we embrace shadows only. To indulge complaisance, is to embrace a *Juno* indeed, that is, nothing but air and smoke.

Having seen one of its principal effects, let us now attend to one of its principal marks or signs: The complaisant aim at nothing more than shew and parade; and as the more paint we see upon a face, the more we believe its defects, judging of the malady by the remedy applied; so we may conclude, the more we see of study and constraint in the actions and behaviour of some persons, the more we may suspect their designs, and that the greatest malice seeks only the fairest mask to disguise itself withal. A flatterer is more liberal of his offers than a friend, and false friendship often makes a greater eclat than true ; the reason is
plain,

plain, because art is more prodigal than nature, and fiction than truth. Fiction amuseth itself with accidents, but truth adheres steadfastly to the substance. Men, like trees, generally bear more leaves than fruit, and are more in shew than in reality. The art of painting and complaisance are somewhat alike, they are both employed in colouring, and work only upon the surface : It is no wonder the complaisant are so full of compliment ; a man is more liberal of counters than of guineas ; it costs less to gild a statue of lead or wood than to make it of solid gold. The fairest roses are not always the most fragrant ; what they have in shew, they lose in smell. Nature herself so distributes her gifts, and as if she was either niggardly or unable, seldom unites in the same subject, beauty and goodness. We may say the same of the truth and appearance of friendship ; we often find the one separate from the other, and that they who carry so much affection in the countenance, have seldom any in the heart. In truth, the complaisant are like the cushions we lean upon, which, tho' soft and cover'd perhaps with some rich stuff, contain nothing within but flocks and straw ; they are bats, which only fly in the dusk, as they love not either night or day, but something between both ; they are peacocks that have a gay plumage, but the feet of a thief, the head of a serpent, and the squall of

I

I know not what *; they are reeds that bend with every wind, and close with every humour; but which grow in dirt, are weak and hollow, break between the hands, and will wound those who lean thereon.

Complaisance errs not only in excess but in defect; it is excessive in praising, but defective in reclaiming, speaking either too much or too little; it equally abuseth discourse and silence; it is like a perspective, which makes things appear great or little at pleasure, as they are brought nearer or flung off at a greater distance; it exalts to an excess the least virtues, and palliates the greatest crimes; it laughs and weeps when it pleases; and, as *Aristotle* says, *it is not less excessive in shewing pity than friendship*. There is no sort of persons that it will not play upon; one while it defends vice, and at another time accuses virtue; it often gives the fairest names to the basest things, calling, for instance, rashness, fortitude; covetousness, good œconomy; impudence, good-humour; and soon after upon the reverse, it gives the most infamous titles to the most commendable things, calling eloquence, babbling; modesty, stupidity; and freedom, insolence.

It knows how to abuse both dispraise and commendation, and to make the laws more severe or favourable as it pleases; it

* Fr. Le cri de Diable.

flings oil into the flame, and adds fuel to the most vitious inclinations; it encourages to evil those that may have some scruple, and reaches out the hand to the most unruly passions, when a just fear lays them under any restraint; it says, as *Julia* did to her son *Bassianus*, *You have the power to do as you please* *.

What is there so black and impious, that complaisance will not advise? it gives a general dispensation; there is no passion so extravagant, that it will not raise in our souls, and encourage there: When *Myrra* † fell in love with her father, she found her nurse so complaisant, as, instead of diverting her from it, she studied all possible means for her success therein. When *Dido* grew passionately fond of a stranger, her sister being too complaisant, endeavour'd rather to kindle the flame than to extinguish it ‡. Complaisance approves of whatever is pleasing to us, and is under no apprehension of not persuading us, when all its eloquence is laid out in counselling us to that which it knows we like best. The evils of concupiscence that spring up in us, complaisance brings to maturity; if

* *Æl. Lamprid. Eutrop. viii. 19.*

† The daughter of *Cinaras*, king of *Cyprus*. See *Ovid. Met. lib. x. ver. 300.*

‡ *Virg. Æn. lib. iv. ver. 50.*

concupiscence is the mother of sin, complaisance is the nurse, who finishes and brings to perfection what the other only but begun.

It can find an excuse for every thing; it tells the amorous *Bassianus* that the will of kings is the supreme law; that being above all, there can be no pretence why he should deprive himself of any pleasure by submission to the censure of other men; it tells *Myrra*, that the gods themselves had no regard to affinity, and that the dictates of love ought not to yield to those of nature; it tells *Dido*, that the dead are not at all piqued at the amours of the living, that she owes no fidelity to him who is now no more, and that *Sichæus* * cannot be jealous in the grave of what *Æneas* was doing at *Carthage*. It finds a ready way of enterprising the most horrid attempts, as in the instances above-mention'd; it encourages the timorous, instructs the ignorant, hardens the scrupulous, and strengthens the weak.

No wonder then that complaisance is so well received, and that the guard which surrounds the person of a king cannot keep it from entering the palace; it is upon this account that it every where looks so pleasant, especially at court, where there is little else but subtle flattery, where licentiousness will not bear contradiction. It is the business of the amorous and courtesans to keep the fair and

* *Dido's* first husband.

their galants in error, be their quality what it will, in order to continue in their good graces ; for we must not dissemble here, and in speaking of this looser sort of complaisance be guilty of the crime we would fain condemn. The complaisant who wait upon a person are, during favour, like the shadows that attend a body in the light ; if the person moves, they move along with him ; if he sweats, they sweat too ; if he is cold, their faces are quite frozen ; if he speaks, they are his echo ; shadows that have no solidity in them, and which fly off, when one thinks to touch them ! A voice without a soul, which interest and not truth draws from the breast of flatterers ! But how vain and useless is this complaisance ! Can the shadow that follows us give us any assistance ? Can the echo that returns our sighs, give us any comfort ! Besides, how dangerous is this complaisance ! Were we to speak blasphemy, this echo will answer us ; were we to run where we should not, this shadow will follow us : This echo repeats the words of the impious as well as of the just ; this shadow attends the sick as well as the sound. Wretched complaisance ! which is so ready in helping us to destroy a good fortune, but cannot comfort us as it ought when it is gone. Deceitful complaisance ! which stays not with us but in the happy days of sunshine, and like birds of passage takes its flight as soon

as winter approacheth ! We cannot but say therefore, that prosperity hath as few true friends as adversity ; since, if the one has no one to comfort it, much less hath the other any one to reprove it ; as the wretched have no one to teach them the duty of hope, the happy have no one to teach them the duty of fear. As compassion stands mute before the afflicted, so does complaisance before the virtuous ; the one is afraid to leave good fortune if reproof should chance to give offence ; the other stays not to comfort the wretched, lest it should partake of their misery. Such then is complaisance, the poison of the great, the enchantment of the court, the enemy of truth, and the mother of vice.

And yet this great mischief is not easily to be prevented ; complaisance is an agreeable murderer, whose every wound she gives pleases us ; she even slays us without our daring to complain. I know there are some, who, like *Ulysses* *, have a remedy against this *Siren*, which laughs not but to make others weep ; which breaks in pieces the vessels that are drawn to her by the sweetness of her song ; and tho' she appears a beautiful woman, is indeed a monster. But if there are some that cannot endure complaisance there are many more who suffer themselves to be enchanted

* Hom. Odyss. lib. xii. ver. 48.

by it; if some are like *Theodosius*, whom no encomiums could move, and who chose rather to be slander'd than flatter'd, many more are like *Antipater* *, who could not endure to be informed of his imperfections, and would be painted in profile, because he had but one eye. Complaisance is an enemy, that is not to be resisted but by flight; it carries empoison'd weapons, with which it wounds by a single touch and conquers at the first approach; it hath inevitable charms, even for the more serious. We drive it from us with regret, and often fly from it only that it may pursue us; if at any time we refuse to give it entrance, it is only by way of ceremony; and we treat it as a mistress, against whom her galant shuts the door, only that she may break it open; when it hath once gain'd the ear, it soon gains the heart; and there is no other defence against it but prudence or insensibility. Above all, the more it satisfies the more it hurts, and is the more dangerous in proportion to its being the more agreeable; wherefore *Artemidorus* † told his friends that he thought it dangerous to converse with a complaisant person even in a dream. How great then must be the malignity and

* One of *Alexander's* successors.

† One that wrote the *Onirocritics*, or interpretation of dreams.

power of this enemy, whose very shadow can do mischief, who is to be dreaded even in her image or picture ! This is but too true in the present age, when complaisance is more in vogue and of greater force than ever ; a time when they who cannot flatter are look'd upon as rude and clownish, and those who will not be flatter'd as altogether insensible ; a time when they who know not the art of flattery, know not the art of pleasing. In this age, as in the days of St. *Jerom*, flattery is taken for an effect of humility or good-will, so that those who renounce this trade are deem'd either envious or proud.

But surely, were we to enquire who they are that suffer themselves to be imposed upon by complaisance, we should find they are generally people of weak minds. The pyramids of *Egypt* give no shadow, tho' they are so very high, and men of sense suffer nothing about them either of complaisance or flattery, because they are no more dazzled with the rays of truth, than eagles are with the rays of the sun. *Antisthenes* * made an excellent comparison, when he said *that the complaisant are like courtesans, forasmuch as they required every thing in their humble servants but reason and prudence*. This is what they stand in need of, who affect the complaisant ; men of judgment

*A philosopher cotemporary with, and a great admirer of *Socrates*.

hold such suppleness in detestation, and men of any spirit choose rather to be troublesome than to dissemble; nay more, they had rather be importuned than fawn'd upon. The wise will not be deceiv'd themselves, any more than they would deceive others; they would not have their judgment err, any more than their will. If a man sees not the artifice of complaisance, it is ignorance; but if he discovers it and still submits to its allurements, it is intolerable ambition. This suppleness belongs only to base minds, the generous are naturally more free; as the hypocrite seems the most blameable among sinners, among all enemies the flatterer is the most dangerous, because if the one wou'd fain deceive the eyes of God, the other would do the same by wise-men: But as God holds in abomination false devotion, the wise will always detest false friendship.

And was such complaisance not dangerous, yet it is infamous, both in those who receive it and those who practise it; it is a certain sign of weakness of soul to suffer it at any time to prevail; and women of understanding will detest such fashionable manners as can find vice and virtue just where they please.

Aristippus * said, that "the only profit he had drawn from philosophy was, that it taught

* A philosopher, by birth a *Cyrenian*; from whence his followers were call'd *Cyrenaics*. Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 99. Diog. Laert.

" him

*“ him to speak freely to all the world, and never
“ to be asham'd of discovering his thoughts :”*

Great minds ought always to have this point in view, and to be of the same opinion, while the vulgar study nothing more than to conceal their thoughts ; but I hold that philosopher in greater esteem, who preach'd nothing else to his disciples in order to promote good life, than that *they should regard the sun in all its motions* ; from whence they might learn, that as this luminary soon dissipates every the least cloud, good minds should be free from all manner of disguise and constraint. The whole art of complaisance consists either of maliciousness or baseness ; it is the token either of a weak mind or a wicked one. As prudence and fortitude are inseparable, finess and weakness go always together ; reeds bend easier to the wind than the sturdy oak ; foxes are more subtle than lions ; the fearful than the brave, and little minds than great. Great minds have seldom any inclination to deceive ; and if at any time they make use of this artifice, it is only by way of counter-poison ; it is not to do evil, but to avoid it ; it is not to attack another person, but to defend themselves ; it is one of the noblest effects of magnanimity to love and hate without disguise. Moreover the wise are always equal and constant, but the complaisant are oblig'd to change every moment ; there is no certainty in their hu-

mour any more than in their faces, because it depends upon the humour of those whom they intend to please ; they must in the same hour find fault with what before they had commended, and cry up to the skies what before they had condemn'd to the shades below ; complaisance therefore is commonly attended with these two shameful qualities, baseness, and inconstancy.

This is no more than what the complaisant themselves confess in their behaviour, as the most expert in this mystery never address themselves but to the weak and simple-minded ; they are like the quacks that offer not to expose their drugs but among low and common people. Men of judgment know how to take off this mask, and to laugh at this vain illusion ; they mind not what they are in the opinion of others, but what they really are in themselves. And from hence it is that they who love themselves most, love also flatterers ; because we seldom find the true knowledge and love of self in the same person. Those who thoroughly know what they are themselves, give no heed to flatterers when they praise them for what they are not ; but those who idolize their own opinions, have an aversion for all those who contradict them ; like *Ahab* *, they love none but complaisant pro-

* 1 Kings xxii. 8.

phers; and they care not who deceives them, so that they do but flatter them.

Indeed, there are some women, who, like *Jesabel**, hate your *Elijahs*, I mean those who dare reprove them for their faults; they are like monkeys, who will break the glass that shews them their deformity; whereas, says *Solomon*†, *A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver. As an ear-ring of gold and an ornament of fine Gold, so is a wise reprover upon an obedient ear.* I own, that in submitting to reproof, as in the boring an ear, one must lull the senses in order to feel the less pain; but that whatever pain it gives, women should resolve to endure it patiently, because this is more useful and honourable; as amendment contributes more to adorn the mind, than the richest ear-rings to adorn the face. Or otherwise, if we so love ourselves as not to endure truth when it sets our faults before us, complaisance will there soon gain the victory. As there is no further difficulty in taking a fortress, when it is surrendered to the besiegers; so it is easy to conquer a person by flattery, when self-love gives up the fort. Complaisance finds not much trouble in surprising the mind, when it hath got intelligence from ourselves by the means of self-love; it is like those thieves

* 1 Kings xix 2, &c.

† Prov. xxv. 12.

who

who have confederates in the house, ready to open the doors to them in the night when the family are least upon their guard. When *Eve* was once gained, *Adam* soon followed; so our inclination being once corrupted by complaisance, it is not long before the mind surrenders; this comparison seems the more just, forasmuch as the complaisant have the subtlety of serpents as well as their venom; they insensibly work themselves in, where they gain the least admittance; they attack our disposition in order to debauch our reason, and make the like trifling present of an apple.

They therefore who are sensible of a natural inclination to love complaisance, ought always to be upon their guard; they must not suffer themselves to slumber, lest the flatterer, like the serpent, should seduce this *Eve* within them. Women especially are in great danger, if they are not upon their guard, when complaisance offers them the fruit that promiseth life, but *the end thereof is death*. Indeed they ought well to consider this example, wherein they see what fatal mischief was wrought by complaisance upon the first of women, inspiring her with boldness to sin, and giving countenance to that which God himself had forbidden. They ought to remember, they have many enemies in wait to deceive them, who flatter not but to destroy them,

them, and accommodate themselves to their humour, only the more easily to seduce their minds.

The best advice I can give is, when any one loads us with undue praises, we should most attentively consider what we really are ourselves; to judge whether these painters have drawn us to the life, we should compare the copy with the original, and consider whether the pourtrait is not rather drawn according to our inclination than according to nature. There is no greater opposite to complaisance than conscience, as the one often condemns, while the other praiseth us; but as notwithstanding any detraction, we still may be really good and praise-worthy; so, however flattery may commend us, we may be really bad and justly blameable. Complaisance therefore is a capital enemy to the conscience; it would fain extinguish this divine light, it would lay this holy sentinel asleep, it would make dumb this inward tongue which ought to speak to us without ceasing, and which tormenteth us with its remorse at the same time that complaisance is flattering us with its praises.

What then is more pernicious in society than complaisance, which keeps us from the knowledge of our faults, and amuseth us with worldly error? we ought rather to bear an affront than complaisance, because it is less dangerous to be accused than to be praised falsely.

fallſly. The wounds of a friend are of more value than the kiſſes of flatterers ; ſuppoſe we ſhould miſtake, and think ourſelves what we really are not, ſtill it is better to deem ourſelves vicious in order to humble ourſelves, than to believe ourſelves virtuous, leſt we ſhould flatter ourſelves in our own pride. There is leſs hurt in flying from a mere phantom, than in ſuffering a real enemy to approach us ; it is better to fear an apparent evil than not to fear what is truly ſo ; fear in this reſpect runs much leſs hazard than confidence.

It is true, that complaiſance and detraction are equally the enemies of virtue ; but if the one falls upon us with the ſword, the other attacks us with poiſon : We ought rather therefore to be afraid of flatterers than ſlanders ; and to fly from enemies who conceal their deſigns, than from thoſe who declare open war. But let us ſee what in the end becomes of the complaiſant, with all their fineneſſe, their paint and dawbing ; when their artifice is once diſcover'd, we utterly deſeſt them ; they become ſuſpected by all the world ; no one has any affection for them but ſuch as do not know them ; and in truth, the ſatiſfaction that proceeds from complaiſance, and the diſguſt that ariſes from freedom, generally laſt as long as one another. At firſt we diſreliſh candour and freedom, and are mightily pleaſed with flattery and complaiſance ;

plaisance ; but upon further proof we alter our opinion, and have as much aversion for the latter, as we before had for the former ; the one is sweet and pleasant for a while, but finds long bitterness in the end ; and the other begins with slight distaste, but ends in lasting and solid contentment ; the one resembles physic, which is distasteful in order to cure ; the other is like poison, which is sweet in order to do hurt ; so that complaisance in this respect hath very different effects from those of truth ; forasmuch as the whole world esteem and seek after truth before it appears to them, but no sooner do they see it than it gives pain to the eyes : On the other hand, all the world condemns the complaisance of flatterers ; but when it approacheth, how charming is it ! how enchanting ! we neither hate the one nor love the other, but in their absence.

Having seen the bad qualities of complaisance, let us now examine the good and useful ; notwithstanding what hath been said, complaisance may be as far from flattery as prudence from craftiness, and courage from rashness ; and to say, that at least it is very difficult to distinguish the one from the other, is doing it as much wrong, as if we shou'd maintain that a man cannot be liberal without being profuse, or that a woman cannot be comely without being clumsy, or that moderation cannot be separated from excess.

I must own, that sometimes complaisance stoops too low, as when *Cynethus* * praised *Demetrius Phalereus* for coughing harmoniously, when he had got a cold: I own too that flatterers may abuse this excellent virtue; but what is there that cannot be abused? what is there so good or so divine, that the ignorant and malicious will not prophane? May we not make an ill use even of truth? are not they who publicly boast of some good action they have done, guilty of vanity, tho' they speak what is true? We must not therefore find fault with complaisance, because there are many who know not how to practise it aright; in its nature it is very good, tho' commonly it is put to a very bad use.

To prove this, do we not find that the great freedom of speech, which many are so apt to praise, proceeds very often not from integrity of heart, but from conceitedness of opinion, vanity, and imprudence? We take pleasure in contradiction, because the fear of being overcome gives us a reluctance to confess even the truth itself. I must observe however, that such a morose humour proceeds from a bad principle, at least it is a bad effect from a good cause; they that are so stubborn, or so little complaisant, ought to be pitied, be they ever so learned or virtuous. We may say of them, as *Plato* said of

* A poet of the island of *Chios*.

Xeno-

Xenocrates *, that notwithstanding his great learning and probity he had need to offer sacrifice to the graces. If to be guilty of such ill-manners was unseemly in a philosopher, how can it ever be commendable in a woman? As a gentle sweetness is the natural endowment of their sex, complaisance ought always to attend their actions and demeanor; I approve not indeed of those who seem affected, or under any constraint to please; but then I cannot excuse those who labour so much to be serious that they become quite churlish. Sweetness and austerity are not contrary to each other, but only different; prudence may so perfectly blend them together that the one may give a grace to the other.

I mean not by this, that in order to be complaisant they must universally approve of every thing; to be ready to please, or to contradict on all occasions whatever, are two extremes equally blameable. The persons that love to contradict in every thing, are either morose or presumptuous; and they who approve of every thing, are either ignorant or of a mean spirit; they who profess universal contradiction, do it either by inclination, or design; if by inclination, this arises from the savageness of their disposition; if by design, this arises from the vanity of their minds; but however that be, it never succeeds well;

* See *Plutarch* in the life of *C. Marius*.

either

either the temper is faulty, or the will imprudent; they are either of low birth, or have had no education.

How troublesome are such persons in conversation! if they had as great regard for the public as for their own private good, they would make a vow of eternal sequestration; they would never shew themselves but when there is need to mortify the world. Whatever we do or do not, it is impossible to please them; if we will not agree with their sentiments, they are extremely vexed; and if we follow their opinion, they presently entertain a quite different one, so as to be forever contradicting; if we praise virtue, they will immediately discommend it; if we condemn vice, they will employ their utmost endeavours to defend it; it matters not what opinion they are of, provided it be contrary to the opinion of others. If you praise them, they will accuse you of flattery; if you praise them not, they will accuse you of ingratitude; if we speak, we are called prattlers; if we speak not, we are thought proud and scornful; they find fault with either discourse or silence; they condemn both conversation and solitude.

In fact, persons of this humour are in a manner always very proud, where the complaisant are very humble; for to define complaisance, it is nothing else than patient civility

lity o
tian v
world
motiv
is to
men.
be c
mity
sider
we o
but
comp
not h
just
T
bear
hum
own
ever
that
to c
who
selve
have
at la
to a
mier
hath
ries
gree

lity or civil charity. If charity in the Christian world endureth all things *, in the moral world complaisance doth the same, tho' the motives are different; forasmuch as the one is to please God, and the other to please men. After all, we shall not think it hard to be complaisant, and to bear with the infirmity and imperfections of others, if we consider, that in this we do no more than what we often stand in need of for ourselves; but 'tis a misfortune, that they who have no compassion or tenderness for others, know not how to bear it when they meet with a just return.

They who are not complaisant enough to bear with the least faults in others, have never humility enough to suffer a reproof of their own more hainous crimes; they think that every one abuses reproof like themselves, and that it is not given in order to instruct, but to offend. They despise the opinion of the whole world, and yet would be adored themselves; they are as impatient as insolent; have as much vanity as rudeness; and if at last ignorance or truth should oblige them to agree with you and be silent, their very mien still shews contradiction; after their mouth hath concluded peace, their very silence carries on the war. Can any thing be more disagreeable in conversation than this humour?

* 2 Cor. xiii. 7.

surely

surely this quarrellsome temper is fit for no other society than the wrangling schools. I do not deny but that we may sometimes argue together, the better to come at truth, and in order to make the entertainment more agreeable by the variety of subjects in dispute; but there is reason to fear the being too warm and passionate on this occasion; at least we ought always to remember, that dispute in conversation is a war, wherein we ought not to contend with obstinacy, nor conquer with insolence; provided that complaisance attends these debates, nothing can be more agreeable; there can no more offence be given in a dispute of this sort, than between two persons that are flinging flowers at one another.

The same persons that have an inclination to contradict, have likewise an inclination to correct and reform every thing; but they are altogether as useless as troublesome; they know not how to shew good-will in reproof, any more than good-nature in disputing. Every thing that proceeds from their churlish humour is displeasing; tho' they even speak truth, it is with so ill a grace, that instead of making men better they only make them their enemies: We at first take a disgust to them, afterwards we have an aversion, and at last we utterly detest them; they are always the object of hatred or ridicule.

Com.

Complaisance meets with better success, since, as it praises without flattery, so it improves without giving offence; complaisance knows the art of curing agreeably; it takes off the bitterness of the physic without destroying its virtue; it is a sun that loses not its light in qualifying it for the eyes of the weak; it keeps it from dazzling, but not from enlightening the beholder. As the loadstone has not only the virtue to attract iron, but also to point out the north-pole; so complaisance charms both high and low; it enlightens those that have eyes, and attracts those that have not. They who have any knowledge see the force of it, and they who have not feel it; verily, complaisance hath a secret virtue to charm all hearts; it is a loadstone that attracts the very iron, I mean, the most barbarous and unpolish'd dispositions.

It gains insensibly upon their minds, even while it corrects them; it falls not impetuously like hail, but with the softness of snow; tho' the snow be cold it nevertheless, in scripture stile *, covers the ground, as it were, *with a mantle of wool*, in order to warm and cherish the seeds of the earth. In like manner tho' her correction may seem disagreeable, it still warms our hearts, and makes good designs, and holy enterprises spring up therein; it even obliges in rebuking, and if it strikes, it is

* Psal. cxlvii. 16.

with

with a rod in blossom, which in touching us strews us with flowers instead of wounds. Without complaisance the best advice seems rather a reproach; correction is injurious, praise is disagreeable and conversation irksom.

Neither is complaisance a blind virtue; it hath eyes as well as hands, it strikes not without due regard; there are some faults that it corrects, and others that it bears with; it bears with those which it cannot prevent; and indeed, setting aside that brotherly reproof to which christianity obliges us, what matter is it to us that many people err and have wrong opinions, where they concern not either morality or salvation? As we cannot pretend to cure all those who are any way diseased, we ought not to pretend to undeceive all those who are in error; it would be as vain an undertaking to correct all false opinions, as to administer physic to all the diseases in the world: We have no commission for this purpose; this belongs to the providence of God, and not to us.

Besides, what necessity is there to speak all that we think, and to declare in public all that either pleaseth or displeaseth ourselves? A wise man ought always to think before he speaks, but he is by no means oblig'd to speak all he thinks: He must not, in order to avoid saying nothing but what is true, by
saying

saying all that is true be guilty of indiscretion; to be frank and free, there is no need of being uncivil: We offend not against truth by not always publishing it; we are forbidden indeed, always to speak that which is false; but we are not commanded to speak always that which is true. There is no law that obligeth us to publish all our sentiments, or to discover all our thoughts.

On the other hand, this great freedom of speech is not only unjust or troublesome, but also very dangerous; this imprudent plainness often irritates the sweetest temper, whereas complaisance sometimes softens the most rugged. *Clitus* lost the friendship of *Alexander* by having spoke too freely; *Scipio* gain'd the affection of *Syphax* by entertaining him with an agreeable pleasantness; the one preserv'd his life with a stranger and barbarian; the other, by having taken an indiscreet liberty, lost his life at the hands of his most intimate friend*. Experience furnisheth us with examples enough to this purpose, without our having recourse to history; we shall daily find that without complaisance, we become odious and insupportable to all the world; where there is no complaisance there can be no civility, and without these two excellent qualities society cannot but be very disagreeable. But above all, women should consider,

* Quint. Curt. lib. viii. cap. 3.

that

that as their faces cannot please without some share of beauty, their conversation can never be agreeable without some share of complaisance.

But lastly, what is of greater concernment, having shewn how they ought to practise complaisance, let us now consider how they ought to receive it, and let us examine the difference between a complaisant person and a flatterer, that we may not mistake the one for the other. The celebrated *Panthea* is a sufficient instance in this point ; this lady was not less modest than fair, she contemn'd even the praises she justly deserv'd ; *Lucian* describing the perfections of her mind as well as face, compares her to the *Minerva* of *Phidias* and the *Venus* of *Praxiteles*. *Panthea* would by no means accept commendations that seem'd to her excessive ; nor cou'd she endure to be compared to a goddess ; *Lucian*, to answer her, and to justify the comparison he had made, shews us, in very few words, the difference between the praises of an orator and those of a flatterer.

“ We must not, says he, in praising any
 “ thing compare it to that which is less, be-
 “ cause this would be to take off from its me-
 “ rit ; nor to what is equal, for this would
 “ be no more than comparing a thing with
 “ itself ; but to something more excellent,
 “ from whence the subject of praise may re-
 “ ceive

“ ceive a greater lustre and eclat. An hunter,
 “ says he, when he praises a favourite dog,
 “ does not compare him to a fox, because
 “ this is too little ; nor to a wolf, because
 “ this is too near an equality ; but to a lion,
 “ that hath more strength and courage. Praises
 “ without foundation are mere flatteries, praises
 “ without ornament are injurious, praises that
 “ join ornament to merit are always just and
 “ acceptable ; it is flattery that praiseth the
 “ crooked for having a fine shape, and the
 “ bald-pate for a fine head of hair. From
 this reasoning then of *Lucian* we find that in
 praising we must raise that which is little to a
 proper mean, and that which is merely pro-
 per to something excellent ; praise must not
 say what is false, but only magnify ; it ought
 not to be profuse, and yet may be liberal.
 There is a great difference between plain
 history and panegyric ; mere description is
 not sufficient, something must be added of
 pomp and ornament.

Women may judge from hence, that there
 is even more difference between praise and
 flattery than between the decently setting off
 a face and painting it ; they may clearly see
 from the example of this orator, how they
 ought to give praise ; and from the example
 of this lady, how they ought to receive it.
Lucian shews that he well knew the laws of
 rhetoric ; and *Panthea*, that she was not igno-

rant of the rules of modesty and decorum. I know there are very few, that, like this lady, make a conscience of receiving the praises that are given them be they ever so extravagant and excessive; I know that the vanity of many is not less sacrilegious than bold, when they accept from their idolaters, without the least scruple, the names of angel or something more divine; lastly, I know that we have more reason to exhort to moderation than to freedom. Nevertheless it is to be consider'd, that they ought not to violate the laws of decorum by too closely observing those of modesty; prudence will shew a certain mean between insolence and incivility. Tho' christianity obliges us to reject all sort of praises, even the most just; yet it is good and proper sometimes, that complaisance should approve by the countenance what humility of the soul inwardly contemns. In this respect they always owe their consciences to God, but sometimes their mien and outward behaviour to custom and the world.

But to finish this discourse with a particular of the greatest importance; if they find themselves moved and greatly affected at the praises which complaisance is pleased to bestow upon them, they have nothing to do but to look into themselves, in order to find their remedy in their own consciences. As we are less afflicted, when we know that the evil
said

said
elate
said
selve
tract
that
impo
same
shew
enou
us re
ness
of m
of
souls
who
us br
W
ble
as th
men
know
they
work
had
to th
out
conf
*
pent.

said of us is false, so we ought to be less elated, when we know that the good that is said of us is not true : We must guard ourselves against flattery as well as against detraction by the knowledge of self ; seeing that conscience comforts us against these vile impostors, by shewing us our innocence ; the same will humble us when we are flatter'd, by shewing us our defects. And if it be not enough to consider our own imperfections, let us reflect upon the treachery and deceitfulness of others : How false are the dealings of men ! they that have the countenances of humble admirers, have sometimes the souls of murderers ; and sometimes they who so fondly praise us in their addresses curse us bitterly in their thoughts.

Women, like the poets' *Eurydice*, are liable to find a serpent under every flower* ; as their sex is naturally inclined to sweetness, men will put poison into that which they know they love ; they will lay snares where they are sure they will pass : But flatterers would be able to do them less mischief, if they had more regard to the designs of such than to their speeches ; they would more easily find out those who disguise the truth, if they consider'd that there are three qualities ab-

* Flying from *Aristæus*, she was slain by a serpent. Virg. Georg. iv. 458.

solutely necessary to form a just and friendly speaker; which are resolution, prudence, and affection. Where resolution is wanting, a man either palliates or dawbs; and where prudence or affection are wanting, he becomes injurious. Timorous minds dare not speak, the imprudent cannot, and enemies will not. In short, most innocently to render or receive complaisance, the wise ought to think that it is absolutely forbidden, when we take more care to please men than to please God *. They ought to think that God often disapproves those actions which gain the applause of men; and that they who listen to flatterers for exaltation in this world, shall want wherewithal to defend themselves, when God shall pass judgment on them in the next.



C H A P. XX.

Of BIRTH and EDUCATION.

PLATO with great propriety saith, that the three grand and most excellent principles of the world are nature, fortune, and art; seeing that nature g'ves life; fortune, wealth; art, knowledge; and that nature and art have seldom

* Gal. i. 10.

any lustre but what they borrow from the advantages of fortune, which sets off the other two with proper ornaments, and exhibits them to public view as on a stage. But I cannot approve of this philosopher's opinion, when he says "that nature and fortune produce the greatest things, and art the least. Nature makes the man, while art can rise no higher than to the image of one; fortune gives kingdoms, but art no more than discursive knowledge and science." *Plato* in this sentiment seems not so divine as usual; he speaks like mere fallible man; for so great and valuable are the works of art, that both nature and fortune stand in need of her assistance to raise our admiration; they both are blind 'till art is pleased to open their eyes. Without acquired knowledge it is impossible to live well, or bear any sort of rule with honour or credit. How many great estates have been destroy'd for want of conduct? what great genius's have been lost to the world for want of education? I shall not say any thing here of the power of fortune, but only treat of nature and art, or rather of birth and education, in order to see which of the two it is that women are most oblig'd to in their actions and the conduct of life.

It seems at first, as if birth or the being of good extraction was of more consequence to them.

them than any thing else whatever ; forasmuch as with this advantage they are sufficiently accomplish'd, as it were by nature and without any pains or trouble ; a good genius hath as little need of rules, as a good constitution hath of physic ; and that high birth hath better success in life with tolerable education, than low extraction with the best. As the least of the stars in the heavens is of more estimation, and hath greater influence than the sun in a picture, so the least advantages from nature are of higher value than all that can be acquired by art and study. A studied grace falls as much short of a natural one, as a picture does of the life ; and were all the women to submit to an arbitration, as the three goddesses before *Paris*, I think we should give the same judgment with the shepherd, that the most graceful in native charms is the most beautiful.

As of a good face, without any decoration or setting off, we may observe the beauty ; so of good natural parts, without any culture or instruction, we cannot but observe the strength and excellency ; throw a jewel into the dirt, it will still betray some sparks of native splendor, and an excellent genius will still shine through whatever cloud surrounds it. True nobility always emits certain rays, and carries certain signs of eminence in the countenance ;
which

which gives a better grace and more constant success to all their actions.

The virtues to which we are most inclined by nature last longer than those to which we are not; we more easily retain that which we have by birth, than what is acquired by art and study. Nature herein is like those step-mothers that pay a greater regard to their own children than to those of another bed; she is like the earth that nourisheth more kindly the produce of her own soil, than what is implanted by the gardiner. The effects of nature are like the streams that for ever flow of themselves; the effects of art are like the conduits of fountains, which continually stand in need of repair; what comes from nature is always more equal and sure.

Hence it is, that there are many who love rather to follow their own natural genius than to renounce it for the affectation of any thing else, however better such thing may be and more commendable. Their opinion is not at all unreasonable, since it is very possible to succeed better in cultivating that which, tho' of no great estimation, we have in ourselves, than in pretending to imitate what is more excellent in others. As *David* * was better equipp'd for battle with his crook and staff than with the arms of *Saul*, and could do more execution with the instruments of a shepherd than with

* 1 Sam. xvii. 38.

those of a king ; so more may be effected by our own genius than by all the study in the world ; if the finest method and most pompous stile suits not well with our abilities, the affectation of it would be of more disservice to us than advantage ; for wanting liberty, we can never be truly graceful.

How superfluous is the constraint, how vain the trouble to pretend to acquire a perfection which is not natural to us ! since whatever is indifferent is not worthy to be imitated, and what is most excellent cannot : The highest perfection in any thing is not attainable by art alone : who can acquire by art the nervous strength and flowing ease of true eloquence ? Or in just reasoning, subtilty and promptness ? And as to a good grace, who can ever acquire that native beauty, that sovereign charm, which painters know not how to draw, nor poets to describe, and which it is much easier to be sensible of than to express ?

Besides, what need have we to light a flambeau when the sun shines upon us ? What need to have recourse to the light of art when we enjoy the light of nature ? It is not only superfluous but disgraceful and difficult ; and indeed however fine the rules, and however great the examples which we would follow, are, it oftentimes costs us more trouble to do just what another man does than to do more : It is easier to surpass than to equal another ;
because

because to do more requires only strength and courage, but to do just so much, requires a certain measure and proportion wherein our best endeavours may chance to fail : As it is easier to outrun a man than to walk with him step by step ; because in the former we depend upon ourselves, but in the latter are subject to the humour and gait of him we contend with.

There is too much constraint and mean-spiritedness in acting after this manner ; it is much better therefore to follow our own inclination, provided it be not contrary to the dictates of reason : It is much better to examine our own genius for the attainment of any perfection ; as we first examine the nature of the soil, before we either plant or sow. Whatever may be said in the praise of art, it often proves a labyrinth, from whence we cannot easily extricate ourselves ; we must fly upwards, instead of troubling ourselves to find a way out of so many turnings that generally perplex the vulgar. Indeed great minds will sometimes, like the birds, walk along the paths ; but they as often soar aloft, and make use of their wings as well as feet ; they follow the force of their genius, and give way to the warmth of their own imagination without any other guide than that of common-sense and the light of nature, instead

of embarrassing themselves with the many troublesome rules that are prescribed by art.

If we could arrive at the true knowledge of our own temper and constitution, we should find less difficulty in obtaining success in whatever we undertake; in renouncing this principle to imitate some other person, we are like those who resign a good patrimony upon the uncertainty of seeking a fortune elsewhere; we are like *Marc Antony*, when he forsook the finest beauty in *Rome* to run after one not half so fair in *Egypt*; it is to prefer a *Cleopatra* to the matchless *Octavia*; despising what is in our power, however excellent it be, for something not easily attainable, nor of equal value when attained. How happy would it be for women in every thing they do or omit, thoroughly to know their own temper and constitution!

For behold the source of the greatest disorders in the world; ignorant of what we are by nature we would fain acquire that which we have not abilities to attain. The gay humour will sometimes affect the reserve of the melancholy, and the melancholy the *fiercé* of the cholerick; instead of adapting our humour to that which is most suitable hereto, we fly from it and pursue an example, which rather throws us back and hinders us from arriving at any degree of perfection. If we duly regarded the seeds of virtue that nature hath
sown

sown in our minds, we should render ourselves much more perfect and happy ; more perfect, because we should with less pains acquire whatever perfection is conformable to our nature ; and more happy, because our actions would have less constraint, and we should employ ourselves only in those means which are conducive to our happiness.

But it is a misfortune, saith *Cicero*, that *we suck down error with our mothers' milk*. To obey custom, truth must yield to vanity, and nature to opinion ; we are so confounded with the variety of opinions, and impressions that are made on us from the cradle, that we cannot find our true selves when we come of age to make this reflection. We know not the abilities of our own genius, and have more regard to what others do, than what we are able to do ourselves. We act herein, like some mothers that are more fond of other children than their own, and love an adopted branch better than their own offspring ; without considering, that were we to follow nature we should sooner arrive at perfection and happiness ; and that, whatever we do contrary to our own humour, it must always want an agreeable freedom and a good grace.

I cannot deny however but that there are some inclinations very bad, and some dispositions that stand in great need of reformation ; but even herein may be seen the power of nature,

nature, since there are so very few who study to correct their natural temper, and to surmount the vices that are born with them. This is not only true of particular persons but of whole nations; the *Cartbaginians* were always reckon'd deceitful; the *Lacedæmonians* slow and tardy in their undertakings, and the *Atbenians* on the contrary rash and over-hasty *. Thus I say particular countries are attach'd to particular vices, as well as the individuals; which vices it is very difficult to overcome; nay strive all we can, we never gain a complete victory over these natural dispositions. *Solon* was a man that loved letters, and accordingly he was found with a book in his hand when he was dying; *Socrates* was naturally given to jeer and railing, and accordingly play'd the buffoon in the last moments of his life †.

For a man to desire intirely to overcome this natural tendency, is much the same as to desire to leap above his shadow, or to fly from himself. We may indeed mortify our natural passions, but we cannot kill them; we may possibly keep them under so as not to permit them to become our masters, but they will sometimes rebel; if they do not altogether govern us, they however give us much trouble; we may perhaps for some time keep

* These examples are omitted in the latter editions.

† The names likewise of *Solon* and *Socrates* are omitted in the latter editions.

them in their proper channels, but they will at length overflow, and like a torrent carry along all before them. *Nero* at his first setting out behaved with prudence and decorum; but in a little while not even the care and tuition of *Seneca* were able to restrain the natural vitiousness of his temper; the mask was thrown off, and the man, if he might be called man, appeared in his genuine colours*.

Let us look into ourselves, we shall find that a favourite passion will sometimes get the better of us, notwithstanding the efforts of reason and the precepts of philosophy. If our vitious inclinations seem subdued, it is but for a while, like *Martial's* bear that leap'd upon his keeper and devour'd him, tho' he had been tamed for many years, nor had before attempted any mischief*.

How strange are the effects of nature! there have been those who have not discovered the vitiousness of their tempers but in the very end of life. *Pliny* says, that as in the *Indies* there are certain countries where the hair is white in youth, but grows black in old age; so we see many, who are sober and discreet in their childhood, but in their riper years

* Tacit. ann. 4.

† I do not remember this said of any bear in *Martial*, but of a lion. lib. i. epigr. 10.

Læferat ingrato leo perfidus ore magistrum,
Ausus tam notas contemnerare manus.

are addicted to all manner of sport, licentiousness and debauch; these are the seeds of evil that lie lurking within us, and shoot not forth but in the latter season.

Nature will always take its own course, and whatever pains are taken by education to correct it, it will at last shew its good or bad qualities. There is a notable instance of this in the two daughters of *Augustus*; they were brought up in the same court, had the same instructions, and the same examples set before them; yet *Livia* kept company with none but libertines, while *Julia* delighted only in the conversation of the wise: At all public entertainments the one was surrounded with courtesans and profligates, and the other with philosophers *. Thus although these two princesses had the same care taken of their education, they were very different in their lives and conduct; by following their own inclinations, the one was a discreet and most accomplish'd lady, the other a loose and most abandon'd prostitute. Such then is the force of nature, good or bad; let us now see what are the effects of a good education, and how absolutely necessary it is for all women however distinguish'd by their birth.

Whatever may have been said in favour of high birth, education seems still more requisite for the accomplishment of the fair sex:

* Tacit. annal. 1. Sueton. in vitâ Augusti.

The former depends upon chance, the latter upon the application of our own minds. Education is necessary for all sorts of persons, it makes such as have a good natural disposition more perfect, and such as have a bad one more tolerable ; it gives a lustre to the one, and repairs the defects of the other. As lead may be made more valuable by the art of *Phidias* than a mass of unwrought gold ; so but mean natural parts may succeed better in the world by a good education, than the most excellent disposition when spoiled by an improper and faulty education.

In the beginning of this chapter we laid down the three principles of *Plato*, but here we shall take notice of the three principles of *Plutarch* ; “ we can arrive, says he, at no “ *perfection either in virtue or the sciences without nature, reason, and application**.” Nature gives the capacity, reason gives rules and precepts, and application exerciseth us in acquiring facility and habit. Learning without genius is still rude, and nature without learning is blind ; but both the one and the other without practice and experience are still imperfect : From hence it is manifest, how necessary education is, since it comprehends both art and experience ; it polisheth and gives the finishing stroke to what nature but begun ;

* See *Plutarch's* morals, on the education of children.

as nature affords matter, education must give form and beauty.

For this reason our ancestors thought that a man stood not less indebted to his tutor and instructors than to his parents; seeing that if these gave him life the other gave him knowledge, without which life itself would prove but a burden. The *Lacedæmonians* therefore made choice of one of their wisest and most eminent magistrates, to instruct and educate their children: *Eteocles* * chose rather to give his old men in hostage to *Antipater* than the young ones, fearing lest youth should be corrupted in a strange country. Lastly, it was upon this account that the *Pythagoreans* were wont to say, that *the education of youth was the foundation of the public weal.*

And indeed it was but right to think that states and provinces depended greatly upon the good-nurture and education of children; because it is very difficult to keep a people in obedience who have been bred up in rebellion. Besides, the principles which nature inspires generally regard only private good, whereas art and education point out the duty we owe the public; nature prompts us to aspire after liberty, and education still retains us in submissive duty.

Good education therefore is absolutely necessary: however rich the soil there must be la-

* The *Lacedæmonian* general.

bout

bour and tillage where we expect any fruit; so however excellent the natural genius is, yet for its better success it must have recourse to good instructions and good examples. Yet more, as the richer the ground is, it is more fertile of weeds and brambles; so the stronger the natural parts are, they are generally more productive of bad effects while they continue without discipline. Corrupt nature employs all her power in the production of evil; we must prune our inclinations as we do the trees, that those parts only may thrive which will bring forth fruit. I own that we must sometimes have regard to temper; for as all sorts of ground are not fit for all sorts of seeds, so every natural disposition is not capable of receiving the same impressions; as nature without art is never certain and constant, art without nature hath neither strength nor sweetness; it is necessary there should be matter to sustain the form, and without a substance to rely upon there could be no accidents.

But however requisite good natural parts may be for our success in life, they may chance to lie under some constraint, and we may be oblig'd to take as much pains to excel in a virtue to which we have an inclination, as in that to which we have none. Indeed this point of morality is not less agreeable than necessary; for fear therefore of abuse herein it
is

is good to observe that nature gives us not so strong a propension to virtue, as to the extremes which beset us from a tempting world ; she rises to excess or falls into defect, if not stayed in the point of mediocrity by the assistance of art and education. Nature stands in need of the goad or the bridle ; she either freezes or burns, and flies from one extreme to the other, if education points not out the mean wherein true virtue consists.

Moreover, when nature carries us to any excess, be it rashness, prodigality, or the like, we are apt to think we have an inclination to virtue, whereas in truth we are pursuing vice only ; and therefore it is said that morality finds as great difficulty in healing the diseases of the soul, as physic those of the body. Physic can hardly cure the diseases that attend a consumption ; morality can hardly cure the diseases that arise from too great a plenitude. Physic more easily pulls down than it repairs ; morality more easily repairs than it pulls down : The one labours to give life to the body, the other to kill the bad habits of the soul *.

So that even in that to which we have the strongest natural tendency, we sometimes find more difficulty to succeed ; it is harder for the prodigal to become truly liberal than for the covetous man ; it is more easy to raise a

* This last sentence is omitted in the latter editions.
defect

defect to a proper mean than to make excess return again to order. The reason is plain, excess always gives more pleasure than defect; and tho' these two extremes are equally vitious, yet we are more freely inclined to the one than to the other; we choose rather to have too much than too little; we had rather be fat and puffed up than lean and meagre. It seems more excusable and shews a better spirit, to sin with the prodigal than with the covetous, and with the rash than with the coward.

It is certain therefore that simple nature gives us nothing just and regular; it only makes us prodigal or rash, but it is art or education, that must teach us how to be truly brave and liberal. From whence we may learn, that the stronger the natural parts are they stand in need of the better education, in order to regulate or retrench the bounties of nature; for in truth without education a woman by nature fluent of tongue will become a prattling gossip; the serious disposition will turn to savageness, and the wise to deceitfulness and fraud. Nature will lose its way without a guide, and its force and vigour become prejudicial, unless properly employed by art and the light of reason.

But suppose that what I have said were false; suppose it were more easy to succeed in a virtue to which we have a natural inclination
than

than in that to which we have none; what would there be in this worthy of praise? Of what advantage is it to be good, when we cannot be otherwise? What honour is there in being virtuous, when we cannot sin but by mere force and study? This may be a happiness, but not such as to be gloried in. A person is no more praise-worthy for having a natural tendency to some virtue than for being born with a fair face or a good constitution. Indeed virtues that are born with us may be founded upon no commendable principles; natural patience comes from stupidity, hardness of temper from ignorance, and the want of a generous spirit. In short there can be no merit where there is no liberty.

But granting knowledge and choice, yet what praise can there be in acting after such a manner to which we are readily inclined by nature? We do not wonder so much at the excellency of an orator in *Demades* * as in *Demosthenes*; I say *Demosthenes*, because nature seems not to have given him either tongue or lungs sufficient for that province; who nevertheless became so celebrated for his admirable eloquence, that his sole example may suffice to shew that there is nothing impossible to art, and that there is no defect but what may be overcome by labour

* An *Athenian* orator, who would rise up and finish what faint *Demosthenes* could not utter for want of premeditation and ability.

and study. This indeed is highly commendable, when notwithstanding any natural opposition to what is good we cease not our labours till we have acquired an habit thereto; indeed to raise a virtue in our souls to which nature is repugnant, is like those princes who to evidence their power build palaces and pleasure-houses upon rocks and in deserts. How glorious is it to see *Heraclides* * become a Philosopher, having so little an inclination to wisdom? Or *Socrates* become so good a man, with a disposition so little inclinable to virtue? How glorious is it to see a soul altogether chaste, when the warmth of lustful youth fires the blood? How glorious is it to see a philosopher forcing an infirm body to war, and exerting a noble courage while the senses tremble? I much more admire the courage of *Cato* than that of *Ajax*, the courage of reason more than that of constitution. I am not surpris'd, that the blind should defy the lightning, and the deaf should not fear the thunder; the less knowledge a man hath of evil, undoubtedly he hath the less reason to fear it; but I behold with surprise and admiration the many great personages, that have acquired the habit of several virtues to which by nature they had no disposition.

* A philosopher of *Pontus*, scholar to *Plato* and *Aristotle*, called for his effeminacy *Pompicus* instead of *Ponticus*.

There

There is more honour then in conquering an inclination to evil, and being good by choice, than in being so from temper and constitution ; education therefore is altogether requisite, since it improves the virtues of a good disposition, and amends the defects of a bad one ; nor is there any person of so mean a birth or so vile a disposition that ought not to aspire to perfection, seeing there are so many great examples of persons that have surmounted the vitiousness of their Temper, and gain'd a complete victory over their repugnancy to all goodness. It is education that must do this, and therefore it is highly to be esteem'd since it serves both for nourishment and physic ; it heals the diseased and preserves the healthful ; it polishes what is good and corrects what is bad in the natural constitution.

But to come to what is of greater importance ; for our better success in life we must begin betimes to qualify ourselves for true probity by means of a pious education ; for, whatever disinclination we may have to evil, there are many virtues daily to be acquired and many imperfections to be conquered. An hatred of vice and the love of virtue cannot be inculcated too soon ; I like not therefore the opinion of *Hesiod*, who would not have children instructed before they are seven years old : *Cbrysippus* * pleases me better, who

* A stoic philosopher born at *Tarsus*. He was a scholar to *Zeno*, and a most acute logician. Hor. Sat i. 3. 124. Laert. Plutarch, On stoic philosophers.

maintain'd that in the whole life of man there is no time to be lost. Can we begin too soon to amass that wealth of which we never can be rich enough? can we study too soon that knowledge, in which we never can be sufficiently perfect?

The length of time required for the acquisition of knowledge and the shortness of human life, is a general complaint*; but if we search into this mistake we shall find that this evil proceeds not from our ending life too soon, but from our beginning it too late. We should find it long enough for the attainment of all necessary knowledge, if we began to live and to study near the same time; they who sleep till noon complain unjustly of the shortness of the day; they would have kept back the evening, had they made a proper use of the morning. Since we cannot lengthen the term†, we must the sooner set to work; we must forward the beginning with all possible improvement,

* Our want of time and the shortness of human life are some of the principal common-place complaints, which we prefer against the establish'd order of things, they are the grumblings of the vulgar, and the pathetic lamentations of the philosopher; but they are impertinent and impious in both. *Bolingbr.* letters on the true use of retirement and study.

† The term itself is long; we render it short, and the want we complain of flows from our profusion, not from our poverty: we are all arrant spend-thrifts, &c. *Bolingbr.* *ibid.*

since

since we cannot by any means push off the end.

At what time then must we undertake that important business, the education of children? surely we can never teach them too early what ought to be the practice of their whole lives; as *Laelius* * among the heathens taught his daughter in her infancy the laws of eloquence, that she might learn to speak with grace and propriety, so St. *Jerom* taught *Pacatula* the laws of christianity even in the cradle, that when grown up she might lead a righteous and godly life. What ought we to learn sooner than religion? or where can we offer up the first-fruits of reason, or make the first essays of the tongue more worthily, than in acknowledging and adoring that almighty Being who gave us both the one and the other?

Josephus says that the *Israelites*, by command of *Moses*, knew the laws before they knew their own names; from whence we may learn at what time to begin a christian education. It may be objected perhaps that young children are not capable of so serious a knowledge; but surely infants are capable of knowing the laws, tho' not of putting them in practice; they are capable of the functions of the memory, tho' not of those of judgment;

* A nobleman of *Rome*, firnam'd the wife. See *Plutarch* in the life of *Gracchus*.

hence

hence the poets feigned the most ancient of the muses to be *Mnemosyne* *, that is, Memory, to shew us, that this is the first thing we are capable of ; and as we can expect nothing from the field that has not been till'd and sown, so no fruit can redound from all our care and watchings, if this mother of art and sciences be barren. This then must be rendered fruitful by a good and timely education in order to produce salutary effects, when children come to the age of reason and understanding ; infants are capable of receiving when they cannot give ; they are capable of impression tho' not of action.

The knowledge of good is form'd in our souls, as the seeds are in the ground ; there is a time when they lie conceal'd, a time when they spring forth, and a time when they bear fruit. How happy are they who are taught the things of heaven before they know the things of earth ! who learn devotion before they learn vanity ! These divine foundations can never be shaken ; all the good that is imprinted upon this *rasa tabula* can never be effaced ; this holy favour with which a new vessel is imbued, will last a long time. It is of great importance therefore, that the

* She was the mother of the muses, who are said to have been born of *Jupiter* and *Mnemosyne*, that is, intellect and memory.

first impressions should be made of good and not of evil; and as *Quintilian* required that, in order to make a man an orator and to form the tongue to fluency and propriety, his nurse herself should be eloquent; so it is likewise desirable, that she should be religious and devout in order to form the moral sense of children and lay betimes the foundations of virtue.

I do not mean by this that we must begin all at once to teach children the high mysteries of religion; we must have the same regard to their weaker minds as to their stomachs; we must give them milk before we give them more solid meat *. It would be ridiculous to talk of the greatness of eternal glory to him whose mind is set upon his toys, or to preach the merit of obedience to him who as yet lifts up his little hand to beat his mother. Christian knowledge, as *Tertullian* writes, *bath certain degrees and certain ages wherein to grow and raise itself gradually to perfection.*

But after all, tho' it may be improper to instruct children in such lofty subjects, can we teach them nothing but what is superfluous? When we consider how full of action they are, and how busy in their little tricks, is not this a tacit complaint that we suffer them to lose time? Is not this a sign that they want some better employ? and that they

* 1 Cor. iii. 3. Heb. v. 13, 14.

already desire somewhat more besides their dolls and play-things? I am not so bigotted to my own opinion, as to suppose it a proper rule of action for others; but hear what St. *Jerom* saith concerning the education of *Patula*, and which may serve for the rest of her sex.

“ As soon, saith he, as she hath passed
 “ her seventh year, let her learn the psalter
 “ by heart, and let the holy scriptures be the
 “ treasure of her soul. We must begin, he
 “ adds, to instruct our children as soon as
 “ they begin to blush; when they are capa-
 “ ble of shame, they are capable of disci-
 “ pline: When their countenances betray these
 “ visible marks of their consciences, we may
 “ from this their remorse suspect their inno-
 “ cence, and be assured they already know
 “ the difference between vice and virtue.”
 Such are the sentiments of this holy man; perhaps he may seem too severe to many, but be that as it will, 'tis a lamentable sight to see how education is neglected or abused; to see what liberties are given to children, and that they often meet with praise where they deserv'd correction; and as if they could not learn to sin soon enough, they are suffer'd to see and do such things, as can have no other effect than to embolden them in evil when they grow up to a proper age.

I would not be thought austere, and must own, that too great restraint is oftentimes very dangerous. The poets' *Danaë* lost her innocence even in the strong tower wherein her parents had shut her up, to guard her against all attacks *; this solitude proved more perillous to her than to have been at large. I own that as the waters that have been sometime kept in, when the dam is broke, flow down with greater impetuosity, so some dispositions that have been hardly used by too great restraint, will be apt to take the greater liberties when they meet with a favourable opportunity. Lastly, I own that moderation must be used herein, that all things are not to be allowed or forbidden, that prudence ought to point out a proper mean between libertinism and tyranny, and a discreet management both of promises and threatnings, of sweetness and austerity.

However, I cannot help thinking that restraint is much safer for such tender years than liberty; and that, without a good natural understanding, the chains of fear will be more likely to bind them to their duty than those of love. Sweetness of temper is good, and

* 'Tis said her father *Acrisius* shut her up in this tower, because it was foretold by the oracle that he should be killed by his grandson; which afterwards came to pass.

properly

properly used to those who have knowledge and a good disposition; but where these are wanting, nothing can be more dangerous. Nay even a good disposition may be spoiled by too much liberty, and a vitious one will never be balk'd in its designs when occasion offers to shew itself: I think it good therefore to treat these young folks as we do the sick; we must give them what we think most useful for them rather than what they like best themselves. It is running too great an hazard to rely upon their own conduct; diffidence in this respect is a principal part of prudence, which not only regards the evils that have happen'd but what may happen. By checking an opportunity we prevent at least the bad effect, if not the desire of it; the venom of it may remain, but it can do no hurt; and to shew how far our caution herein may extend itself, *St. Jerom* adviseth that the young and beautiful *Pacatula* should not only be kept from balls and comedies, but even from the church-assemblies when any danger was apprehended; for sacred as these places are, occasional and profane spectators will sometimes intrude.

If moreover we examine into the origin of evil, we shall find that the greatest danger of corrupting children lies generally at home; if some daughters are as faulty as their mo-

thers, this comes by imitation, as well as by inheritance. Bad example hath not less influence upon education than a bad stamen upon the constitution. I blush to think of the great disorders of this age; how is it possible for a boy not to love play, who scarce ever seeth his father without the dice or cards in his hands? or a daughter to be chaste that hears her mother sighing for her galants, that sees her continually receiving billetdoux; and when her whole talk is of little else than delightful walks and suspicious assignations*? After this, can we expect to keep them from the vice and follies which they have seen ourselves commit? Indeed, however we may threaten or whatever lessons we may give, example will have more force to carry them to evil than any check or correction to restrain them from it. As the vine lays hold of the first prop it can find, childhood conforms itself to the first model that it sees; not being able to act from reason, it will act by example. Children receive bad impressions very easily, which are not so easily to be worn off; and as the apostles seem'd to find more difficulty in casting out a devil that had possess'd a child†, we ought to think the conversion,

* I must here excuse myself to the ladies, as before to our young gentlemen, in reminding them that the author was a Frenchman.


† Matt. xvii. 19.

if

if it should happen, of a confirm'd debauchée as great a miracle. Bad education casts so deep a root in the soul, that it is almost impossible ever to eradicate it; judge then, what hope there can be of salvation, when habit is become as vicious as nature. To induce mothers to think seriously on this weighty affair many notable examples might be brought, both sacred and profane; but let one suffice at present, *Plutarch's Eurydice* †. This illustrious lady, when aged, set herself to learn the arts and languages, that she might instruct her children therein; she thought it not enough to give them life by birth, if she did not make them capable of virtue by education. What an example is this! to shew, that however some mothers may want merit and probity, yet they ought purposely to acquire them, in order to instruct their children; and that if an heathen took so much pains to make her children speak well, christian mothers ought to take more in instructing their children to live well.

* See his dissertation, on the education of children.





C H A P. XXI.

*Of ÆQUANIMITY in good and bad
FORTUNE.*

IT is very difficult to know, whether women are more susceptible of moderation in good fortune than of patience in bad ; whether they are more liable to despond in affliction than to be insolent in prosperity ; since pain and pleasure have the same effect upon our minds, as the frost or scorching rays of the sun have upon flowers ; as flambeaux go out by having too much or too little matter, so the mind or spirit of man is lost in having too much or too little satisfaction. If we examine well our levity, we shall find that it ariseth from these two sources ; fortune either attacks with poison or with the sword ; she destroys us with the soft countenance of a siren or the terrible one of a fury ; and lest we should escape her, she turns even our good to evil.

As painters observe that the same wrinkles of the face will serve both for weeping and laughing, experience shews that, like children, we often weep and laugh at the same thing ; and further 'tis observable, that they
who

who are overjoy'd at good fortune, are too much cast down at the reverse. Defect and excess cause alike this inequality of temper; and as the bodies that are most sensible of heat are likewise so of cold, the souls that are most deeply pierced with pain are likewise too much elevated with pleasure; and these are generally such as are most subject to insolence and impatience. There are very few who know how to regulate their passions, and to shew a proper presence of mind on the great occasions of joy and sorrow; there are few who, like *Socrates*, can always exhibit an equal countenance and mind in all sorts of accidents: We suffer ourselves to be hurried down with the torrent, we are dragged along by the present occasion; we are like the birds that swim upon the water in a storm, and rise and fall with the wave that carries them.

I would not have it thought, that by an equal mind I mean a stupid one; I would have women to be wise but not insensible; not to divest themselves of all passion, but to manage it rightly; for that would be as unjust as it is impossible: But suppose it was possible, would it not be inhuman philosophy to renounce all compassion and pity, love and hope? An eminent person of our times saith very justly, *that to think intirely to take away*

the passions, is to make a man either a rock or a God, by placing him in a state either above or below sensibility. And Epictetus saith admirably well, that we must not be without affection like brutes, nor without reason like madmen, but so behave as to set reason in opposition to pain; that hereby we may shew, that we can feel pain and again taste health; that we have sensibility and wisdom, or otherwise it is not æquanimity but stupidity; it is to shew ourselves void of sense or reason.

And indeed I can by no means approve of the stubborn constancy of the *Stoics*; their wise man seems like *Pindar's Ceneus*, whose naked skin was so hard, that it could not be pierced with darts and arrows *. Their insensible philosopher seems composed of adamant; he is shut up without acknowledging himself a captive; when he is grown old, he does not decay; he is ugly, without being disagreeable; he is a king, without any revenues except his arguments; he possesseth all things, yet begs his bread; his fancy serves him for a *cornucopia* in the midst of poverty; and in short he is no otherwise happy than as he is a fool.

This stoical spirit is no more to be moved by joy than sorrow; so that to be of an equal temper, after the fashion of this sect, a man

* Ovid. Met. xii. 172.

must

must not be troubled at seeing his friends labouring under sickness or distress. He must not rejoice in good fortune, nor repine in bad; a state of health must give him no more contentment than the severest malady; he must receive the one and the other without resenting the alternative.

Such then is the æquanimity of the stoic; but is not this extravagant morality? would it not be proper to call such as maintain this doctrine poets rather than philosophers? and are not their wise men more like the knights-errants in romances, who have stopped rivers, and even the stars in their courses, and done other such prodigious feats? This is not the wisdom I would have; I am not inquiring after an imaginary strength, and which would destroy humanity instead of regulating it. I own there are proper times and seasons, when to laugh and when to weep; when to be sorrowful, and when to be joyous. And I think *Euphrantus*, when he lost his wife, had just reason to complain of philosophy, which as it commands us to love that which is good, forbids us, when it is taken from us, to mourn the loss of it.

Since we ought to express our joy when we have an object that pleaseth us, ought we not to shew our regret when we have it not? What we possess with love, we cannot part from

from but with sorrow. It is not less natural to be sad than to be merry at the sight of good or evil; provided there be no excess herein, it cannot but be a dreaming philosophy that would restrain a sensation so natural and reasonable. To rejoice in the morning at hearing some good news, and to be sorrowful in the evening at hearing the reverse, is by no means a faulty inconsistency; such a change of temper is just; and as our taste is differently affected with any thing sweet or bitter, so ought our minds to be with good or evil. What danger can there be in acknowledging that our soul is capable of joy or sorrow, as our senses are of pain or pleasure? certainly, in this respect, reason is not contrary to nature, and we may shew ourselves at the same time, both wise and sensible.

But more clearly to manifest this error; there are those who think it a great effect of constancy, not to complain of the evils we endure; but surely there is not less danger in this sometimes than blindness and folly: 'Tis a vanity that hath cost some women very dear, when they have heighten'd their sorrow by endeavouring to conceal it, and by not giving it a proper vent in mournful cries have died upon the spot. When our Lord was pleas'd to express his sorrow in tears*; instead

* Luke xix. 41. John xi. 35.

of accusing him of an unequal and inconstant mind, we ought to confess that tears and sighs are not always the signs of impatience but only of sensibility; and that, if God himself was pleased hereby to declare himself man, we ought not to be ashamed of demonstrating ourselves such by the same visible signs and tokens. However this may be taken for a sign of weakness, it is nevertheless so universal to all the world, that it cannot be more blameable to be capable of weeping than of dying; we are as sensible as mortal.

After all, to what purpose serves this silent stubbornness in grief? will it sooner alleviate our sorrows to be harden'd as a statue of salt, instead of suffering the bitterness thereof to distil from our eyes in tears or exhale in sighs? A great poet justly saith,

*Our tears, like rivers, their due passage claim,
We must not stop, but moderate the same*.*

Grief is sometimes like a flood, which the more you endeavour to restrain the more you will make it rage and swell; let it have its course, it will flow down and soon pass away of itself. Provided we conquer this enemy, it imports not whether we do it by flight or

* Les pleurs, comme les eaux, ont le droit de passage,
Il en faut moderer, non defendre l'usage.

resistance;

resistance; but I am afraid my judgment herein may be called in question; since there seems to be no necessity for allowing many women this liberty of expressing their grief, it being a custom with which they are but too well acquainted. *Isabella* queen of *Spain* indeed is highly praised for having born sickness and the extremest pains without a sigh or groan; and yet nevertheless there are many of her sex who are guilty of a vice quite opposite to this virtue, who not only weep and wail when there is no reason for so doing, but merely through artifice and cunning; and who would not long be sick, if they could but tell what ails them.

However this be, we may learn from what has been said, that to have true equanimity there is no need to abstain always from weeping or laughing; it is too stoical a philosophy, which requires the same mind both in affliction and prosperity. I think that according to the occasion, which presents itself, of good or evil a wise man may be joyful or sad; and that when the subject requires it, he may make his complaint without being guilty of an effeminate weakness; instead of making himself too great a philosopher, like *Possidonium**, who, let him be ever so sick, still

* A philosopher, under whom *Cicero* studied for some time while he resided at *Rhodes*. *Plutarch* in the life of *Cicero*.

pretended

pretended to be in good health. But to go on; having shewn what is not acquanimity, let us now see what it is; having overthrown the opinion of the vulgar, let us examine that of wise men.

As the winds are various, that move and toss the ships on the sea, so are the passions and appetites that trouble and toss the human mind; but among all these motions there are principally two, which cause the most remarkable unevenness of temper in us, I mean, when a present good creates too much joy, or a present evil too much sorrow. These are the passions that make the blood either fly to the extremities or retire to the heart, that makes it dilate or contract itself too much. As fine weather invites us to walk abroad, and a storm makes us fly back again into our houses, so the motions of joy carry us, as it were, too far out of ourselves, and those of sorrow press us too closely in. The excess of the one or the other prevents the mind from being equal and constant. It remains then, to consider which of these two passions troubles us the more; and whether there is not more danger in being too elate in good fortune, than in being too much cast down in bad.

Undoubtedly, sorrow hath more dire effects than joy; there are more shipwrecks in a storm than in a calm; prosperity destroys
not

not like adversity; nor is it possible, that good should produce so much evil as evil itself. Tho' all the passions may cause some uneasiness, there is none so capable of destroying us as that of sorrow; insomuch that the very colour of the countenance betrays the pains that it makes the heart of the afflicted endure, and the disorder that it creates in the thoughts of the wisest man.

I do not wonder that the sorrowful are so pale and faint, and have scarce any life in them; since sorrow is nothing else but a lingring death, and death but a counter-sorrow; and indeed sorrow holds us so long in pain that it seems as it were a *coup de grace*, to end our sufferings with our life. We never hear of any one's killing himself from an excess of joy, but too often of those unhappy wretches who in their deep distress think death a remedy for all their sorrows. Such terrible mischief does this passion work upon the senses and the soul of man; it alters the blood; it infects the temper; it pains the body with sickness, and the mind with confusion; it first weakens the organs, and then the rational faculties; it as often stands in need of physic for its cure as of philosophy. I own that on some occasions affliction rouses the fancy and opens our eyes; but if we examine it thoroughly we shall find that

that it much oftner dulls the mind than quickens it.

How many women hath adversity reduced to the state of the poet's *Niobè*, who in her misery lost all sensation? How many like her have become stupid and motionless, who without exerting the least spirit or courage have given themselves to sorrow, and have been so weak as not to be able to make the least effort towards help or comfort from themselves? No wonder then that sorrow should work such destruction as it does, since it is generally accompanied with despair; it makes no resistance; it sets its arms across and yields itself a prey to the enemy. From hence we may learn that excess of sorrow is more dangerous than excess of joy, because moderation depends more upon ourselves than patience; it is harder, saith *Aristotle*, *to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure*. Temperance depends upon our own liberty of action, but suffering upon the strength and severity of our enemy. As joy persuades, sorrow constrains us; the one solicits, the other forceth; it is easier to defend ourselves against the song of a *Siren*, than from the sudden violence of a storm.

From hence it is that some philosophers have thought patience the least voluntary of all other virtues; because for its support in
the

the world it is necessary there should be some always ready to do mischief, that others may suffer; there must be tyrants, or there would be no martyrs. But however this be, if there was no liberty, there could be no merit; and if it costs some pains to be capable of this virtue, the more this inhañceth its value; because all the world knows it is more easy to resolve upon taking pleasure than to endure pain. Must we not then confess, that sorrow hath more power to hurt us than joy, and that it requires more pains to preserve æquanimity in affliction than in prosperity? Are we not in less danger from evil, when the remedy lies in our own power than when it depends upon another? and are we not more excusable, when our enemy destroys us than when we destroy ourselves.

And as a farther manifestation, that sorrow depends less upon ourselves than joy, 'tis observable that we have less tenderness to the one than to the other. Our infant cries shew, that we are rather born to weep than to laugh; we are born in tears, we live in restlessness, we die in pain: Wherefore saith *Themistius* well to our present purpose, that *we must not wonder at our weeping so naturally, because Prometheus, holding the clay in his hands, in order to make man, temper'd it with no other water than that of tears.*

Every

Every day's experience shews us the truth that is couched under this fable, which, if applicable to both sexes, is yet more particularly so to women; for as their constitution hath less heat in it, it is the more subject to this passion; it being more humid, melancholy harbours therein as in its proper element; and however little cause they may have to weep, they can shed tears in abundance. As little worms breed oftner in a soft substance than in one more solid, sorrow more easily takes possession of an effeminate constitution than of one more strong and masculine. This tenderness and natural delicacy is always the most sensible of pain; so that to guard themselves against the effects of sorrow, they have not fortune to combat with but nature herself; it is an enemy, which is the more to be feared, as it is domestic and dwells within them.

All this however is not enough to shew the bad effects of indulging sorrow. Women should consider that this passion is apt not only to alter the temper, disfigure the countenance and disturb the reason, but even to corrupt the moral sense of good and evil; and therefore casuists have forbid it, as well as the philosophers. And let not any one say, that *adversity shews us heaven, whereas prosperity hides it from us*; for verily, if
among

among the rich some are impious, among the poor there are blasphemers ; if some under good fortune are ungrateful, others under bad are impatient ; if some are insolent in prosperity, others despair in misery.

Nor let any one object that God is better known in adversity than in a prosperous state ; if this seems to happen sometimes, we must impute it rather to our weakness and mistake : For what pretence can there be, that God is more visible in the mere privation of things than in what is true and substantial ? and how is it possible, that he should have deeper imprinted the image of his divinity on the evil which he never made, than on the good which is the workmanship and creature of his own hands ? Besides, why should we not bless the hand that heaps favours upon us, as well as that which strikes us ; and suppose that God, by ineffectually endeavouring to make us love him, should be constrain'd to make us fear him, is not this owing to our ignorance and ingratitude ? Must he never use severity, when we will not suffer ourselves to be charmed with his goodness ?

Let us confess the truth ; we may offend God as soon in adversity as in prosperity ; the conscience is not in less peril under one state than under another ; and if some have purified themselves

themselves by adversity, as gold in the furnace *, there are more that have been burnt up like chaff. Lastly, as saith a great king †, *They that go down into the pit*, praise no more the name of God ; they murmur there, but adore in paradise ; it is not the mouth of the dead but of the living that bleffeth his greatness and power. Such then are the evils that arise from an excess of sorrow ; thus does it destroy the fervor of piety, the vigour of action, the health of the body, the light of reason, and the tranquillity of the mind.

Let us now consider what danger may accrue even from good fortune ; and to begin with what is most important, prosperity makes us ambitious, whereas misery makes us humble ; the one transports us, as it were, out of ourselves, the other makes us retire within ; that conceals our weakness from us, this discovers it to us. *Alexander* knew better from seeing his own blood that he was mortal ‡, than *Philip* from the charge he gave his page to inform him daily of his being man ; the son learned the misery of human nature better from a wound, than the father did from a compliment. It is very difficult for persons

* Isa. xlviii. 10.

† Hezekiah. Isa. xxxviii. 19.

‡ Quint. Curt. lib. viii. cap. 20. *Plutarch* in the life of *Alexander*.

to know themselves in great prosperity ; vanity and flattery always prevent us from seeing truly what we are. I therefore have said elsewhere that good fortune meets not with any more true friends than bad, because if the whole world flies from the one without giving it any assistance, no one comes near the other but for its ruin. Prosperity is not only blind but insolent ; as it hinders us from seeing our own faults, it will not pass an equitable judgment on the merit of others ; whatever duty is paid it, it always thinks that it still deserves more ; it is a folly to pretend to oblige it by any services, when it never thinks we can do enough. Many would be put to the blush, if they did but reflect as they ought, that very often some persons enjoy what others merit more, and that fortune is sometimes liberal where nature is unkind.

How great a blindness ! how many are there as ugly as stupid, who suffer themselves to be persuaded they are beautiful and learned, without ever being able to undeceive themselves either by the glass or self-knowledge ; such then is the evil that prosperity creates in the mind : But this is not all ; it not only darkens the reason, but corrupts the sense of good and evil, and effeminates the courage. The soldiers of *Antigonus* and that of *Lucullus* were bold and hardy, only till they were wounded ;
being

being healed they no more exposed themselves so freely to danger. The voluptuous are without courage, as well as firmness of mind; *Venus* is as inconstant as the element from whence she rose; she staid not long in the place of danger; as soon as *Diomedes* had wounded her, she fled from the siege of *Troy* *.

If some therefore destroy themselves when fortune is their adversary, there are more who ruin themselves by riot and debauch, when in the full enjoyment of her favour. Fortune, they say, hath two hands to combat withal; but we must own that if a thousand fall on her left hand by adversity, ten thousand fall on her right hand by prosperity: And daily experience shews us, that prosperity conquers sooner than adversity; this had a long time besieged *Troy* without taking it, the other was but one night in making it an easy prey; this city withstood the evils of a ten years siege, and afterwards fell in one night's debauch.

Pleasure corrupts every thing; there is nothing so strong but what becomes weak and effeminate in the bosom of this fond lady; she pulls down the strength of the mighty, and blinds the wisdom of the sage; even they

* Hom. *Iliad*. v. 883.

who

who have a long time resisted pain, suffer themselves to be vanquish'd in a moment of pleasure. She caresth only to deceive us, and lifts us up but to give us the greater fall; and to say, that she does us no harm by heaping her bounties upon us, is to say that a flatterer is not an enemy, nor he that should kill us with sweet poison a murderer. However this be, there are few that can defend themselves against her; and for my own part I have an higher esteem for those who use moderation in pleasure, than for those that have patience under torture; I think it more easy to conquer pain than pleasure.

They who have read in *St. Jerom* of the steady virtue of a certain young man, who was bound upon a bank of flowers and exposed to the impudent attacks of a resolute beauty, must own that he suffer'd more upon a bed of roses than if he had been laid upon a bed of thorns; and that the hands of an executioner could not have been more severe, than the filthy and profane assaults of this courtesan: 'Twas a new kind of martyrdom; others suffer it in torments, but he in pleasure itself, which he bore with more impatience than others do their pain.

What an excellent example is this! this christian hero was half a conqueror and half
conquer'd;

conquer'd ; his reason was still victorious, however his senses were subdu'd ; to apprehend this rightly, we need only reflect upon the difficulty of defending ourselves against an enemy that pleaseth us. To oppose adversity or pain, the senses join with the rational soul ; but when we engage with pleasure, the senses take a contrary part to reason ; the whole man resists pain, and but part of him resists pleasure. Strange unhappiness ! in pain the senses are persecuted, however content reason may be ; in pleasure the senses are delighted, and reason is afflicted. In opposing pain, all the satisfaction of pious souls is above ; in opposing pleasure, it is all below.

So difficult is it for all persons to maintain æquanimity amidst the pleasures of life, but especially for the fair sex ; because moderation in prosperity is not so easy a task to them as patience in adversity. The delicacy of their temper seems to set more value upon pleasure ; and joy seems to put them in greater danger than sorrow. In fact, there have been those who have died by the excess of this passion. *Polycrita*, returning to a city of the *Naxians*, was so surpris'd with joy at the enemy's having rais'd the siege, that she dropt down dead * in the midst of the public accla-

* Her monument was called, the sepulcher of envy. See her story in *Plutarch*, on the virtues of women.

mations: And *Zenxis* died with laughing at the picture of an old woman; so that this hath happened sometimes to men, but oftner to women; because they are better able to resist affliction than prosperity; they are more subject to insolence than despair; their minds are more uneven in joy than in sorrow.

Excessive joy therefore may well break the firmness of temper, when it can take away life itself; it may well cause a change of mind, when it causeth death: And here I cannot but find fault with the levity of many, who for their inconstancy and unevenness of temper may be compared to the *Hyenas* that are of an uncertain sex. They are like the lake of the *Troglodites*, whose water changes every moment, and is sometimes sweet and sometimes bitter; there is nothing certain either in their actions or their thoughts. They have always their foot upon the ball of inconstancy, like fortune; ever ready to turn with her, and to throw down what before they lifted up. Of all the virtues there is none to which they seem to have less inclination than to perseverance; they change every moment their affection or their opinion; there is no certainty in what they determine, or in what they love.

They cannot deny this, and if they would give themselves leisure to reflect upon their
incon-

inconstancy, they would confess, that the poets, when they invented the *Chimera*, certainly design'd to draw their picture; forasmuch as there is as great a variety in their opinions as in the body of this monster: It is indeed amazing that the same mind should in so little time be capable of thoughts so different, and even contrary. What grotesque figures would they make, was a painter to undertake to draw them in different attitudes according to their different resolutions?

To day they are chaste, to morrow lewd; sometimes very covetous, and soon after as liberal. They must certainly want memory as well as constancy; for if they at all reflected upon their actions, they would be ashamed of their judgment. I cannot but wish them what *Epictetus* did his wise-man; *That they knew the art of regulating their opinions, and making them ever subject to reason*; they would by this means conquer their enemies, and lay the winds that generally raise such storms in life.

And when is it, that they are most subject to this ridiculous irregularity, but when they are most elate with a prosperous fortune; because at such a time there is scarce any one who does not adore their opinions, be they ever so extravagant; even to the praising their imperfections, and canonizing their

vices? and because, obtaining all they have a mind to, they so tire themselves with pleasure, that their own disgust is the cause of their inconstancy? being weary of true amusements, they busy themselves in imaginary ones; and from hence it is that prosperity and levity commonly dwell together.

But let not any one be deceiv'd herein, and think that by æquanimity I mean stubbornness of opinion; a change of mind is not always blameable; there are times when it may be prudent. It is as great a fault to be attached to one opinion, as to change it when it is good; obstinacy and inconstancy are alike contrary to election, because the one is immoveable when it ought to change, and the other varying when it ought to be fix'd; to be equal and constant we must persevere only in truth and justice. Besides, I know the minds of the most wise may be moved by certain accidents; *Aulus Gellius* tells us, "*That the Stoics themselves did not disown, but their wise-man is liable to change; because, say they, it is not in our power to prevent a sudden emotion, tho' our consent or agreement therewith is;*" and to speak in the terms of their sect, "*Thoughts depend not upon ourselves, but only our indulgence and approbation of them.*" I blame therefore the inconstancy that depends upon ourselves, and not that which is owing to the weakness of our senses,

ses, and which it is not in our power to help.

But there are other causes of this unevenness of temper. The most knowing may sometimes have an unequal and irresolute mind ; because the different lights which things appear in may stagger their choice ; and by viewing the same object under different appearances, they may find it difficult to determine, and even see a probability on every side. But we must own, that this uncertainty is more common among the ignorant ; because not knowing the true nature of good and evil, there is more hazard than confidence in their choice ; and further, the weaker the mind is, it is always the more inconstant.

Again, there are men both of spirit and learning, who nevertheless have a certain natural easiness of temper, which renders them susceptible of all sorts of opinions ; their mind indeed hath understanding, but no strength ; they know how to propose, but want help to finish. There are but too many such, who see the truth but follow it not ; they embark for some port, but the least storm throws them upon another coast ; they suffer themselves to be carried away by persuasion, as the ships are by the winds and waves ; as they are credulous, they are ever inconstant.

And in truth, do we not see many who have a certain diffidence of their own opinions, even when they are just, and tho' they are not blind, they cannot walk without a guide? *Paschal* saith, "*That women are easily imposed upon when they are in great prosperity; and that therefore they seem of so unequal a temper.*" He quotes the example of *Procris* in *Ovid*, to shew, that they readily believe what they either fear or desire; seeing that she was so credulous with regard to calumny, and the tenders of service that *Cephalus* made her in disguise, she became as soon jealous as amorous. And indeed it is no uncommon thing for such as are in prosperity to suffer themselves easily to be overcome by flattery and revenge; as there is not the least injury done them, but what they will require satisfaction for; there is no praise so extravagant, which they will not accept. This is their great misfortune, to believe both flatterers and slanderers.

Lastly, the most common and most dangerous source of this inconstancy is, that there are none so liable thereto, as those who have either no design or a bad one; there are some who propose no end, but to live in I know not what state of indifference; like those archers, who shoot their arrows into the air without taking any aim, or to those piratical
sailors,

sailors, who rove about the seas without putting into any port. It is impossible, but that such should be of an uneven temper; yet they are more so, who entertain bad designs, because remorse makes their mind every moment change its opinion, as their countenance does its colour.

So that to arrive at true æquanimity, nothing is more requisite than innocence. A learned and pious writer gives us a most admirable rule herein: "To preserve, says he, an equal temper in all our designs and sentiments, so that conscience may never reproach us in all our pretensions; let justice seek, prudence find, strength execute, and temperance possess; let there be justice in the affection, prudence in the understanding, courage in the performance, and temperance in the enjoyment." The practice of this advice may fix the thoughts of the most inconstant, and happily determine the most unsettled; for without flattery we must think, that true æquanimity can only dwell with purity of conscience.

To conclude with what is of the greatest importance, whatever happens to us, however strange and fatal it be, there is no necessity we should indulge excessive sorrow. Certainly many would bear with greater constancy

their misfortunes, if they did but consider that it is God who trieth us, and that patience is so excellent a virtue, that, for the exercise of it, he who does nothing but good to man seems to do evil. There are many more, who would guard themselves against sorrow, if they would consider, that this passion is as vain and useless as it is dangerous. If they would consider, I say, that in the greatest extremities there is a remedy, or there is not; if there is, can we not make use of all possible means without afflicting ourselves so greatly? if there is not, we must resolve upon suffering, as upon dying; since as the one is inevitable from the laws of nature, the other is so from the laws of necessity. After all, how superfluous is sorrow! it cannot recover what is lost, nor raise the dead; it prevents not evils from happening, nor can make the good that is passed return again; and nevertheless, as if this fatal passion had not evil in itself, we help it to persecute us; there are those who make not the least effort against it, who have recourse to solitude, lest they should be diverted from their grief, and fly from comforters as from murderers. What blindness is this to create ourselves so much evil, without the least shadow

dow of good! - If we well examine this matter, we shall find that very often we are not sorrowful because we are wretched; but we are wretched, because we are sorrowful.

The End of the First Volume.



N 5

THE

THE JOURNAL OF
JAMES M. SMITH
TO THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN

OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN
OF THE
MOUNTAIN MEN



THE
INDEX
TO THE
FIRST VOLUME.

A.

- A** *Chilles*, page 170, 288.
 Adam and Eve, 205.
 Adonis, 20.
Adrian, the inscription on his medals, *pietas augusta*, 71.
Aegypt, 11.
Aegyptians, 10.
Aequanimity in good or bad fortune, 48, 248. how
 formed, 249, more easily preserv'd in affliction than
 in prosperity, 258.
Affectation, 148, &c.
Affection, by sympathy, 178.
Ahab, 202.
Ajax, 237.
Alcibiades, 34, 64.
Alexander the great, 77, 85, 157, 185, 215, 261.
Amadis, of Gaul, a romance, 20.
Amity, 169, no pleasure in life without it, *ibid.* the *primum mobile* of the passions, 170. of election compared
 to the sun, and that of inclination to the moon, 180.
 See Love.
Anaxaretè, 144.
Animal spirits subject to weariness as well as the senses,
 149.

Antigonus,

The INDEX.

- Antigonus*, his soldier, 262.
Antipater, 198.
M. Antony and Cleopatra, 87, 226.
Antisthenes, 199.
Apelles, 157.
Aphrodisia wife of *Dioclesian*, 145.
Apollo, 60, 122, 179.
Araſpas, 147.
Areopagites, 135.
Ariadne, 110.
Aristagoras, 127.
Aristippus, 200.
Aristotimus, 93.
Aristotle, 59, 102, 193, 257.
Art, more prodigal than nature, 192. both nature and fortune ſtand in need of it, 221. and nature compar'd, 233.
Artemidorus, 198.
Aspasia, 121.
Athenais, 115.
Athenians, 228.
Athens, 11.
Auguſtin, St. 103.
Aurora, 117.

B.

- B** *Aſſianus*, 194, 195.
Beauty, 129. a ſign of goodneſs, *ibid.* worthy of empire, 130. ſoon paſſeth away, 133. *Plato's* opinion of it, 129. *Cato's*, 134. *Theophrastus's*, 130. of the mind, moſt engaging, 100. its power, 135.
Bees, 15, 56, 74.
Birth and education, 220. its advantages and privileges, 222.
Books, caution in the reading them, 8. one may be ſufficient, *ibid.* few neceſſary, 9.
Bridget, St. 122.
Brutus, 45.

Caſar,

The INDEX.

C.

- C**æsar, Julius, 45.
Cameleons, the complaisant compared to them, 189.
Gamma, the wife of *Synaltus*, 100.
Campaspe, Alexander's mistress, 157.
Carthaginians, 228.
Cato, 97, 237. on beauty, 134.
Ceneus, 250.
Cephalus and *Procris*, 167, 270.
Chaldeans, 11.
 Chastity, and Courtesy, 78. a divine quality, esteem'd by its enemies, 80. peculiar to the fair sex, 85. preserv'd by decent employment, 87.
Chimæra, 267.
Cbilon, the philosopher, 145.
 Children, of what knowledge they are capable, 240; how and in what to be instructed, 242.
Chinese, 137.
Cicero, 227.
Cio, Women of, their chastity, 152.
Circe, 165.
Citeria, 33.
Clauda, vestal virgin, 65.
Cleopatra, 87.
 The compassionate, and the cruel, 141.
 Compassion, natural to women, *ibid.*
 Complaisance, 187. a necessary quality to make conversation agreeable, *ibid.* often joined with flattery, 188. the art of deceiving agreeably, *ibid.* one of its principal marks, 191. errs not only in excess, but in defect, 193. gives a general dispensation, 194. the nurse of sin, 195. generally well receiv'd, especially at court, *ibid.* dangerous, vain, and deceitful, 196. infamous, 200. not easily to be resisted, 197. the sign of a weak or wicked mind, 201. inconstant, 202. self-knowledge the best remedy against it, 205. its good qualities, 213. &c. the complaisant take unnecessary pains, 189. compared to the Hercules of the stage, 190. to the sepulchres of princes, *ibid.* to cushions, to peacocks, 192. to reeds,

The INDEX.

- reeds, 193. to shadows, 196. to echo, *ibid.* to the serpent that tempted *Eve*, 204. how punish'd by *Helio-gabalus*, 191. the end of them, 206. can impose only upon weak minds, 199. how to be receiv'd, 216.
 Concupiscence, the mother of sin, 195.
 Constancy and fidelity, 98. only attendant upon good purposes, *ibid.*
 Contemplation, 55.
 Contradiction, the true spirit of it, 211.
 Conversation, 24. not sufficient without reading, 4. compared with reading, *ibid.* 117. many perfections necessary to make it agreeable, 25, 26. the principal scope of it, *ibid.* discretion, silence, and modesty particularly requisite, 27. the choice of fit persons, 32. the vicious and ignorant chiefly to be avoided, 34. knowledge and a sweetness of temper, the two most necessary ingredients, 40.
Cornelia, the mother of the *Gracchi*, 121.
 Courage, 89. not peculiar to men only, *ibid.* must have prudence as well as strength, 91. and fear, when founded on reason, not contrary to each other, *ibid.*
 Courtesy, 78.
Craterus, 145.
 The cruel and the compassionate, 141.
 Cruelty proceeds from a weakness of soul, 144. an enemy to beauty, 146.
Chrysippus, 238.
Cupid, 178. why feigned a child, 64.
 Curiosity and slander, 136.
Cydippus, 165.
Cynethus, 165.

-D-

- D** *Anaë*, 244.
Danaids, 136.
Daphnè, 80, 179.
David, 223.
Demades, 237.
Demosthenes, 237.
Deotima, 181.

Devotion,

The I N D E X.

Devotion, 70. not inconsistent with good-humour, 73.
74. consists not of mere outward forms, 75.

Diana, 88.

Dido and *Aeneas*, 171, 178, 194.

Diffidence generally more wise than credulity, 113.

Diomedes, 263.

Dispositions, the cruel and the compassionate, 141. the gay and the melancholy, 40.

Dissolute women, 152. impudent, calumnious, cruel, 156.

Dolabella, 45.

Dress and ornament, 123. ought to be conformable to the present age, 124. not to take up too much time, 125. unjustly call'd the devil's instruments, 126. extravagancy therein more shameful in men than in women, 127. women too gorgeous in apparel, to be suspected of bad designs, 128.

E.

Education, 220. requisite for all persons, especially the fair sex, 230. its good effects, 232, 235, 238. at what time to begin it, 239, 240.

Elizabeth, St. of Hungary, 47.

Epictetus, 250, 267.

Erasmus, 145.

Eve, 21, 35, 71, 172.

Euphrantus, 251.

Euripides, 95.

Europa, 81.

Eurydice, the poet's, 219.

Eurydice, *Plutarch's*, 247.

Example, its influence on children, 245.

F.

Felicity, not attainable without virtue and good manners, 53.

Fidelity, 98, always pleasant and easy, 104.

Flattery,

The INDEX.

Flattery, and scandal, 139, 206. often join'd with complaisance, 188. how to guard against it, 219.

A Flatterer more liberal of his offers than a friend, 191. in great vogue in this present age. 199.

Francis, duke of Britany, 115.

Furia, 9.

G.

G*alen*, 135:
The Gay, better companions than the melancholy, 41, 51. oftentimes obnoxious, 49. giddy and inconstant, 51. imprudent, 54.

Glaucus, 165.

God, not better known in adversity, than in prosperity, 260.

Good-humour, consistent with a good conscience, 66. and with devotion, 73.

Goddesses, the three, 168.

Goths and Vandals, 91.

Gracefulness. 147. natural to the fair sex, *ibid.* as requisite for discourse as for actions, 150. often prevented by fear as well as by vanity and affectation, 151.

H.

HEathen authors not to be despis'd, 10. caution in reading them, 11. borrow'd their excellencies from the prophets, *ibid.* compared with modern romances, 15.

Hebrews, 10.

Hecuba, 80.

Helen, 80, 156.

Heliogabalus, 130, 160.

Hephæstion, 185.

Heraclides, 237.

Heraclitus, 150.

Herod, 166.

Hesiod, 238.

Hierom, St. 9, 125, 240, 243, 245, 264.

Hipperides, 135.

Hippocrates, 161.

History,

The INDEX.

History, the reading of it commended in preference to romances, 15.

Hortensius, 127.

Hypocrites, 200.

I.

Jason, 110.

Icarus, 43.

Jealousy, 158. does not always proceed from distrust, 159. always dangerous, 162. none but persons of a mean spirit subject to it, 163. capable of perpetrating all manner of crimes, 165. its cure, 164, 168.

Jesabel, 203.

Jews, 76.

Inclination, 182. See Love.

Interpretation, 67.

Io, 81.

Joseph and the virgin *Mary*, 168.

Josephus, 240.

Joy, in excess, as dangerous to women as sorrow; and why, 265. and sorrow, compared, 255.

Jpbigenia, 95.

Iphis, 144.

Isabella, daughter of king *James I*, 115.

Isabella, queen of *Spain*, 254.

Israelites, 10, 240.

Judgment, human, liable to uncertainty, 60.

Julia, daughter to *Augustus*, 128, 230.

Julia, mother to *Bossianus*, 194.

Ixion, 191.

Jvy, comparifons therewith, 18, 163.

L.

Lacedæmonians, 19, 228.

Lælius, 240.

Laocoon, 75.

Learned women, 115.

Lesbia, in *Martial*, 63.

Liberty, without it there can be no merit, 258.

Limbo

The INDEX.

Limbo of vanity, 53.

Livia, 230.

Love, in its nature immortal, 103. from inclination, or by election, 169. the former as agreeable as it is strong, and lasting, 173. more natural, and more generous, *ibid.* the latter more certain, and less dangerous, 177. hath no need of inclination but in its birth, 181. like death makes all things equal, 183. these two sorts of love must be joined together to make one perfect and complete, 185.

Lucian, 216.

Lucretia, censur'd, 68, 97.

Lucullus, his soldier, 262.

M.

M *Acrina*, sister to St. Gregory, 122;

Mariamne, 166.

Martial, 229.

Mary, St. the Egyptian, 35.

Mary Magdelene, 107.

Mary, virgin, 31, 84, 168.

Maries, three, 98.

Mars and *Venus*, 167.

Materia prima, 102.

Medea, 110.

Meditation, 56.

Medusa's head, 146.

Megistho, 92.

Melancholy, the mother of wisdom and of extravagance, 41. the element of the wise, 42. its due praises, 48. the melancholy more discreet and faithful than the gay, 51. of a more equal temper. 54.

Messalina, 160.

Midas, 60, 72.

Milan, duke of, assassinated, 54.

Minerva, 88, 112, 123. by *Phidias*, 216.

Mithridates, 22, 106.

Mnemosyne, 241.

Monima, wife of *Mithridates*, 106.

Moses,

The INDEX,

Moses, 240.

Muses, 123.

Myrrha, 153, 194 195.

N.

N *Aarcissus*, 56, 183.

Nature, indebted to art, 222. its effects compared with those of art, 223. its power, 228, 230.

Natural passions, 228.

Nero, 99, 229.

Niobe, 257.

Numa, 28.

O.

O *Octavia*, wife to *Marc Antony*, 87.

Orpheus and *Eurydice*, 142.

P.

P *Acatula*, 240, 243, 245.

Pain and pleasure, 162, 248, 257.

Painting, compared with romances, 13.

Pamphylia, 121.

Pan, 60, 81.

Panthea, 147, 216.

Paris, 171, 222.

Parthenope, 154.

Paschal, 270.

Passion, a favourite one, 229.

Patience, the least voluntary of all virtues, 257.

Patroclus, 188.

Paula, 125.

Penelope, 160.

Perfidiousness, the most inexcusable of all crimes, 103;

104.

Pericles, 121.

Phidias, 84, 231. his *Minerva*, 216.

Philip, father of *Alexander*, 261.

Phryne, 86, 135.

Piety,

The INDEX.

- Piety, the effects of it, 74.
Pindar, 250.
Plato, 10, 129, 182, 184, 209, 220.
 Pleasure, corrupts every thing, 263,
Pliny, 229.
Plutarch, 231.
 Poetry, 22.
Polycrita, 265.
Polypheme, 90.
Pompeia, wife of *Julius Cæsar*, 70.
Pompeia, wife of *Seneca*, 106,
Pompey, his young knights, 128.
Possidonium, 254.
 Praise, how to be given and receiv'd, 216, 217.
Praxiteles, his *Venus*, 216.
Procris, 105, 139, 167.
Prometheus, 108, 258,
 Prudence and discretion, 107. ought to be the rule of
 every action, 33, 108. and fear inseparable, 112.
 teaches mediocrity, 113. join'd with simplicity, 114.
 Prosperity, destroys not like adversity, 256, its bad ef-
 fects, 261.
Psyche, her lamp, 180.
Pyramids of Ægypt, 199,
Pythagoras, his disciples, 42. a saying of his, 126.

Q.

Quintilian, 242.

R.

- R**eadng, and judgment compared, 2. necessary for
 women of the brightest parts, 3. vain fear and pre-
 sumptuous boldness to be avoided therein, 9. what ef-
 fects it hath upon the mind, 17. its usefulness, 23, 117.
 Reason and custom like the sun and moon, 124.
Rebeccah, 185.
Red-Sea, 29,
 Rendown, an effect without a cause, 59. compared to the
 wind, *ibid*.
 Reputation, 58. not to be neglected because distributed
 unjustly, 62. a public good, *ibid*. more owing to for-
 tune than prudence, 65. Restraint

The INDEX.

Restraint safer than liberty, 244.

Roman lamp, 114.

Romans, 58, 170.

Romances, modern, compared with ancient authors, 12.
an apology for them, *ibid.* answer'd, 14. the danger
in reading them, 18, 19.

S.

S *Cipio*, 85, 131, 215.

Scylla, 165.

Seneca, 229.

Sichæus, 195.

Sigismund, his widow, 155.

Sirens, 154, 197.

Slander, 136.

Socrates, 10, 26, 64, 111, 120, 134, 162, 228, 237, 249.

Solon, 228.

Sorrow, natural, 252, heightend by restraint, 252. when
excessive, hath more dire effects than joy, 255.

Stoics, 250, 286.

Strato, 21.

Suicide, condemn'd, 97, 256.

Sulpitia, 134.

Superstition, 77.

The superstitious more scrupulous in matters of form
than in committing Sin, 76.

Susanna, 66.

Synaltus, 100.

Synorix, 100.

Syphax, 215.

Syrinx, 81.

T.

T *Acita*, a tenth muse, 28.

Tatlers, seldom fit to be trusted, 29. compared to
butterflies, 31.

Tertullian, 242.

Themisius, 258.

Theodosius, emperor, 79, 198.

Theodosius, the younger, 71, 115.

Theodota, 134.

Theophrastus, on beauty, 130.

Theoxena,

The INDEX.

Theoxena, the wife of *Poris*, 92.

Theria of *Crrinth*, 96.

Thescus, 110.

Tiberius, 138.

Time, how to be improved, 239.

Timidity lays not a greater restraint on women than virtue, 85.

Triumvirate, 168.

Troglodites, 266.

Trojan horse, 75.

Troy, 263.

Tutola, or *Philotis*, 109.

V.

V*enus*, 88, 263. of *Phidias*, 84. of *Praxiteles*, 216.
Virtue and devotion, 70.

Ulysses, 90, 197.

Vulcan, 167.

W.

W The wind, 59.

Women. like princes, have need of dumb preceptors, 5. ought not to cover too general an acquaintance, 32. ought to esteem virtue more than reputation, 71. more firm in their resolutions than men, 97. less perfidious than men, 105. not to be excluded from public government, 108. learned, 115. how to be accomplish'd, 118. as capable of the sciences as men, 120. in great esteem among the ancient *Gauls*, 121. too gorgeous in apparel to be suspected of bad designs, 127. but once guilty of a crime not to be called vicious, 141. naturally inclined to pity and compassion, *ibid.* fond of praise, 218. owe always their consciences to God, but sometimes their outward mien and behaviour to custom and the world, 218. too easily betrayed, 219. more subject to indulge sorrow, 259.

X.

Xenocrates, 86, 209.

Z.

Zeuxis, 18, 26, 177, 266.

TEXTS

The INDEX.

TEXTS of SCRIPTURE referred to in this volume.

G en. xxv. 24. page 185	Jer. xxviii. 10. page 160
Exod. xi. 2. 10	Ezek. viii. 14. 20
— xxv. 22. 186	Matth. vii. 1, 12. 166
Levit. xxi. 17, 18. 129	— ix. 19. 65
Numb. v. 12. 158	— x. 16. 114
Deut. xxi. 11, 12. 11	— xvii. 19. 246
1 Sam. xvii. 38. 223	— xxv. 2, 3. 50
1 Kings iii. 20. 177	Luke xix. 41. 252
— xix. 2. 203	John xi. 35. 252
— xxii. 8. 202	— xiii. 23. 87
Pfal. liii. 5. 10	— xix. 25. 98
— cxlvii. 16. 213	2 Cor. xiii. 7. 211
Prov. xxv. 12. 203	1 Theff. v. 22. 64
Ecclef. vii. 28. 88, 101	Tit. ii. 7, 8. 64
Isaiah xlvi. 10. 261	Rev. iv. 8. 49
Jer. ix. 2, 3. 160	— xii. 1. 181





